Self-Concept Clarity: Measurement, Correlates, and Cultural Boundaries

Jennifer D. Campbell, Paul D. Trapnell, Steven J. Heine, Ilana M. Katz, Loraine F. Lavallee, and Darrin R. Lehman

University of British Columbia

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 141-156.

Running Head: Self-Concept Clarity

Abstract
Self-concept clarity references a structural characteristic of the self-concept; the extent to which an individual's self-beliefs are clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, and temporally stable.  We develop a 12-item self-report scale to measure self-concept clarity and examine (a) its nomological network in terms of self-esteem, the Big-Five dimensions, and self-focused attention (Studies 1-3), (b) its criterion validity (Study 4), and (c) its cultural boundaries (Studies 5-7).  Regression analyses revealed that low self-concept clarity was independently associated with high neuroticism, low self-esteem, low conscientiousness, low agreeableness, a tendency to engage in chronic self-analysis, lower levels of internal state awareness, and an uncontrolled ruminative form of  self-focused attention.  Consistent with theory on the divergence in self-construals between Western and Eastern cultures, Japanese respondents exhibited lower levels of self-concept clarity and attenuated correlations between clarity and self-esteem than their Canadian counterparts. 

Self-Concept Clarity: Measurement, Correlates, and Cultural Boundaries

	Within the last couple of decades, psychologists' view of the self-concept has undergone a dramatic transformation (Markus & Wurf, 1987).  Early researchers treated the self-concept as a unitary, monolithic entity--a stable, generalized view of the self--and typically focused their research efforts on a single aspect of the self-concept, self-esteem.  Contemporary researchers, in contrast, rely on a multifaceted, dynamic construal in which the self-concept is defined as a cognitive schema--an organized knowledge structure that contains traits, values, episodic and semantic memories about the self and controls the processing of self-relevant information (Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Kihlstrom et al., 1988; Markus, 1977).
	The current conceptualization allows a distinction between the contents of the self-concept and its structure.  The contents can be usefully subdivided into knowledge components--Who/What am I?--and evaluative components--How do I feel about myself?  Examples of knowledge components include beliefs about one's specific attributes (e.g., traits, physical characteristics), as well as roles, values, and personal goals.  Evaluative components include the positivity of specific self-beliefs and self-esteem, a global self-evaluation that is the product of viewing "the self" as an attitude object.  Structural characteristics of the self-concept refer to how the knowledge components or specific self-beliefs are organized.  For example, Linville (1982, 1987) coined the term self-complexity to represent the number of different or independent dimensions that underlie the organization.  Donahue and her associates (Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & John, 1993) have focused on another aspect of complexity, the extent to which these dimensions are integrated.  Another structural variable can be found in Showers' (1992) work on compartmentalization, the extent to which positive and negative self-beliefs reside in different dimensions.
	The present paper is concerned with another structural aspect of the self-concept, namely self-concept clarity (Campbell, 1990, Campbell & Lavallee, 1993).  Self-concept clarity is defined as the extent to which an individual's specific self-beliefs are clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, and temporally stable.  A couple of points may serve to bring the clarity construct into sharper focus.
	First, clarity overlaps with a number of other more traditional constructs.  One construct with obvious overlap is that of identity (achievement, status, integration, etc.).  Identity, however, has a much richer and more complex set of elements than clarity (e.g., Adler, 1959; Allport, 1961; Baumeister, 1986; Erikson, 1959; Marcia, 1980), characteristics that render the identity construct rather difficult to assess empirically.  The literature also contains a plethora of overlapping constructs that have a narrower focus than clarity.  For example, Rosenberg's (1965) notion of self-concept stability focuses on the temporal stability of self-beliefs, whereas the constructs of role variability (Block, 1961) and self-consistency (Gergen & Morse, 1976) focus on the internal consistency of self-beliefs.  In addition, the HPI Identity (Hogan, 1986) and the Identity Integration (O'Brien & Epstein, 1988) Scales focus on generalized certainty about the self, combined with behavioral manifestations of certainty such as decisiveness and well-defined long-term goals.  Although clarity encompasses all of these intrapsychic components, behaviors such as goal-directedness and decisiveness are omitted from the definition of the construct and treated as theoretically plausible manifestations.
	Second, clarity is a characteristic of people's beliefs about themselves (i.e., the self-concept).  It is mute with respect to accuracy of those beliefs and therefore does not necessarily imply "self-knowledge" in the sense of insight or awareness of one's behavioral potentials (Wicklund & Eckert, 1992).  A person could hold highly articulated self-beliefs that one might argue, on the basis of behavior, are inaccurate
	Self-concept clarity and the other structural variables mentioned earlier (e.g., self-complexity) are theoretically independent of the contents of the self-concept.  That is, any particular set of self-beliefs could, in principle, be organized with varying degrees of complexity or be held with different levels of confidence and stability.  Campbell (1990, Campbell & Fehr, 1990;  Campbell, Chew, & Scratchley, 1991; see also Baumgardner, 1990), however, demonstrated a connection between clarity and self-esteem, the global positivity of the contents.  Although high self-esteem people have positive, well-articulated beliefs about the self, the prototypic low self-esteem person does not, in contrast, have a well-defined negative view of the self.  The self-concepts of low self-esteem people are better described as evaluatively neutral, and more importantly, are characterized by relatively high levels of uncertainty, instability, and inconsistency (low clarity or self-concept confusion).
	The demonstration of the self-esteem/clarity relation has proved to be theoretically useful in understanding many of the contradictory, puzzling, and paradoxical findings in the self-esteem literature.  Although space precludes a review here, a number of self-esteem phenomena (e.g., low self-esteem plasticity, Brockner, 1984) that are not easily understood by referencing differences in the positivity of self-beliefs are cogently and parsimoniously explained by noting that high- and low-self-esteem people differ in the clarity of  their self-beliefs (e.g., Baumeister, 1993; Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Campbell & Lavallee, 1993; Campbell et al., 1991; Setterlund & Neidenthal, 1993; Tice, 1993).
	The validity of these explanations, however, hinges on the assumption that clarity, like self-esteem, can be conceptualized as a relatively stable trait.  Although plausible, this assumption is currently unsupported.  The empirical research examining the self-esteem/clarity relation has generally pretested subjects on standard self-report scales of self-esteem and subsequently tested them on a number of indirect or unobtrusive measures of clarity (e.g., the temporal stability of self-descriptions) with a converging pattern of evidence emerging across studies and measures (see Campbell & Lavallee, 1993, for summary).
Research Aims
	One goal of the present paper was to ascertain if self-concept clarity is a relatively stable individual difference or trait, and more specifically, if it is one that could be reliably captured in self-reports.  Giiven the previously established emprical connection between clarity and self-esteem, we also aimed to determine if trait measures of clarity and self-esteem could be reliably differentiated from one another in self-reports.
	The adoption of this first goal does not in any way deny the validity or utility of conceptualizing clarity, self-esteem, or any other component of the self-concept as a state (e.g., the dynamic or working self-concept, Markus & Wurf, 1987; identity images, Schlenker, 1985).  Using Conley's (1984) terms, self-concept clarity is a "self-opinion", a type of individual difference that is useful to assess both as a state and a trait because it is susceptible to environmental influences, but also exhibits high levels of temporal stability (Conley argues that self-opinions exhibit lower stability than traits such as intelligence with time lags longer than ten years).  This dual nature of individual differences in self-opinion is, in fact, highlighted in the postulated interplay between clarity, temporary levels of self-esteem, and the working self-concept in theoretical accounts of the self-esteem literature (e.g., Campbell & Lavallee, 1993).  In addition, Lavallee and Campbell (1994) recently documented the importance of state changes in self-concept clarity in understanding people's responses to daily events that are either related or unrelated to their personal goals.
	A second goal was to explore and expand the nomological network of the self-concept clarity construct by examining its relations with a number of other personality dispositions.  The traits we examine are based on the Five-Factor Model of personality (i.e., neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience), which is currently the model of choice for measurement of normal range personality trait dimensions owing to its demonstrated comprehensiveness (Briggs, 1992; Goldberg, 1990, 1993; Wiggins & Trapnell, in press PAUL IS THIS STILL IN PRESS?).  We anticipated that self-concept clarity would be negatively related to neuroticism and agreeableness and positively related to conscienciousness and extraversion (in order to avoid excessive redundancy, we postpone describing the theoretical rationale for these relations until the discussion section), and believed that an empirical demonstration of these relations might yield theoretical benefits comparable to those that have emerged in the self-esteem literature.
	A third, related goal was to examine the relation between self-concept clarity and chronic attention to the self (i.e., self-consciousness).  It has been argued that higher levels of self-attention should result in a more clearly articulated self-schema (e.g., Buss, 1980).  A number of studies have provided support for this proposition (e.g., Nasby, 1985, 1989; Scheier, Buss, & Buss, 1978) and, consistent with this generally positive view of self-attention, there are also studies showing that high levels of self-consciousness may buffer the adverse effects of stressful life events (e.g., Mullen & Suls, 1982; Suls & Fletcher, 1985; cf. Frone & McFarlin, 1989).  A more negative view of self-attention, however, is suggested by the close associations between self-focus, negative affective states, and psychopathology.  In a recent review, Ingram (1990) found elevated levels of self-focus to be such a universal feature of psychopathological states and disorders that he concluded ""the apparent ubiquitousness of this process in disorder makes it difficult to find anything dysfunctional that is not accompanied by increased self-focused attention" (pp. 156).  Other evidence suggests that negative mood is not only associated with, but may in fact cause, increases in self-focused attention (Wood, Saltzberg, Neale, Stone, & Rachmiel, 1990; Wood, Saltzberg, & Goldsamt, 1990; cf. Salovey, 1992).
	These two lines of evidence imply a "self-absorption paradox" with respect to psychological adjustment: despite their higher levels of psychological distress and pathology, self-focused individuals possess a clearer, better articulated self-structure than do less self-focused individuals.  Although this pattern is consistent with the "sadder but wiser" phenomenon noted in the literature (Alloy & Abramson, 1988), it stands in direct contradiction to the positive relation between self-concept clarity and self-esteem (Campbell, 1990), as well as to research showing that people high in self-consciousness are more susceptible to external cues and feedback (Hull et al., 1988)
	In an effort to better understand these contradictory findings, we examined the relations between self-concept clarity and a number of scales measuring dispositional levels of self-focused attention.  The effort involved a new motivational taxonomy of self-attentive traits (Trapnell & Campbell, 1994), in addition to the more traditional taxonomy of public vs. private self-consciousness.  The most widely used taxonomy of dispositional self-consciousness is that of Buss (1980), operationalized by the public and private subscales of the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975).  The public self-consciousness scale assesses chronic attentiveness to or awareness of one's external self (the self as a social object), whereas the private self-consciousness scale assesses chronic attentiveness to or awareness of one's inner thoughts, feelings, and attitudes.
	A number of studies, however, have shown that while the public scale is unidimensional, the 10-item private scale contains two distinct factors, usually referred to as internal state awareness (PRIV-ISA) and self-reflectiveness (PRIV-SR; Burnkrant & Page, 1984; Gould, 1986; Lennox & Welch, 1987; Mittal & Balsubramanian, 1987; Piliavin & Charng, 1988; but see Britt, 1992, and Bernstein, Teng, & Garbin, 1986, for arguments against splitting the private scale into two factors).  The PRIV-ISA factor consists of four items including "I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem" and "I'm alert to changes in my mood."  The PRIV-SR factor consists of six items including "I'm always trying to figure myself out" and "I reflect about myself a lot."  We examined the two private factors separately because although low self-concept clarity could plausibly lead individuals to engage in chronic self-analysis (PRIV-SR; that is, to try to "figure myself out"), self-analysis that is motivated by uncertainty might be associated with a decreased awareness of one's internal states, moods and feelings (PRIV-ISA).
	We also employed a second model of dispositional self-attentiveness recently proposed by Trapnell and Campbell (1994).  This model distinguishes two motivational bases for self-attentiveness, interest or curiosity and threat or anxiety, each of which is linked to a different Big-Five personality factor (openness and neuroticism, respectively).  The Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire (RRQ) was developed to measure individual differences in these two motivationally distinct varieties of self-attentiveness.  The Reflection scale measures affectively positive curiosity or interest in one's inner thoughts, feelings, and attitudes (e.g, "I love exploring my 'inner' self").  The Rumination scale, in contrast, measures affectively negative, uncontrolled thoughts about the self motivated by anxiety or uncertainty ("Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself".  Development and validation of the RRQ is reported elsewhere (Trapnell & Campbell, 1994), but it is useful to note here that (a) the Reflection and Rumination Scales represent relatively independent forms of self-attention, and (b) both scales are substantially correlated with the PRIV-SR subscale, but they are differentially related to the PRIV-ISA subscale: reflection is consistently, moderately related to inner state awareness, whereas rumination is unrelated or slightly negatively related to it.
	A final research goal was to explore the cultural boundaries of the clarity construct.  In Markus and Kitayama's (1991) influential paper, they argued that Eastern and Western cultures have strikingly different construals of self.  In brief, the Western (or independent) construal views the self as an independent, self-contained, autonomous entity.  The self has a unique and stable configuration of internal attributes that governs the individual's behavior across situations.  The Eastern (or interdependent) construal, in contrast, views the self as an interconnected entity that has meaning only when cast within an interpersonal context.  Internal attributes are seen as situation specific, and to the extent that there is a recognition of invariant attributes, they tend not to be viewed as diagnostic of the self, but as aspects to be controlled or regulated in order to achieve harmony with others.
	Self-concept clarity is a construct that is very closely aligned with Western construal of the normative self; that is, the independent, but not the interdependent, self should possess a clearly defined, consistent set of internal attributes that remain stable across situations.  To investigate this possibility, we measure self-concept clarity and self-esteem in Canadian and Japanese samples with the expectation that, relative to Japanese samples, Canadian samples will exhibit higher average levels of clarity, and a more pronounced positive association between clarity and self-esteem.
Overview of the Research
	The first three studies report the development of  the Self-Concept Clarity/Confusion (SCC) Scale, present evidence for the scale's reliability, and examine the associations between the SCC scale and scales measuring dispositional forms of self-esteem, the Big Five personality dimensions, and different forms of self-focused attention.  Standard means of assessing the convergent, divergent, and construct validity (Wiggins, 1973) of a scale consist of demonstrating that the pattern of correlations between the scale and measures of other constructs conforms to (a) the definition or conceptual specification of the construct and (b) theoretical propositions regarding psychological antecedents and consequences of the construct.  Therefore, the results of these studies not only examine the nomological network of the clarity construct, but also serve to establish the SCC scale's validity to the extent that the pattern of correlations adheres to theoretical expectations.
	The first three studies were conducted over a three-year period.  In Study 1, we focused on self-esteem and neuroticism (in addition to the Self-Consciousness Scale).  This focus was predicated by the fact that (a) a relation between clarity and self-esteem was anchored in prior empirical research (e.g., Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990), and (b) both the self-esteem and identity literatures have documented a relatively strong inverse relation between these constructs and a general factor that has been labeled as emotional instability or neuroticism by Big Five personality theorists (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1987) and as negative affectivity by theorists concerned with the structure of emotion (e.g., Watson & Clark, 1984).
	In Studies 2 and 3, we examined all of the Big-Five dimensions by including the NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI: Costa & McCrae, 1989).  We also included the PANAS scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) which assesses dispositional Negative Affectivity (NA) and Positive Affectivity (PA), identified by Watson and Tellegen (1985) as the most superordinate and dominant dimensions of emotional experience.  In addition, scales measuring depression and repression-sensitization, constructs associated with, but not equivalent to global neuroticism, were administered.  Finally, Studies 2 and 3 included the Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire (RRQ) as well as the Self-Consciousness Scale to assess dispositional forms of self-focused attention.
	A second and equally important aspect of construct validity is external or criterion validity, the extent to which test scores relate to nontest manifestations of the construct in a theoretically consistent manner (Wiggins, 1973).  We examined the SCC scale's external validity in Study 4, in which pretest SCC scores were used to predict two unobtrusive measures of clarity, the internal consistency and temporal stability of subjects' self-descriptions.
	Studies 5 - 7 focus on the cultural boundaries of the clarity construct.  All three of the studies contrast average SCC scores and the correlations between SCC and self-esteem in Canadian and Japanese samples.  The studies differ primarily with respect to the characteristics of the Japanese samples.
STUDIES 1 - 3
Method
Respondents
	Three samples of University of British Columbia undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology classes completed a battery of personality instruments.  Study 1 tested 471 subjects whose ages ranged from 17 to 44 (M = 19.11 years, SD = 2.51).  Of those who indicated their sex, 167 were male and 295 were female.  Study 2 included 608 subjects whose ages ranged from 17 to 42 (M = 19.37 years, SD = 2.55); 262 were male and 328 were female.  Study 3 had 465 subjects whose ages ranged from 17 to 48 (M = 19.61 years, SD = 3.15); 138 were male and 312 were female.  All participants received extra course credit for participation.
Measures
	Because the test batteries administered in the three studies differed in their content, we note below which studies contained each measure.  Unless otherwise noted, all scale items were responded to with 5-point Likert scales anchored by Strongly Disagree (1) and Strongly Agree (5).
	Self-Concept Clarity/Confusion (SCC).  The Study 1 battery contained an initial pool of 40 items designed to measure self-concept clarity.  Some of these items assessed  the certainty, temporal stability, and internal consistency of self-beliefs, while other items assessed fairly direct behavioral ramifications of SCC, such as indecisiveness and a lack of clearly-articulated goals.  The initial 40-item pool was generated both by culling (and sometimes revising) items from published scales measuring related constructs (e.g., Rosenberg's [1965] Self-Concept Stability Scale) and by constructing new items.  The test batteries administered in Studies 2 and 3 contained a subset, 20 items, of this original item pool.
	Self-esteem.  We included two measures of self-esteem in Study 1 -- the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, which taps generalized, global feelings of self-worth, and the Texas Social Behavior Inventory (TSBI: Helmreich, Stapp, & Ervin, 1974), which focuses on social self-esteem or perceived social competence.  Studies 2 and 3 included only the Rosenberg Scale.
	Big Five measures.  The NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1989) was administered in Studies 2 and 3 to measure the Big Five dimensions.  The NEO-FFI (FFI) is a 60-item personality questionnaire with 12 items each tapping the dimensions of extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience.  The FFI is a factor-analytically derived shortform of the NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1985).  Reliability and validity evidence for the FFI is impressive, with the FFI scales accounting for approximately 75% as much of the variance in convergent criteria as the full NEO-PI (Costa & McCrae, 1989). 
	The PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) consists of twenty adjectives, 10 measuring the dispositional mood dimension of Negative Affectivity (NA; e.g., nervous, hostile, ashamed) and 10 measuring the dispositional mood dimension of Positive Affectivity (PA; e.g., proud, enthusiastic, inspired).  NA is strongly related to the Big Five neuroticism dimension, whereas PA is moderately related to the Big Five extraversion dimension (Meyer & Shack, 1989; Watson & Clark, in press PAUL IS THIS STILL IN PRESS?).  (The orthogonality of NA and PA, and their robust, differential relations to extraversion and neuroticism have led to the proposal that extraversion and neuroticism be re-labeled "Positive Emotionality" and "Negative Emotionality" (Tellegen, 1985; Tellegen & Waller, in press PAUL, IS THIS STILL IN PRESS?))--PAUL, DL SUGGESTS WE DELETE THIS LAST SENTENCE AND I AGREE; ARE YOU ATTACHED TO IT?.
	Scales measuring selected aspects of neuroticism were also administered in some of the studies.  Specifically, the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (TMAS: Taylor, 1953) was administered in Studies 1 and 3, the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck, 1967) in Studies 2 and 3, and a short version of the Byrne Repression-Sensitization Scale (R-S: Byrne, 1961) in Study 3.  The TMAS is a true-false questionnaire consisting of 50 MMPI items selected on the basis of face validity to measure manifest trait anxiety.  The scale is alternatively considered as one of the best available markers of negative affectivity or neuroticism (Watson & Clark, 1984).  A 20-item shortform version of the TMAS developed by Bendig (1956) was used in Study 3 instead of the original 50-item scale.  The BDI is a 21-item questionnaire measure of depression that has been widely used with college populations (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1982).  The R-S scale is a true-false questionnaire consisting of MMPI items selected on the basis of face validity to operationalize the trait of repression-sensitization, the tendency to cognitively avoid versus approach threatening perceptions, thoughts, and feelings (Bell & Bryne, 1978; Gordon, 1957).  We used a 43-item shortform version constructed by Paulhus and Levitt (1983), who reported alpha reliabilities of .81 (males, n=94) and .85 (females, n=152), and a factor structure based on the combined-sex sample closely resembling that reported for the original R-S scale. 
	Finally, the Study 3 battery included an 18-item shortform version of the Need for Cognition scale (NCOG: Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984)  The original NCOG is a 34-item true-false questionnaire measuring the tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), a construct that overlaps with the Big-Five openness to experience dimension.  The 18-item short-form, constructed from factor and psychometric analyses of the original scale, may be a less problematic measure of the construct than the longer version which has been criticized for its multidimensionality.
	Self-consciousness.  The Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) was administered in all three studies.  Our own factor analyses of the Self-Consciousness Scale consistently replicated the results reported by other investigators (e.g., Burnkrant & Page, 1984): the Public Scale was unidimensional, but the Private Scale divided into the two expected subfactors, Self-Reflection (6 items) and Internal State Awareness (4 items).  We therefore derived Self-Reflection (PRIV-SR) and Internal State Awareness (PRIV-ISA) subscores by summing subjects' responses to the six and four items, respectively.
	In Studies 2 and 3, subjects also completed the Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire (RRQ), which consists of two 12-item scales (Trapnell & Campbell, 1994).  The Reflection (REF) Scale taps a controlled form of affectively positive "private" self-focus tendencies that are motivated by epistemic curiosity.  The Rumination Scale (RUM) taps an uncontrolled form of affectively negative "private" self-focus tendencies that are motivated by perceptions of uncertainty and threat.
	Other measures.  Although our primary focus in Studies 1 - 3 was on self-esteem, the Big Five dimensions, and self-consciousness, we administered several additional measures.  The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), a 25-item true-false questionnaire, was administered in Studies 1 and 3 in order to evaluate the extent to which responses to the SCC scale were associated with socially desirable response tendencies.  In Study 1, subjects also rated themselves on 16 adjectives, each representing a label for one of the 16 sectors of Wiggins' circumplex model of interpersonal traits (Wiggins, 1979).  (These pretest ratings were used in Study 4, which examined the temporal stability of subjects' self-descriptions).
Results
	We focus first on the data relevant to the development and reliability of the SCC scale.  Then we examine the correlations between SCC and the measures of the other constructs.  Finally, we report the results of multiple regression analyses which provide a portrait of the independent personality concomitants of self-concept clarity.
Self-Concept Clarity/Confusion Scale
	In compiling the preliminary pool of 40 items, we initially anticipated a final SCC scale that assessed not only self-concept clarity per se, but several behavioral manifestations of clarity such as decisiveness and goal directedness.  Although we were able to construct a psychometrically adequate 20-item scale spanning all of these content facets1, we subsequently decided that a scale focusing specifically on the epistemological status of the self-schema was preferable on both theoretical and practical grounds.  Our bias toward the inevitable "bandwidth-fidelity" dilemma in the measurement of psychological constructs (Wiggins, 1973) was to err on the side of an overly narrow final instrument.  Our reasoning was that although decisiveness and goal directedness are logical manifestations of self-concept clarity, both represent broad constructs of their own and share many features with a large number of other important trait constructs (e.g., dominance, conscientiousness, vocational identity).  Because inclusion of such items on the SCC scale might unnecessarily complicate interpretations of SCC effects, we opted to keep the item set brief and as conceptually univocal as possible.
	Item selection for the SCC scale was based on the criteria of internal consistency, lack of item redundancy, and adequate construct breadth.  In terms of construct breadth, we included items that specifically tapped the internal consistency (Items 1, 6) and temporal stability (Items 2, 5, 8, 9) of self-beliefs, along with more generic self-certainty items (Items 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12).  The scale was scored in the direction of low clarity (or alternatively self-concept confusion).  Table 1 gives the 12 items selected for the final scale, along with the average factor loadings (principal component analysis) and the average corrected item-total correlations.  Table 2 gives the scale statistics for each of the three separate samples.
	Internal consistency.  Alpha reliability coefficients ranged from .85 to .86, with a combined sample value of .86 (Table 2).  The combined-sample corrected item-total correlations ranged from .35 to .66, with an average item-total correlation of .54 (Table 1).  An examination of the combined-sample inter-item correlation matrix reveals that all of the items are positively intercorrelated, with correlations ranging from .10 to .58, and a mean inter-item correlation of .34 (Table 2).  The alphas, item-total correlations, and inter-item correlations all indicated high levels of internal consistency, and there was very little variability in these statistics across the three samples.
	Test-retest reliability.  The scale was readministered to 155 Study 1 subjects after a 4-month interval and to 61 Study 3 subjects after a 5-month interval.  Despite the relatively long intervals between testings, the test-retest correlations of .79 and .70, respectively (Table 2), revealed that the scale exhibited high levels of temporal stability.
	Evidence for a general factor.  In addition to the reliability data, factor analyses yielded strong evidence of a single, general factor.  Principal-components and maximum-likelihood factor analyses in each sample typically yielded only one factor with an eigenvalue greater that 1.0.  Although some analyses did yield a second factor with eigenvalues of approximately 1.0, the items that comprised this second factor neither replicated across samples nor across solutions (principal components versus maximum-likelihood).  In each sample, every item loaded positively on the first unrotated factor, with a minimum item loading of .34, and the average correlation between these loadings in the three samples was .84.   In the combined sample, all items had loadings greater than .45 (see Table 1), which is substantially above the conventional cutoff of .30 for meaningful loadings (e.g., Gorsuch, 1983).  A scree test also confirmed the unidimensionality of the scale.  In the combined sample, the first factor accounted for 41% of the total variance, with the second factor accounting for only 8%.
	The high internal consistency (alpha) and homogeneity (inter-item r) coefficients, the absence of any negative correlations in the matrix of inter-item correlations, the uniformly high loadings on the first unrotated factor, and the scree tests all suggest that the scale items are associated with a general factor measuring a unitary attribute (Briggs & Cheek, 1986).
	Scale distributions.  Table 2 gives the SCC scale means, standard deviations, and information relevant to sex and age differences for each of the three samples.  The overall scale mean increased across the three samples, indicating that in the 3-year time period encompassing the three studies subjects exhibited somewhat lower levels of self-concept clarity.  Although these differences could reflect a form of scale unreliability (i.e., sensitivity to variations in the number or type of other scale items included in the test battery), there are reasons to doubt this interpretation.  First, in Studies 2 and 3, we constructed five different forms of each test battery in which we systematically varied the location of the SCC items within the test battery.  Analysis of variance indicated that SCC scores were invariant over the five forms of the batteries (both Fs < 1).  Second, scores on some of the other scales indicated that the three samples tended to exhibit generally higher levels of psychological distress across time.  For example, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scores tended to decline over time, and the depression (BDI) and neuroticism (FFI) scores increased over time.  Taken together, these data suggest that the increases in SCC scores across studies may reflect an historical trend in our samples rather than scale unreliability.2
	Table 2 also shows that females tended to score somewhat higher on the SCC Scale than did males.  Although the sex difference was not reliable in Studies 1 or 2, it did reach conventional levels of significance in Study 3.  This relatively small, but consistent, sex difference is congruent with prior research that generally reveals somewhat higher levels of neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1985), anxiety (Jackson, 1976), and negative affectivity (Woods, Rhodes, & Whelan, 1989) among women (Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990).
	Finally, Table 2 reveals small, but negative, correlations between SCC Scores and age in all three studies.  Although the direction of these correlations is consistent with an expected developmental trend of higher levels of self-concept articulation or clarity with increasing age, it is important to note that the present samples did not contain adequate age variability to constitute a reasonable test of this trend.
	Social Desirability.  The SCC Scale exhibited moderate negative correlations with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale which was administered in Studies 1 and 3, rs = -.32 and -.33, respectively.  The modest magnitude of these correlations is consistent with those usually obtained with measures of traits that have evaluative connotations.  For example, in our own samples, the self-esteem, neuroticism, self-consciousness, and agreeableness measures all exhibited correlations with the Marlowe-Crowne Scale that were very comparable to those exhibited by the SCC Scale.
Personality Correlates of Self-Concept Confusion
	Table 3 contains the zero-order correlations between the SCC Scale and the other measures administered in the three studies.  To facilitate interpretation of these correlations, we grouped together in Table 3 scales that are theoretically (and empirically) associated with a common underlying dimension.  For example, we placed the NEO-FFI neuroticism Scale, the Negative Affectivity Scale, the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, the Beck Depression Inventory, and the Repression-Sensitization Scale together under the common label of "neuroticism" (see McCrae & Costa, 1987; Watson & Clark, 1984).  We also grouped together the scales that focus on dispositional self-attention or self-consciousness.
	Self-esteem.  As anticipated, the SCC scale was substantially and negatively correlated with the measures of self-esteem (avg. r = -.61); people lower in self-esteem exhibited lower levels of self-concept clarity.  These correlations replicate the results of earlier studies that used indirect measures of self-concept clarity (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990) and therefore provide evidence for the SCC Scale's construct validity.
	Neuroticism.  We anticipated that low self-concept clarity (confusion) would be substantially correlated with neuroticism or negative affectivity.  This expectation was also confirmed (avg. r = .56).  The SCC Scale exhibited strong positive correlations with the PANAS NA Scale (avg. r = .50), the NEO-FFI Neuroticism Scale (avg. r = .64), the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (avg. r = .61), the Beck Depression Inventory (avg. r = .49), and the Repression-Sensitization Scale (r = .63)
	Other Big Five dimensions.  The SCC Scale exhibited moderate, negative correlations with the two measures of extraversion, although the correlations were somewhat higher with the PANAS PA Scale than with the NEO-FFI Extraversion Scale.  The PA Scale assesses a general tendency to experience affective states characterized by high levels of pleasurable arousal (i.e., enthusiasm, energy), whereas the NEO-FFI Extraversion scale is a blend of positive affectivity and items that assess the tendency to initiate and enjoy social interaction.
	The SCC Scale also exhibited fairly substantial correlations with the NEO-FFI Conscientiousness dimension, indicating that people low in self-concept clarity are low in conscientiousness.  Although we will discuss this association in more detail later, it is useful to note that traits such as decisiveness, goal-directedness and achievement orientation appear as facets of conscientiousness in various Five Factor trait models (e.g., Goldberg, 1990; Costa, McCrae & Dye, 1991; McCrae & Costa, 1987).  These correlations suggest that motivational dynamics, goal structures, and self-control may have important links to the clarity of one's self-concept.
	In contrast to our expectations, the SCC Scale exhibited moderate negative correlations with the NEO-FFI Agreeableness dimension, suggesting that low self-concept clarity may be associated with social interactions that are somehat more hostile, reserved and less trusting.  Finally, the SCC Scale was uncorrelated with the NEO-FFI Openness to Experience Scale (avg. r = .01), but it did exhibit a small, negative correlation with the Need for Cognition Scale (r = -.20), indicating that people with more uncertain self-concepts do not engage in or enjoy thinking as much as their high clarity counterparts.  However, because NCOG was also correlated negatively with neuroticism in this sample, its relation to clarity may reflect shared neuroticism variance (see regression analyses reported below).
	Self-consciousness.  We distinguished between two subtypes of private self-consciousness, self-reflection and internal state awareness, and between two motivationally distinct varieties of private self-consciousness, reflection and rumination.  The Self-Reflection (PRIV-SR) and Internal State Awareness (PRIV-ISA) subscales of the private self-consciousness scale were relatively independent of one another (avg. r = .26), as were the scores on the Reflection and Rumination Scales (avg. r = .22).  However, the RRQ Reflection and Rumination Scales were both highly correlated with the PRIV-SR subscale (avg. rs = .52 and .51, respectively), indicating that the tendency toward chronic self-analysis is equally likely to reflect epistemic interest in the self or anxious preoccupation with the self.
	SCC was moderately correlated with the Private Self-Consciousness Scale (avg. r = .27).  However, an inspection of the correlations with the two subscales of Private Self-Consciousness revealed that this correlation derived from the fact that while the SCC Scale exhibited a strong positive correlation with the Self-Reflection Subscale (avg. r = .43), it was negatively correlated with the Internal State Awareness Subscale (avg. r = -.15).  This pattern suggests that despite a greater tendency toward chronic self-analysis, individuals with more confused self-concepts are somewhat less attuned to their internal states than people with more clearly articulated self-schemas.
	The correlations between the SCC Scale and the Reflection-Rumination Scales further indicated that the higher levels of self-analysis exhibited by people low in clarity are not necessarily motivated by intellectual curiosity about themselves, but rather took the form of intrusive self-relevant thoughts motivated by threat or uncertainty.  The SCC scale was substantially correlated with Rumination (avg. r = .52), but largely uncorrelated with Reflection (avg. r = .12).
	Finally, the SCC Scale was moderately correlated with the Public Self-Consciousness Scale (avg. r = .26), suggesting that people with low self-concept clarity may be more sensitive to or concerned about how their behaviors are viewed and evaluated by others.
Regression Analyses
 	Although an inspection of the zero-order correlations provides some insight into the potential concomitants of self-concept clarity, a number of the personality traits we measured tend to be intercorrelated with one another (e.g., self-esteem is negatively correlated with neuroticism or negative affectivity, Watson & Clark, 1984).  Therefore, it was theoretically important to ascertain the extent to which these traits exhibited associations with self-concept clarity that were independent of their associations with other traits.  For example, does self-concept clarity still appear to be an important concomitant of self-esteem after controlling for the fact that both clarity and self-esteem are negatively associated with neuroticism?
	To address this issue, in Studies 2 and 3, we regressed the Rosenberg self-esteem Scale, the five NEO-FFI scores, and the five measures of self-consciousness (the Private Self-Consciousness Scale was not included because it is completely redundant with the Self-Reflection and Internal State Awareness Subscales) on SCC scores.  Although Study 1 did not include the full complement of measures employed in Studies 2 and 3, we also undertook a somewhat comparable analysis with these data by regressing the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (neuroticism), the Positive Affectivity Scale (Extraversion), and the three available self-consciousness scores (Self-Reflection, Internal State Awareness, and Public Self-Consciousness) on SCC scores.
	The regression analyses accounted for 56%, 56% and 52% of the variance in SCC scores in Studies 1 - 3, respectively.  The pattern of associations (the Beta weights are shown in Table 4) was remarkably consistent across the three samples.  Low clarity (confusion) was independently associated with lower levels of self-esteem, higher levels of neuroticism, higher levels of self-reflection or chronic self-analysis, and lower levels of internal state awareness in all three studies.  It was also independently associated with higher levels of rumination, lower levels of conscientiousness, and lower levels of agreeableness in the two studies that included these measures.  The Beta weights associated with public self-consciousness, openness to experience, and self-focused attention motivated by intellectual curiosity (the RRQ Reflection Scale) were consistently small and nonsignificant.  The only trait that failed to show a consistent pattern across studies was extraversion, which exhibited a nonsignificant negative Beta weight in Study 1, a near-zero Beta weight in Study 2, and a significantly positive Beta weight in Study 3.
	Although we treated SCC scores as the criterion variable in these regressions for ease of presentation, the results do not necessarily imply that the significant predictor traits cause differences in self-concept clarity.  Indeed, regression analyses in which each of the reliable predictors was treated as the criterion variable yielded comparable results.  For example, when self-esteem was treated as the criterion variable, the SCC Scale accounted for significant incremental variance in self-esteem after controlling for the variance accounted for by the remaining traits.  Therefore, the regression results should be viewed as showing that SCC is either an independent cause or an independent consequence of those traits that yielded reliable Beta weights.
Discussion
	The results of Studies 1 - 3 provided some evidence that self-concept clarity is a stable trait that can be captured via self-reports.  The SCC scale exhibited excellent reliability, both in terms of its internal consistency and temporal stability.  The studies also provided initial evidence for the scale's validity.  Although we postpone a substantive discussion of the personality concomitants of clarity until the general discussion, the pattern of correlations with other traits was generally consistent with prior research (e.g., the self-esteem/clarity relation) and with the theoretical description of the clarity construct (e.g., the fact that SCC Scores were positively associated with chronic self-analysis, and negatively associated with internal state awareness).  Another important form of validity, however, not addressed in Studies 1 - 3 is that of criterion validity.  Therefore, we turn to Study 4 which was designed to demonstrate the validity of the SCC Scale using external behavioral criteria, as opposed to scores on other self-report measures.
Study 4
	Previous research (e.g., Campbell, 1990) examining the self-esteem/clarity relation utilized unobtrusive or indirect measures of self-concept clarity, including the temporal stability and internal consistency of subjects' self-descriptions.  In Study 4, we used these two behavioral indicants of self-concept clarity to assess the criterion validity of the SCC Scale.
Method
Respondents
	A subset of subjects (N = 155) who had participated in Study 1 were recruited four months later to participate in a study concerned with how people describe themselves.  Subject selection was conducted without regard to subjects' scores on the SCC scale.  However, given the previous studies demonstrating a relation between self-esteem and clarity (e.g., Campbell, 1990), we did attempt to ensure that approximately half of the subjects fell above and half fell below the median on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale.  This procedure resulted in a sample of 48 males and 107 females whose SCC scores averaged 29.07, a scale mean that was nearly identical to the full Study 1 sample (29.88).
Procedure and Materials
	Participants reported for Study 4 in groups of 2-4; however they all undertook the tasks described below in individual cubicles.  Pariticipants first rated themselves on 16 adjectives, each representing a label of one of Wiggins's 16 sectors of the interpersonal circumplex (Wiggins, 1979).  Because they had made these same ratings four months earlier in Study 1, the second set of ratings allowed us to assess the temporal stability of their self-descriptions.
	To assess the internal consistency of their self-descriptions, participants were subsequently asked to make me/not me decisions for a list of 56 adjectives, within which were embedded 25 pairs of opposites (e.g., careless/careful, timid/bold, lazy/hardworking).  The adjectives were presented by a microcomputer (presentation order was randomized for each subject) and subjects were instructed to press the "y" key if they believed that the adjective described them and to press the "n" key if it did not.  Internal consistency was operationalized as the number of opposite pairs that elicited a consistent response pattern ("me" to one adjective and "not me" to its opposite).
	Finally, participants were re-administered the SCC Scale in order to assess the scale's temporal stability (these results were reported in Table 2).  They were subsequently debriefed regarding the purpose of the study and thanked for their participation.
Results and Discussion
	Three measures of temporal stability were calculated for each subject from the two sets of ratings on the 16 circumplex adjectives: (a) the number of adjectives that exhibited any change in rating (NCHG), (b) the average absolute difference between each of the 16 ratings (ABDIFF); and (c) the within-subject correlation (Fisher's r-to-z transformation) between the two sets of ratings (CORR).  The first two measures, which assess the extent to which subjects changed their ratings between the two testing occasions, were highly correlated with one another (r = .74), and the two change measures were negatively correlated with CORR, the similarity in the rank order of the adjectives in the two set of ratings (avg. r = -.67).  The internal consistency measure, however, was only slightly related to the temporal stability measures, avg. r = -.08 with the two change measures, and r = .09 with the rank-order measure.
	The correlations between the SCC Scale and the internal consistency and temporal stability measures were all reliable and in the expected direction (see Table 5).  Subjects low in clarity exhibited fewer consistent responses on the me/not me rating task (r = -.31), and their ratings on the circumplex adjectives changed more (avg. r = .31) and were less similarly rank-ordered (r = -.38) over the 4-month interval.
	The correlations between the other personality variables measured in Study 1 and the criterion variables are also given in Table 5.  The pattern of these correlations corresponds quite closely with the direction and strength of the associations between these other personality measures and the SCC Scale.  Lower levels of self-esteem and higher levels of neuroticism were quite strongly associated with lower levels of internal consistency and temporal stability.  Extraversion (low), the self-reflection subscale of private self-consciousness (PRIV-SR), and public self-consciousness exhibited similar, but weaker, patterns.  The Internal State Awareness Subscale of private self-consciousness (PRIV-ISA) was relatively independent of the criterion variables.
	In order to assess the unique contribution of the SCC Scale in predicting the criterion variables, we conducted hierarchical regression analyses using a multiple-act criterion.  The criterion consisted of an unweighted combination of the internal consistency score, one of the change scores (NCHG), and the rank-order score (CORR), derived by first standardizing and then summing the three scores.  In the first analysis, we entered the SCC score and then tested for the incremental variance accounted for by the other personality variables.  The SCC score accounted for 22.2% of the variance, F(1,139) = 39.58, p < .001, and the six other variables, either tested as a group, (5.3% incremental variance; F(6,133) = 1.46, p < .15), or individually, did not account for a significant proportion of incremental variance (the individual contribution of public self-consciousness was marginally significant, 1.9% incremental variance; F(1,133) = 3.51, p < .07).  In the second analysis, we first entered the other six variables and then tested for the incremental variance of the SCC Scale.  The SCC Scale accounted for 6.2% of the variance after controlling for the other six variables, F(1,133) = 11.42, p = .001.
	The results of this study provide good evidence for the external or criterion validity of the SCC Scale.  The criterion variables we used, although based on subjects' self-reports, were unobtrusive indicators derived from the patterning of these reports within testing occasions (the internal consistency measure) and across testing occasions (the temporal stability measures).  The disadvantage of unobtrusive measures is that they contain more extraneous variance, a feature that reduces their reliability and therefore the overall magnitude of the validity correlations.  This disadvantage, however, is outweighed by the fact that such measures also eliminate the possibility that the results were affected by self-presentation, social desirability, or experimental demand characteristics.
	The internal consistency and temporal stability of self-beliefs are both direct theoretical manifestations of self-concept clarity.  The fact that the present empirical measures of these criteria were relatively independent of one another, but that both were reliably correlated with SCC scores, also serves to strengthen the results.  Indeed, when the two types of criterion variables were combined, their zero-order correlation with the SCC scale was quite substantial (r = .47, p < .001), despite the 4-month time lag and the unobtrusive nature of the criteria.
	The correlations between the other personality variables and the criterion variables roughly paralleled the extent to which these other variables were correlated with the SCC Scale.  The correlations of the criteria with self-esteem replicate the results of earlier studies (Campbell, 1990, Studies 2 and 4), and the correlations with neuroticism are unsurprising given the substantial overlap of this dimension with both clarity and self-esteem.  The correlations with the PRIV-SR subfactor and the public self-consciousness scale were more interesting and suggest that two different forms of chronic self-attention, a tendency to engage in chronic self-analysis and a tendency to be aware of the self as a social object, are both associated with a self-concept that is internally inconsistent and temporally unstable.
	The SCC Scale also exhibited incremental validity in this study; that is, it accounted for significant variance in the criteria after controlling for the impact of the other measured traits.  However, given the high levels of multi-collinearity in the predictors (especially between SCC, self-esteem, and neuroticism), we view this outcome as somewhat fortuitous in that rather small changes in some of the zero-order correlations might have altered the outcome.  On the other hand, we do not view a successful test of incremental validity as either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the scale's validity and utility.  Its validity lies in the extent to which the pattern of its associations with test and nontest criteria conforms to theoretical expectations, and its utility lies in its ability to enhance our understanding of the traits with which it appears to be a common component.
Studies 5 -7
 	Self-concept clarity seems to be particulary relevant to the construal of self that is predominant in Western, but not Eastern, cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  Western cultures tend to view the self as an autonomous inviolate entity; containing a unique, clearly-articulated set of internal attributes that remain stable across situations.  Perhaps it is because the clarity construct captures the essential characteristics of the self that are normative in Western culture that it exhibits such substantial correlations with evaluative aspects of the self (e.g., self-esteem) in Canadian samples.  The Eastern self, in contrast, is sustained and formed by its social environment (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), suggesting that situational changes would be associated with changes in the self.  This normative inconsistency in the self suggests that clarity and evaluation of the self would not be as strongly associated for the Eastern self.  To examine this possibility, we conducted three studies in which we compared mean SCC scores and SCC/self-esteem correlations in samples of Westernized Canadian and Japanese students.  Japanese students were chosen as the comparison sample because Japan represents a prototypical Eastern culture (Markus & Kitayama, 1991)
Method
Subjects
	Samples from Japan and Canada were compared in each of the three studies.  In Study 5, the Japanese sample consisted of 80 exchange students from Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto who had been studying at UBC for about 6 months.  In Study 6, the Japanese data were collected in Japan from introductory psychology students at Nagasaki University (n=112) and research methods students at Ritsumeikan University (n=84).  Because these two samples exhibited similar SCC and self-esteem scores, they were combined.  In Study 7, the Japanese sample consisted of 100 exchange students from Ritsumeikan University who had been in Canada for less than one week at the time of testing.  Aside from a few respondents who were born in other East Asian countries, the Japanese respondents were born and raised in Japan.
	The Canadian data in all three studies were collected from introductory psychology and introductory social psychology classes at UBC.  Because the cultural background of the Canadian students was quite heterogeneous, the samples were reduced to include only those subjects who met all our criteria of a "Westernized Canadian" sample.  The samples include only those subjects who: 1) had been born in either Canada of the United States; 2) were of parents that had been born in Canada, the United states, or in a European country; 3) declared their ethnic descent to be that of a European culture; and 4) in order to keep the age range comparable to the Japanese samples, were under the age of 25.  In Studies 5-7, 112, 90, 82 subjects, respectively, met all these criteria and formed the "Westernized Canadian" samples, or "Canadians," for short.
Materials
	Subjects completed questionnaire packets which included the Self-Concept Clarity Scale, Rosenberg's (1965) Self-esteem Scale, and a number of other measures not included in the present report3.  The Japanese subjects all completed a Japanese version of the questionnaire.  The original English version was translated into Japanese, and then back-translated into English by a second translator to ensure comparability and equivalence in meaning (Brislin, 1970).
Results and Discussion
	We anticipated that (a) the Japanese would exhibit higher average scores on the SCC Scale (that is, less clarity) than their Canadian counterparts, and (b) that the correlation between the SCC Scale and the Rosenberg Self-esteem (SE) Scale would be lower among the Japanese.  The average SCC, SE scores, and the SCC/SE correlations shown in Table 6 indicate that these expectations were realized in all three samples.  The Japanese exhibited higher SCC scores (and hence less clarity) than the Canadians (all ps < .01) and, consistent with prior research (Bond & Cheung, 1983; Mahler, 1976), they also exhibited lower average SE scores.  In addition, the Canadian samples exhibited substantial negative correlations between the SCC and SE scales, comparable to those reported earlier in Studies 1 -3.  The correlations in the Japanese samples were consistently smaller-- tests comparing the correlations between the Japanese and Canadian samples were significant in Studies 5 and 7 (ps < .01) and marginally significant in Study 6 (p < .07).
	In order to explore these cultural differences in more detail, we combined the samples from the three studies and conducted comparable analyses on each of the 12 SCC scale items.  The results, shown in Table 7, indicated that although every SCC scale item exhibited a more substantial correlation with SE among the Canadians than the Japanese (all ps < .05), the overall mean differences in SCC emerged on only 10 of the 12 items.  The other two items showed a nonsignificant reversal, with Canadians exhibiting somewhat higher scores than the Japanese.
	The exceptions are informative.  One of the reversals is Item # 5, which along with Items 2, 8, and 9 was designed to assess the temporal stability of self-beliefs (see Table 7 for item content).  Item 5 differs from the other temporal stability items in that it inquires about continuity of the self over a relatively long time period, whereas the other three items focus on cross-situational consistency over relatively short time periods.  Markus and Kitayama (1991) note that a cultural mandate of the interdependent self is to accommodate one's behavior to changing situations in order to achieve connection with others, a mandate that would anticipate less cross-situational consistency among the Japanese.  This situational variability, however, does not necessarily imply a past self that lacks continuity with the present self.  Although our Japanese subjects perceived the self to be less consistent across situations, they did not tend to view this accommodating self as being less continuous over time.
	The other item that exhibited a slight reversal was Item # 7, a general uncertainty or confusion item that asks subjects to compare how well they know themselves with how well they know other people.  Although speculative, there are a couple of possible explanations for this reversal.  First, it is possible that this item reflects cultural differences in perceived knowledge about other people.  On other general confusion items (e.g., 3, 10, 11), the Japanese subjects professed to have less self-knowledge than the Canadians.  For example, they were much less likely to endorse the item "In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am."  Given this evidence for lower levels of perceived self-knowledge, it would seem that the relative reluctance of the Japanese subjects to endorse Item 7 could derive from the fact that they also don't believe that they know other people very well.  A second possible explanation for the reversal is that this item reflects cultural differences in modesty.  Some subjects might feel that knowing other people better than they know themselves is akin to knowing other people especially well.  To the extent that this is true, the Japanese may be hesitant to endorse this item because they are reluctant to believe that they know others so well.
	In sum, Studies 5 - 7 provide consistent support for theoretically derived predictions about cultural differences in average levels of self-concept clarity and clarity's association with self-esteem.  These studies, therefore, not only add to the growing literature documenting cultural variation in construal of self (e.g., Bond & Cheung, 1983; Cousins, 1989; Mahler, 1976; Markus & Kitayama, 1991), but also provide, along with Studies 1-4, converging evidence for the construct validity of the SCC Scale.

General Discussion
The SCC Scale
	One aim of the present paper was to ascertain if the self-concept clarity construct deserves conceptualization as a relatively stable trait amenable to measurement via self-reports.  To accomplish this goal, we developed the SCC Scale, a 12-item questionnaire instrument scored in the direction of low clarity or self-concept confusion, and examined its psychometric properties, its relations with self-report measures of other traits, its predictive associations with indirect behavioral indicants of  the construct, and its cultural boundaries.  The emergent evidential package converged on an affirmative answer.
	The examination of the SCC Scale's psychometric properties yielded strong evidence for its reliability.  A variety of tests (e.g., Cronbach's Alpha, factor analyses, inter-item correlations) attested to the scale's high levels of internal consistency, and two tests, conducted over four- and five-month intervals, provided evidence for the scale's temporal stability.  Ascertaining the validity of a measure, however, is a more complex enterprise comprised of demonstrating convergent, discriminant, criterion, and construct validity.  In this section, we focus on only some of the relevant evidence in order to avoid a redundant discussion of those data that also address other goals of the paper.  We will, however, reference the validity issue again in subsequent sections.
	As anticipated by prior research using indirect measures of self-concept clarity (e.g., Campbell, 1990), the SCC Scale was substantially correlated with self-esteem.  Although this outcome provides evidence for the scale's construct validity, the magnitude of the correlations may also raise some concerns regarding discriminant validity.  Is the SCC Scale simply a surrogate measure of self-esteem?  A number of outcomes suggested that this is not the case.  First, regression analyses conducted in Studies 1-3 demonstrated that the SCC Scale exhibited a consistent pattern of reliable relations with other traits after controlling for its overlapping variance with self-esteem.  Second, Study 4 showed that the SCC Scale predicted unique variance in unobtrusive behavioral criteria after controlling for self-esteem (and a number of other predictors).  Finally, Studies 5 - 7 demonstrated that the substantial correlations with self-esteem obtained in Western samples were greatly attenuated in Japanese samples where the normative construal of the self does not prescribe that individuals should hold a clearly articulated set of invariant attributes.  Therefore, the studies taken together suggest that while self-concept clarity and self-esteem are quite strongly associated in Western samples, they are distinct constructs whose relation with one another is theoretically explicable and informative (see, for example,  Baumeister, 1993; Campbell, 1990; Campbell & Lavallee, 1993).
	Study 4 provided evidence for the scale's criterion validity.  SCC scores, taken four months prior to the study, reliably predicted two behavioral manifestations of self-concept clarity--the internal consistency and temporal stability of self-descriptions.  The study additionally tested the predictive utility of a number of other measures including self-esteem, neuroticism, extraversion, public self-consciousness, and the two subscales of the private self-consciousness scale.  The zero-order correlations between the criteria and the other traits roughly paralleled the magnitude of the associations between these other traits and the SCC scale.  Finally, although not necessary for the demonstration of criterion validity, regression analyses showed that the SCC scale predicted unique variance in the criteria after controlling for other traits tested.
	Studies 1 - 3 examined how the SCC scale was related to a variety of other traits including markers of Big Five dimensions and scales related to self-focused attention.  Our aims in exploring these relations were to expand the nomological network of the clarity construct and to shed some light on the self-absorption paradox.  We discuss the data relevant to these aims below, but note that because the pattern of these relations was consistent with the theoretical definition of the clarity construct, they also serve to bolster the validity of the SCC Scale.
Relations with the Big Five Dimensions
	To summarize, the SCC Scale exhibited strong positive correlations with neuroticism, and moderate negative correlations with extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness.  Subsequent regression analyses, controlling for self-esteem, the other Big-Five dimensions, and the self-focus variables, revealed consistent patterns for three of the dimensions; neuroticism (a strong positive contribution), conscientiousness (a moderate negative contribution), and agreeableness (a weak, but reliable, negative contribution).  Extraversion yielded an inconsistent pattern across the three studies.  We discuss each of these relations below.
	Neuroticism.  The zero-order relation with neuroticism was anticipated given prior demonstrations of strong relations between identity diffusion, self-esteem, and  variables related to the neuroticism dimension (e.g., Marcia, 1980; Watson et al., 1988).  However, the fact that it emerged as a relatively strong concomitant of self-concept confusion after controlling for self-esteem deserves some comment.  Neuroticism, like all of the Big Five dimensions, is conceptualized to consist of common variance (attributable to the underlying factor) and specific variance (specific traits or facets that define the factor).  Because one facet of neuroticism (labeled depression) is clearly marked by chronic low self-esteem, the independent contribution of neuroticism probably reflects the scale's additional relations with other facets, most notably anxiety and vulnerability (see Costa & McCrae, 1980; McCrae & Costa, 1992; McCrae & John, 1992, for a description of the Big Five facets).  The vulnerability facet is quite directly aligned with low clarity in that it is characterized by uncertainty and a lack of confidence, and the markers of the anxiety facet include low self-confidence as well as traits such as anxious, nervous, and tense.  The fact that the SCC scale consistently emerged as a robust independent concomitant of both self-esteem and neuroticism suggests that an uncertain or confused self-concept may be an important antecedent or consequence of the syndrome of cognitions and behaviors associated with these traits.
	Conscientiousness.  Conscientiousness also correlated with clarity independently of self-esteem, dispositional self-focus, and the other Big Five personality dimensions. Given the strong influence of dispositional conscientiousness on important life outcomes such as academic achievement and job performance (see Digman, 1992), even a modest, independent effect for conscientiousness on self-concept clarity may warrant further study.  There are numerous reasons to expect such an effect.  Empirical links between conscientiousness and traits resembling self-concept clarity are apparent in many recent efforts to empirically classify representative samplings of personality trait adjectives and questionnaires in terms of the Big Five factors. Comprehensive factorial studies of trait adjectives by Goldberg (1990) show five clarity-related adjective clusters loading primarily on conscientiousness: decisiveness (e.g., decisive, purposeful), predictability (e.g., consistent, steady), inconsistency (e.g., inconsistent, erratic), indecisiveness (e.g., indecisive, wishy-washy), and aimlessness (aimless, unambitious).  Similar findings have been recently reported by Hofstee, deRaad and Goldberg (1992) for trait adjectives, and Johnson and Ostendorf (1994) for bipolar adjective scales and personality questionnaires. 
	A recent study by Costa and McCrae (in press) in which self-ratings on the California Adjective Q-SET (CAQ) were correlated with self-report domain and facet measures of the Five Factor model provides especially clear support for the conscientiousness findings reported here.  In a sample consisting mostly of older adults, the CAQ item "has a clearcut, consistent personality" was found to possess a broader association with facet measures of conscientiousness than with those of neuroticism. The  pattern of these latter correlations also indicated that clarity, at least as measured by this single CAQ item, may be more strongly linked to inhibitive forms of conscientiousness (e.g., deliberation or impulse restraint) than to more proactive forms (e.g., achievement-striving; see Costa, McCrae, & Dye, 1991). 
	Although it appears that self and observer perceptions of clarity reliably involve perceptions of conscientiousness, It is important to point out that the linkage between clarity and conscientiousness may not just reside in the eye of the beholder. In an experiment reported by Paulhus (1989), persons given strong motivation to alter their self-descriptions were especially likely to do so if they possessed low pretest scores on conscientiousness.  Neuroticism showed a similarly strong interaction with the self-concept lability manipulation. Other behavioral evidence of a linkage between clarity and conscientiousness is found in an experimental study of delay of gratification reported by Funder and Block (1989). This study examined personality correlates of the preference for a delayed monetary payment over an immediate smaller payment, a preference believed by the authors to reflect individual differences in the tendency to contain, inhibit, or modulate impulses (i.e., to behave conscientiously). The three CAQ items bearing a family resemblance to self-concept clarity, "clear-cut, internally consistent personality", "unpredictable and changeable behavior, attitudes", and "feels a lack of personal meaning in life", were among the highest correlates of delay of gratification in both male and female subjects.
	Although space limits preclude a more extensive review of the evidence, It seems likely that inhibitive (e.g., self-control) and proactive (e.g., goal-directedness) aspects of conscientiousness both play a role in the development of a stable and consistent self-image. The relation of impulse control to a coherent self-image has just been noted. The possibility that goal-directedness plays a nontrivial role in self-concept articulation is implied by William James' (1890) well-known definition of the self as "a fighter for ends".  The possibility that self-control and goal-directedness both play a vital role in the development of a stable, well-articulated self-structure was suggested a bit more recently by Murray (1938):
The concept of ego emphasizes the determining significance of 1, conscious, freely willed acts: making a resolution (with oneself) or a compact (with others) or dedicating oneself to a life-long vocation, all of which "bind" the personality over long periods of time; 2, the establishment of a cathected ego ideal (images of a figure one wants to become); 3, the inhibition of drives that conflict with the above-mentioned intentions, decisions, and planned schedules of behavior. ( pp. 138).
	On a final empirical note, consistent evidence of moderate heritability for conscientiousness (see Loehlin, 1992), implies that at least one causal direction is reasonably assured: stable individual differences in conscientiousness likely play an important, causal role in the development and maintenance of a stable self-concept. Clearly, more detailed investigation of the role of dispositional conscientiousness should be a priority for future research on individual differences in self-concept clarity.
	Extraversion.  Assertiveness or social dominance is commonly considered a central facet of extraversion (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1983).  One would expect that dominant, assertive, individuals would report greater clarity in their self-beliefs than timid, reticent, individuals, and indeed the SCC Scale consistently exhibited moderate zero-order associations of this form with measures of extraversion.  The regression analyses, however, suggested that extraversion is not a consistent, independent concomitant of  self-concept clarity.  The most plausible explanation for this outcome is that low self-confidence is also a central component of (low) self-esteem and neuroticism.  Because the latter two traits exhibit more substantial associations with the SCC Scale, it is likely that these traits captured the overlapping confidence variance in the regression analyses.
	Agreeableness.  With respect to agreeableness, we anticipated a small positive relation with the SCC Scale.  Because people who are uncertain or confused about themselves should be more dependent on the social environment (e.g.,  Block, 1961; Campbell & Lavellee, 1993), we expected that they might be somewhat more compliant, modest, and eager to please than those with more certain self-concepts.  In contrast, the data suggested that low-clarity individuals were somewhat less agreeable, an association that retained its significance after controlling for self-esteem, the other Big Five dimensions, and the self-focus variables.  The data are, however, consistent with some recent work by Donahue et al. (1993) who reported that their measure of self-concept fragmentation was not only associated with a tendency to reject social norms and conventions (low socialization), but indeed predicted such behavior 30 years later.  PAUL, YOU SAID YOU HAD SOME OTHER DATA FROM BLOCK SUPPORTING THE CORRELATION
	Summary.  Because the Big-Five dimensions constitute orthogonal factors that appear to underlie an enormous variety of individual differences (e.g., Goldberg, 1990), examining a scale's relations with these dimensions is an important step in defining or understanding the relevant construct.  Nonetheless, it is only a first step.  The Big-Five represent very broad factors or domains consisting of a constellation of more specific interrelated traits or facets, a fact which allows the possibility that identical scores on a dimension may differ markedly in the facet profiles (McCrae & Costa, 1992).   It is also the case that specific traits can mark facets of more than one dimension; for example, self-confidence appears as a positive marker of the vulnerability facet of neuroticism and a negative marker of the assertiveness facet of extraversion (McCrae & Costa, 1992).
	We made reference to facets in interpreting the SCC scale's relations with the Big-Five dimensions, but because the NEO-FFI does not yield individual facet scores, studies employing instruments that yield individual facet scales (Costa & McCrae, in press) are clearly required.  However, that the results of studies examining how individual trait clusters load on each of the Big-five factors (e.g., Goldberg, 1990) typically reveal that traits such as insecurity, instability, and to a lesser extent, low self-esteem exhibit the general pattern of associations we obtained with the SCC Scale; positive loadings on neuroticism, negative loadings on conscientiousness, agreeableness, and extraversion.  Costa, McCrae and Dye (1991) also reported a similar pattern of loadings for external locus of control, an outcome consistent with the proposition that people who lack self-concept clarity should be more dependent on the external environment (e. g., Campbell, 1990).
Self-Focused Attention and Self-Concept Confusion
	Also consistent with an elevated dependence on the external environment was the moderate correlation between Public Self-Consciousness and SCC.  Of greater interest, however, are the SCC Scale's associations with the various measures of private self-consciousness as they provide some clues relevant to the self-absorption paradox.  Although the SCC Scale was moderately correlated with the full Private Self-Consciousness Scale, its correlations with the two private subscales revealed a striking divergence.  SCC was substantially correlated with the PRIV-SR Subscale which taps the tendency to engage in chronic self-analysis, but it was inversely related to the Internal State Awareness Subscale.  This pattern supports Piliavin and Charng's (1988) argument that the two private subscales may be associated in opposite directions with measures of identity seeking (i.e., low clarity).  The pattern also challenges those who have based their argument for maintaining the unitary structure of the private scale on the fact that  "there is no evidence for any criterion that is differentially predicted by the two subscales" (Bernstein et al., 1986, pp. 473).
	Correlations with the Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire (Trapnell & Campbell, 1994), which assesses two motives underlying private self-consciousness, revealed yet another divergence.  The SCC Scale was strongly associated with Rumination which taps an affectively negative, uncontrolled form of self-focus motivated by threat or uncertainty, but not with Reflection which taps an affectively positive, controlled form of self-focus motivated by curiosity.  Because the Rumination scale is strongly associated with neuroticism and the Reflection scale is strongly associated with Openness, one could argue that this pattern is simply a replication of the SCC Scale's correlations with their associated Big-Five dimensions.  However, regression analyses revealed that Rumination, self analysis (PRIV-SR), and low internal state awareness (PRIV-ISA) all emerged as independent concomitants of low clarity.  This configuration draws a unique portrait of the self-attentional processes of low clarity individuals:  In a chronic attempt to "try to figure themselves out", they experience high levels of intrusive self-relevant thoughts, thoughts which apparently serve to maintain or even increase their uncertainty and lead to a perception of decreased awareness of their internal states.  Although this portrait certainly does not provide a definitive solution to the self-absorption paradox, it does suggest that the relation between perceived self-knowledge and self-focused attention may depend critically on distinguishing between different forms of  self-focused attention and different motives for attending to the self.
Cultural Boundaries of the Self-Concept Clarity Construct
	Consistent with the recent cross-cultural literature (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991), Studies 5-7 revealed differences in SCC scores between Canadians and Japanese.  Canadians reported lower SCC scores than Japanese and Canadians' SCC scores were more closely associated with their reported self-esteem than they were for Japanese.  These differences indicate that the meaning of the SCC construct may differ across cultures.  The clarity construct was developed within the context of Western culture where the habitual point of focus is on the individual, and items were selected to reflect the clarity of individuals' self beliefs.  However, in Japanese culture individuals look to the social environment to define the self (Cousins, 1989), suggesting that the apparent inconsistency and instability in Japanese self-concepts probably appear as a consequence of their interdependent and contextual nature.  Indeed, asking questions about the clarity of the self-concept in the abstract, without providing any contextual information, might appear odd to Japanese.  Although in Western cultures it makes sense to label a self-concept that is inconsistent and unstable as low in clarity or confused, these labels are not appropriate within more contextual cultures such as Japan.  Here, elevated SCC scores most likely reflect self-concepts that are normatively prescribed to be contextually flexible or responsive.  In support of this reasoning, the Japanese exhibited significantly lower relations between SCC and SE.  We urge caution, then, in interpreting SCC scores in non-Western samples.  Future efforts toward the development of a similar scale that measures self beliefs in cultures where a contextual and dynamic sense of self is valued would likely prove fruitful.
Summary and Conclusions
	We presented evidence that self-concept clarity can be conceptualized as a stable trait, one that is reliably and validly measured with the SCC Scale.  We correlated the SCC Scale with measures of self-esteem, the Big-Five dimensions, and self-focused attention, tested its criterion validity, and examined its cultural boundaries, activities which not only supported the scale's validity, but provided evidence relevant to a number of other important issues (e.g., the self-absorption paradox, cultural differences in self-construal).  The utility of the SCC Scale has also been demonstrated by investigators examining other criteria.  For example, Smith, Wethington and Zhan (1994) recently demonstrated that low clarity is uniquely related to a preference for passive coping styles (controlling for self-esteem, depression, anxiety, and perceived social support).  Similarly, Setterlund and Neidenthal (1993) demonstrated that low clarity4 uniquely predicted (controlling for self-esteem) the failure to use a decision-making strategy that involves the self to guide choice behavior (i.e., prototype matching).  
	The present data are mute, however, with respect to the causal relations between clarityand its correlates.  In discussing the clarity/self-esteem relation, Campbell and  Lavallee (1993) provided plausible theoretical mechanisms and cited experimental data that supported both possibilities--that clarity causes self-esteem and vice versa.  Similar arguments (and some data) could be cited here with respect to the other relations we have documented.  For example, we argued that self-uncertainty may cause people to experience a ruminative form of self-focused attention, but it is also plausible that rumination could lead to increased confusion in the self-concept.  We tend to believe that, at least among adults, the network of relations are probably systemic, but are hopeful that research testing broad theoretical accounts for the general nature of traits (e.g., phychophysiological, evolutionary, genetic, developmental, dynamic) may eventually elucidate the antecedents and consequences of self-concept confusion (see McCrae & John, 1992, for an overview of  these theories).  

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Footnotes
1  We earlier reported a preliminary 20-item clarity scale with three highly intercorrelated factors (avg. r = .52) labeled generalized certainty, goal-directedness, and decisiveness (Campbell, Katz, Lavallee, & Trapnell, 1991)
2  Although it is likely that the increase in SCC means over the 3-year period reflects the steadily increasing proportion of Asian students at UBC during this period, we were unable to test this possibility because we did not collect information on ethnic background in Studies 1 -3 (see Studies 5 -7 for cultural differences in SCC).
3  A small portion of the Study 5 data reported here is contained in Heine, Lehman, Okugawa, Lehman, and Campbell (1992).  In addition, the Study 6 data were derived from the subject samples used in Heine and Lehman (1994).
4  Setterlund and Neidenthal (1993) and Smith et al. (1994) both employed the earlier 20-item version of the scale (Campbell et al., 1991).