The Weirdest People in the World

How representative are experimental findings from American university students? What do we really know about human psychology?

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Abstract

Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology, cognition, and behavior in the world’s top journals based on samples drawn entirely from highly educated segments of Western societies. Researchers—often implicitly—assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these “standard subjects” are as representative of the species as any other. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the human behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across population and that standard subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species—frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles (holistic vs. analytic), self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The comparative findings suggest that members of Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, or behavior – hence, there are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions of human nature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these scientific challenges.
In the tropical forests of New Guinea the Etoro believe that for a boy to achieve manhood he must ingest the semen of his elders. This is accomplished through ritualized rites of passage that require all young male initiates to fellate a senior member (Herdt 1984, Kelley 1980). In contrast, the nearby Kaluli maintain that male initiation is only properly done by ritually delivering the semen through the initiate’s anus, not his mouth. The Etoro revile these Kaluli practices, finding them disgusting. To become a man in these societies, and eventually take a wife, every boy must undergo these ritual initiations.

Such in-depth studies of “exotic” societies, historically the province of anthropology, are extremely important for understanding human behavioral variation. However, this paper is not about these peoples. It’s about another exotic group: people from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. In particular, it’s about the Western, and more specifically American, undergraduates who form the bulk of the experimental database in the experimental branches of psychology, cognitive science, and economics, as well as allied fields (we label this aggregate of fields the “behavioral sciences”). Given that scientific knowledge about human psychology is largely based on findings from this population, we ask how representative these typical subjects are in light of the currently available comparative database. How justified are researchers, in asserting, or—as if often the case—of implicitly assuming, a species-level generality of their experimental findings? Are these WEIRD people representative of our species? Here, we review the evidence regarding how WEIRD people compare with those from other populations.

To pursue this we constructed our empirical review by looking first for studies that involved large-scale comparative experimentation of important psychological or behavioral variables. Although such comparative studies are highly informative, they are rather rare, especially when compared to the frequency of species-generalizing claims. When such studies were absent we have relied on large assembles of studies comparing 2 or 3 populations, and, when available, relevant meta-analyses.

Of course, researchers do not implicitly assume universality with everything they study. Some phenomena are a priori expected to vary across individuals, and by extension, societies, such as personal values, emotional expressiveness, and personality traits. Indeed, the goal of much research on such topics is to identify the ways that people and societies differ from one another on these. A number of large-scale research projects have sought to map out the world on dimensions such as values (G. Hofstede 2001, Inglehart, Basanez, & Moreno 1998, S. H. Schwartz & Bilsky 1990), personality traits, (e.g., McCrae, Terraciano, & Project 2005, Schmitt, Allik, McCrae, Benet-Martinez, & al. 2007), and levels of happiness, (e.g., Diener, Diener, & Diener 1995). The present review does not address those phenomena assessed by individual difference measures for which the guiding assumption in the research is variability among
populations. Instead we restrict our exploration to those constructs which have largely been assumed, at least until recently, to be *de facto* universals.

Our examination of the representativeness of WEIRD subjects is necessarily restricted to the rather limited database currently available. We have organized our presentation into a series of telescoping contrasts showing, at each level of contrast, how WEIRD people measure up relative to the other available reference populations. Our first contrast compares people from modern industrialized societies with those from small-scale human societies. At our second telescoping stage, we contrast people from Western societies with those from non-Western industrialized societies. Next, we contrast Americans with people from other Western societies. Finally, we contrast university-educated Americans with non-university educated Americans, or university students with non-student adults, depending on the available data. At each level we discuss behavioral and psychological phenomena for which there are available comparative data, and we assess how WEIRD people compare with the other samples. We emphasize that our presentation of telescoping contrasts is only a rhetorical approach guided by the nature of the available data. It should not be taken as capturing any uni-dimensional continuum, or suggesting any single theoretical explanation for the variation. Throughout this paper we take no position regarding the substantive origins of the observed differences between populations. While many of the differences are probably cultural in nature in that they were socially transmitted as a consequence of growing up in a particular social group (Boyd & Richerson 1985, R. E. Nisbett, Peng, K., Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A. 2001), others are likely environmental and represent some form of non-cultural phenotypic plasticity, which may be developmental or facultative, as well as either adaptive or maladaptive (Gangestad, Haselton, & Buss 2006, Tooby & Cosmides 1992). Other subpopulation differences could arise from genetic variation, as observed for production of lactase enzymes to process milk into adulthood (e.g., Beja-Pereira et al., 2003). Regardless of the reasons underlying these population differences, our concern is whether researchers can reasonably generalize from WEIRD samples to humanity at large.

Many radical versions of cultural relativity deny any shared commonalities in human behavior across populations. To the contrary, we expect humans from all societies to share, and probably share substantially, basic aspects of cognition, motivation, and behaviors. As researchers who see much value in applying evolutionary thinking to psychology and behavior, we have little doubt that if a full accounting were taken across all domains among peoples past and present, that the number of similarities would indeed be large, as much ethnographic work suggests (e.g., D. E. Brown 1991)—ultimately, of course, it’s an empirical question. Thus, our thesis is not that humans share few basic psychological properties or processes; rather we question our current ability to distinguish these reliably developing aspects of human psychology from more developmentally, culturally, or environmentally contingent aspects of our psychology using WEIRD subjects. Our aim here, then, is to inspire efforts to place knowledge of such universal
features of psychology on a firmer scientific footing by empirically questioning, rather than a priori dismissing, population variability.

Background

Before commencing with our telescoping contrasts, we first discuss two observations regarding the existing behavioral science literature: (1) the database in the behavioral sciences has long been drawn from an extremely narrow slice of human diversity; and (2) behavioral scientists routinely assume, at least implicitly, that their findings from this narrow database generalize to the species.

The Behavioral Sciences Database is Narrow

Who are the people studied in behavioral science research? An analysis of the top journals in six disciplines of Psychology from 2003-2007 revealed that 68% of subjects came from the US, and a full 96% of subjects were from Western industrialized countries, specifically North America, Europe, Australia, and Israel (Arnett Forthcoming). The make-up of these samples appears to largely reflect the country of residence of the authors, as 73% of first authors were at American universities, and 99% were at universities in Western countries. This means that 96% of psychological samples come from countries with only 12% of the world’s population. Put another way, a randomly selected American is 300 times more likely to be a research participant in a study in one of these journals than is a randomly selected person from outside of the West.

Even within the West, however, the typical sampling method for psychological studies is far from representative. In the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, the premier journal from social psychology—the sub-discipline of psychology that should (arguably) be the most attentive to questions about the social background of their participants—67% of the American samples (and 80% of the samples from other countries) were composed solely of undergraduates in psychology courses (Arnett Forthcoming). Furthermore, this tendency to rely on undergraduates as samples has not decreased over time (Peterson 2001, Wintre, North, & Sugar 2001). Such studies are thus sampling from a rather limited subpopulation within each country.

Beyond psychology, in experimental economics or decision science the subject pools are not much more diverse. American and Western undergraduates still dominate. However, we should note that experimental economists have at least endeavored to acquire data from large nationally representative samples in Europe (Bellemare & Kroger 2007, Ernst Fehr, Fischbacher, von Rosenbladt, Schupp, & Wagner 2002, Guth, Schmidt, & Sutter 2003, Harrison, Lau, & Williams 2002), and development economists working in third world contexts are beginning to
incorporate large-scale experimental measures into their data collection (Barr 2004, Cardenas, Stranlund, & Willis 2000). Some economists have also developed university-wide subject recruiting (rather than using discipline-specific subject pools Hertwig & Ortmann 2001) and have pursued specialized non-student subjects (e.g., List 2004).

In sum, the behavioral science database does not reflect the full breadth of human diversity. Rather, we have largely been studying the nature of WEIRD people, a certainly narrow and potentially rather peculiar subpopulation.

**Researchers Often Assume their Findings are Universal**

Sampling from a thin slice of humanity would be less problematic if researchers explicitly recognized the problem and confined their interpretations to the populations from which they sampled. However, despite their narrow samples, behavioral scientists often are interested in drawing inferences about the *human* mind (e.g., Gergen, 1973; Sears, 1986; Sue, 1999). Nevertheless, this inferential step is still rarely challenged or defended—with some important exceptions (e.g., Medin & Atran 2004, Rozin 2001, Witkin & Berry 1975)—despite the lack of any general effort to assess how well results from WEIRD samples generalize to the species. This lack of epistemic vigilance underscores the prevalent, though implicit, assumption that the findings one derives from a particular sample will generalize broadly – one adult human sample is pretty much the same as the next.

The world’s leading scientific journals and behavioral science textbooks consistently publish research findings that generalize to “humans” or “people” from research done entirely with WEIRD undergraduates to the species, often without a single sentence suggesting inferential caution. Arnett (in press) notes that psychologists would surely bristle if journals were renamed to more accurately reflect the nature of their samples (e.g., *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology of American Undergraduate Psychology Students*). They would bristle, presumably, because they believe that their findings would broadly generalize.

There are many examples in which the researchers generalize from exclusively WEIRD subjects to humans everywhere, without qualification. In top journals such as *Nature* and *Science* researchers frequently extend their findings from undergraduates to the species—often declaring this generalization in their titles (“in humans”). These contributions typically lack even a cautionary footnote about these inferentially extensions (e.g., Ernst Fehr & Gächter 2002, Gurerk, Irlenbusch, & Rockenbach 2006, Rockenbach & Milinski 2006, Sanfey 2007). Of course, there are important exceptions to this general tendency (e.g., Buss 1989, Daly & Wilson 1988, Tracy & Matsumoto 2008).

In psychology, much of this generalization is implicit. A typical article won’t claim to be discussing “humans” but will simply describe a decision bias, psychological process, set of
correlations, etc., without discussing issues of generalizability. Commonly, there will be no mention of any demographic information provided about the participants aside from their age and gender. Though, in recent years there is an incipient trend to qualify some findings with disclaimers such as “at least within Western culture;” however there remains a robust tendency to generalize well beyond their samples.

When is it safe to generalize from a narrow sample to the species? First, if one had good empirical reason to believe that little variability existed across diverse populations in a particular domain it would not seem unreasonable to tentatively infer universal processes from a single subpopulation. Second, one could make an argument that as long as one’s samples were drawn from near the center of the human distribution then it would not be overly problematic to generalize across the distribution more broadly—at least the inferred pattern would be in the vicinity of the central tendency of our species. Below, with these assumptions in mind, we review the evidence for the representativeness of findings from WEIRD people.

**Contrast 1: Industrialized Societies vs. Small-Scale Societies**

Our theoretical perspective, which is informed by evolutionary thinking, leads us to suspect that many aspects of people’s psychological repertoire are universal. However, the current empirical foundations for our suspicions are rather weak because the database of comparative studies that include small-scale societies is scant, despite the obvious importance of small-scale societies in understanding both the evolutionary history of our species, and the potential impact of diverse environments on our psychology. Here we first discuss the evidence for differences between populations drawn from industrialized and small-scale societies in some seemingly basic psychological domains, and follow this with research indicating universal patterns across this divide.

**Visual Perception**

Many readers may suspect that tasks involving “low-level” or “basic” cognitive processes such as vision will not vary much across the human spectrum (Fodor 1983). However, in the 1960’s an interdisciplinary team of anthropologists and psychologists systematically gathered data on the susceptibility of both children and adults from a wide range of human societies to five “standard illusions” (Segall, Campbell, & Herskovits 1966). Here we highlight the comparative findings on the famed Mueller-Lyer illusion, because of this illusion’s importance in textbooks, and its prominent role as Fodor’s indisputable example of “cognitive impenetrability” in debates about the modularity of cognition (McCauley & Henrich 2006).
Segall et al. manipulated the length of the two lines in the Mueller-Lyer illusion (Figure 1) and estimated the magnitude of the illusion for each participant—by determining the approximate point at which an individual perceives the two lines as being the same length. Figure 2 shows their results for the 16 societies, including 14 small-scale societies. The vertical axis gives the ‘point of subjective equality’ (PSE), which measures the amount that segment ‘a’ must be longer than ‘b’ before the two segments are judged equal in length. PSE measures the strength of the illusion.

Figure 1: Mueller-Lyer Illusion. The lines labeled ‘a’ and ‘b’ in each figure are the same length. Many subjects perceive line ‘b’ as longer than line ‘a’.

Figure 2: Mueller-Lyer Results for Segall et al.’s cross-cultural project. PSE is the percentage that segment ‘a’ must be longer than ‘b’ before individuals perceive them as equal.

The results show substantial differences among these populations, with American undergraduates anchoring the extreme end of the distribution followed by the South African European sample (“SA Europeans”), from Johannesburg. On average, the undergraduates required that segment ‘a’ be about a fifth longer than ‘b’ before the two segments were perceived as equal. At the other end, the San foragers of the Kalahari were unaffected by the so-called “illusion” (it’s not an illusion for them). While the San’s PSE value cannot be distinguished from zero, the American undergraduates’ PSE value is significantly different from all the other societies studied.
As discussed by Segall et. al., these findings suggest that visual exposure during ontogeny to factors such as the “carpentered corners” of modern environments may favor certain optical calibrations and visual habits that create and perpetuate the illusion. That is, the visual system ontogenetically adapts to the presence of recurrent features in the local visual environment. Since elements such as carpentered corners are products of particular cultural evolutionary trajectories, and were not part of most environments for most of human history, the Mueller-Lyer illusion is a kind of culturally evolved byproduct (J. Henrich 2008).

These findings highlight two important considerations. First, this work suggests that even a process as apparently basic as visual perception can show substantial variation across populations. If visual perception can vary, what kind of psychological processes can we be sure won’t vary? Second, both American undergraduates and children are at the extreme end of the distribution, showing significant differences from all other populations studied (meanwhile, many of the other populations cannot be distinguished from each other). Since children already show big population-level differences, it is not obvious if developmental work can substitute for research across diverse human populations.

Suppose that visual perception researchers were San, and that the empirical findings in the Mueller-Lyer paradigm were all from San bands. If this was the case, the San researchers would have concluded that visual perception is immune to such illusions. Would we not be concerned about the foundations of our theories of vision if our database consisted mostly of work done with San?

**Economic Decision Making**

By the mid-1990’s researchers were arguing that a set of robust experimental findings from behavioral economics were evidence for evolved human universal motivations (Ernst Fehr & Gächter 1998). Foremost among these experiments, the Ultimatum Game, provides a pair of anonymous subjects with a sum of real money for a one-shot interaction. One of the pair—the proposer—can offer a portion of this sum to a second subject, the responder. Responders must decide whether to accept or reject the offer. If a responder accepts, she gets the amount of the offer and the proposer takes the remainder; if she rejects both players get zero. Under these conditions, if subjects are motivated purely by self-interest, responders should always accept any positive offer; knowing this, a self-interested proposer should offer the smallest non-zero amount. Among subjects from industrialized populations—mostly undergraduates from the U.S., Europe, and Asia—proposers typically offer an amount between 40% and 50% of the total, with a modal offer of usually 50% (Camerer 2003). Offers below about 30% are often rejected.

With this seeming robust empirical finding in their sights, Nowak, Page and Sigmund (2000) constructed an evolutionary analysis of the Ultimatum Game. When they modeled the
Ultimatum Game exactly as played, they did not get results matching the undergraduate findings. However, if they added reputational information such that players could know what their partners did with others on previous rounds of play, the analysis predicted offers and rejections in the range of typical undergraduate responses. They concluded that the Ultimatum Game reveals humans’ species-specific evolved capacity for fair and punishing behavior in situations with substantial reputation influence. But, since the Ultimatum Game is typically done one-shot without reputational information, they argued that people make fair offers and reject unfair offers because their motivations evolved in a world where such interactions were not fitness relevant—thus, we are not evolved to fully incorporate the possibility of non-reputational action in our decision-making, at least in such artificial experimental contexts.

More recent comparative experimental work has dramatically altered this initial picture. Two unified projects (which we call Phase 1 and Phase 2) have deployed the Ultimatum Game and other related experimental tools across thousands of subjects randomly sampled from 23 small-scale human societies, including foragers, horticulturalists, pastoralists, and subsistence farmers, drawn from Africa, Amazonia, Oceania, Siberia and New Guinea (J. Henrich et al. 2005, J. Henrich et al. 2006). Three different experiments show that the experimentally-measured behaviors of people in industrialized societies consistently occupy the extreme end of the human distribution. Notably, some populations from small-scale societies with only face-to-face interaction behaved in a manner reminiscent of Nowak et. al.’s analysis before they added the reputational information. That is, these populations made low offers and did not reject.

To concisely present these diverse empirical finding, we show results only from the Ultimatum and Dictator Games in Phase II. The Dictator Game is the same as the Ultimatum Game except that the second player cannot reject the offer. If subjects are motivated purely by self-interest, they would offer zero in the Dictator Game. Thus, Dictator Game offers yield a measure of fairness (equal divisions) among two anonymous people. By contrast, Ultimatum Game offers yield a measure of fairness combined with an assessment of the likelihood of rejection (punishment). Rejections of offers in the Ultimatum Game provide a measure of people’s willingness to punish unfairness.
Figure 3. Behavioral measure of fairness and punishment from the Dictator and Ultimatum Game for 15 societies (Phase II of Project). Figure 3A and 3B show mean offers for each society in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games, respectively. Figure 3C gives the income-maximizing offer (IMO) for each society. IMO is a measure of the collective willingness to punish a low offer of the group.
Using aggregate measures from each population for these experiments, Figure 3 shows that the behavior of the U.S. adult (non-student) sample occupies the extreme end of the distribution in each case. For Dictator Game offers, Figure 3A shows that the U.S. sample has the highest mean offer followed by the Sanquianga from Colombia, who are renowned for their prosociality (Kraul 2008). The U.S. offers are nearly double that of the Hadza, foragers from Tanzania, and the Tsimane, forager-horticulturalists from the Bolivian Amazon. For Ultimatum Game offers, the U.S. has the second highest mean offer behind the Sursurunga, from Papua New Guinea. For the punishment side in the Ultimatum Game, we show the income maximizing offers in each population (IMO), which is a measure of the population’s willingness to punish inequitable offers. IMO is the offer that an income-maximizing proposer would make if he knew the probability of rejection for each of the possible offer amounts. The U.S. sample is tied with the Sursurunga. These two groups have an IMO five times higher than 70% of the other societies. While none of these measures indicates that people from industrialized societies are entirely unique vis-à-vis other human populations, they do show that people from industrialized societies consistently occupy the extreme end of the human distribution.

Analyses of these data show that a population’s degree of market integration and its participation in a world religion both independently predict higher offers, and account for much of the variation between populations. Community size positively predicts greater punishment (Henrich, Ensminger and McElreath, n.d.). The authors suggest that norms and institutions for exchanging in ephemeral interactions culturally coevolved with markets and expanding larger-scale sedentary populations. In some cases, at least in their most efficient forms, neither markets nor large population were feasible before such norms and institutions emerged. That is, it may be that what behavioral economists have been measuring in such games is a specific set of social norms, evolved for dealing with money and strangers, that have emerged since the origins of agriculture and the rise of complex societies.

Suppose that Nowak and his coauthors were Tsimane, and that the numerous empirical findings they had on hand were all from Tsimane villages. If this were the case, presumably these researchers would have simulated the Ultimatum Game and found that there was no need to add reputation to their model. The straight simulation result is pretty close, and one need not assume subjects somehow unconsciously do not understand the experimental anonymity. This unadorned evolutionary solution would have worked fine until they realized that the Tsimane are not representative of humanity. According to the above data, the Tsimane are about as representative of the species as are Americans, but at the opposite end of the spectrum. Would we not be concerned about the foundations of our theories of economic decision making if our database consisted of Tsimane subjects?

**Folkbiological Reasoning**

Recent work in small-scale societies by an interdisciplinary team of anthropologists and psychologists suggests that some of the central conclusions regarding the development and
operation of human folkbiological categorizing, reasoning, and induction are limited to urban subpopulations of non-experts in industrialized societies. While much more work needs to be done, it appears that typical subjects (children of WEIRD parents) develop their folkbiological reasoning in an culturally and experientially impoverished environment, by contrast to those of small-scale societies (and of our evolutionary past), distorting the species-typical pattern of cognitive development, as well as adult patterns of reasoning for WEIRD people.

Cognitive scientists using children drawn from U.S. urban centers, often surrounding universities, have constructed a developmental theory in which folkbiological reasoning emerges from folkpsychological reasoning. Before age 7 urban children reason about biological phenomena by analogy to, and by extension from, humans. Between ages 7 and 10 urban children undergo a conceptual shift to the adult pattern of viewing humans as one animal among many. These conclusions are underpinned by three robust findings from urban children: (1) inferential projections of properties from humans are stronger than projections from other living kinds, (2) inferences are asymmetric, with inferences from human properties to mammals emerging as stronger than inference from mammals to humans, and (3) children’s inferences violate their own similarity judgments by, for example, providing stronger inference from humans to bugs, then from bugs to bees (Carey 1985, 1995). These findings have been taken to indicate massive and early anthropomorphizing of the folkbiological domain.

However, when the folkbiological reasoning of both rural native American Menominee communities in Wisconsin and Yukatek Maya was investigated (Scott Atran et al. 2001), none of these three empirical patterns emerged. Among the Yukatek Maya, the human category appears to be incorporated into folkbiological induction relatively late. The results indicate that some background knowledge of the relevant species is crucial for the application and induction across a hierarchical taxonomy (Scott Atran et al. 2001). In rural environments both exposure to, and interest in, the natural world is commonplace, unavoidable, and a natural part of the enculturation process. This suggests that the anthropocentric patterns seen in U.S. urban children result from insufficient cultural input and a lack of exposure to the natural world. The only real animal that most urban children know much about is Homo sapiens, so it is not surprising that this species dominates their inferential patterns. Since such urban environments are highly “unnatural” from the perspective of human evolutionary history, any conclusions drawn from subjects reared in such informationally-depauperate environments must remain rather tentative. Indeed, studying the cognitive development of folkbiology in urban children would seem the equivalent of studying “normal” physical growth in malnourished children.

This deficiency of input likely underpins the fact that the basic level biological categories for WEIRD adults are life-form categories (e.g., bird, fish, and mammal) and these are also the first categories learned by children. (If you say “what’s that” (pointing at a maple tree), the common
answer is “tree”). However, in all small-scale societies studied, the generic species (e.g., trout, fox, and maple) are the basic level category and the first learned by children (S. Atran 1993, Berlin 1992).

Impoverished interactions with the natural world may also distort assessments of the typicality of natural kinds in categorization. The standard conclusion from research with American undergraduate samples has been that goodness of example, or typicality, is driven by similarity relations. A robin is a typical bird because this species shares many of the perceptual features that are commonly found in the category BIRD. In the absence of close familiarity with natural kinds, this is the default strategy American undergraduates resort to, and American psychology has assumed it is the universal pattern. However in samples which interact with the natural world regularly, such as professional taxonomists or Itza Maya villagers, typicality is based not on similarity, but on knowledge of cultural ideals, reflecting the symbolic or material significance of the species in that culture. For the Itza, the wild turkey is a typical bird, because of its rich cultural significance, even though it is in no way a bird most similar to other birds. The same pattern holds for similarity effects in inductive reasoning—WEIRD people make strong inferences from computations of similarity, whereas populations with greater familiarity with the natural world make strong inferences from folkbiological knowledge that takes into account ecological context and relationships among species (S. Atran, Medin, D. L., & Ross, N. O. 2005).

Above we have emphasized differences in folkbiological cognition uncovered by comparative research. This same work has also uncovered reliably developing aspects of human folkbiological cognition that do not vary, such as that categorization of plants and animals in all cultures follow the same hierarchical taxonomy, and that the generic species level has the strongest inductive potential, despite the fact that this level is not always the basic level across cultures. Our goal in emphasizing the differences here is to show (1) how peculiar industrialized (urban in this case) samples are given the unprecedented environment they grow up in, and (2) how difficult it is to figure out a priori what aspects will be reliably developing and robust across diverse slices of humanity if research is largely conducted with WEIRD samples.

**Spatial Cognition**

Human societies vary in their linguistic tools for, and cultural practices associated with, representing and communicating (1) directions in physical space, (2) the color spectrum, and (3) integer amounts. There is some evidence that each of these differences in cultural content may influence some aspect of non-linguistic cognitive processes (D’Andrade 1995, Gordon 2005, Kay 2005, Stephen C. Levinson 2003). Here we focus on spatial cognition, for which the evidence is most provocative. As above, it appears that industrialized societies are at the extreme end of the continuum in spatial cognition. Human populations show differences in how they think
about spatial orientation and deal with directions, and this difference may be influenced by linguistically-based spatial reference systems.

Speakers of English and other Indo-European languages favor the use of an egocentric system to represent the location of objects in relative terms (e.g., “the man is on the right side of the flagpole”). In contrast, many, if not most, languages, favor an allocentric frame which comes in two flavors. Some allocentric languages such as Guugu Yimidhirr (an Australian language) and Tzeltal (a Mayan language) favor a geocentric system in which absolute reference is based on cardinal directions (“the man is west of the house”). Another allocentric frame is an object-centered approach that locates objects in space relative to some fixed anchor (“the man is behind the house”). When languages possess systems for encoding all of these spatial reference frames, they often privilege one at the expense of the others. However, the fact that some languages lack one or more of the reference systems suggests that the accretion of all three systems into most contemporary languages may be a product of long-term cumulative cultural evolution.

In data on spatial reference systems from 20 languages drawn from diverse societies—including foragers, horticulturalists, agriculturalists, and industrialized populations—one three languages that relied on egocentric frames as their single preferred system of reference. All three were from industrialized populations: Japanese, English and Dutch (Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & Levinson 2004).

The presence of, or emphasis on, different reference systems may influence non-linguistic spatial reasoning (Stephen C. Levinson 2003). In one study, Dutch and Tzeltal speakers were seated at a table and shown an arrow pointing either to the right (north) or the left (south). They were then rotated 180 degrees to a second table where they saw two arrows: one pointing to the left (north) and the other one pointing to the right (south). Participants were asked which arrow on the second table was like the one they saw before. Consistent with the spatial-marking system of their languages, Dutch speakers chose the relative solution, whereas the Tzeltal speakers chose the absolute solution. Several other comparative experiments testing spatial memory and reasoning are consistent with this pattern, although, as in other young and growing fields, lively debates about interpretations persist (S. C. Levinson, Kita, Haun, & Rasch 2002, Li & Gleitman 2002).

Extending the above exploration, Haun and colleagues (2006, 2006) examined performance on a spatial reasoning task similar to the one described above using children and adults from different societies, and great apes. In the first step, Dutch-speaking adults and eight-year olds (speakers of an egocentric language) showed the typical egocentric bias, whereas Haifom-speaking adults and eight-year olds (a Namibian foraging population who speak an allocentric language) showed a typical allocentric bias. In the second step, four-year old German-speaking
children and great apes (gorillas, orangutans, chimpanzees, bonobos did not differ) were tested on a simplified version of the same task. Their performance showed a marked preference for allocentric reasoning. These results suggest that human children share with other great apes an innate preference for allocentric spatial reasoning, but that this bias can be overridden by input from language and cultural routines.

If one were to work on spatial cognition exclusively with WEIRD subjects (say, using subjects from Japan, the U.S. and Europe) one might conclude that children start off with an allocentric bias but gradually shift to an egocentric bias with maturation. The problem with this conclusion is that it would not apply to many human populations, and may be the product of particular cultural environments. In the next contrast, we will highlight additional evidence suggesting that WEIRD people may be unusual in their egocentric bias.

We have discussed several lines of comparative data suggesting that important psychological and behavioral variation exists among populations. There remain numerous smaller-scale comparative studies hinting that the above studies may be only the tip of the iceberg. For example, research comparing two small-scale societies with two industrialized populations, including American undergraduates, show that only the industrialized populations are risk averse decision makers when facing monetary gambles involving gains (J. Henrich & McElreath 2002). Similarly, extensive inter-temporal choice experiments using a panel method of data collection indicates that the Tsimane, an Amazonian population of forager-horticulturalists, discount the future 10 times more steeply than WEIRD people (Godoy et al. 2004).

**Similarities Between Industrialized and Small-Scale Societies**

Some larger-scale comparative projects show universal patterns and processes in human psychology. Here we list some noteworthy examples:

1) **Illusions:** We discussed the Mueller-Lyer illusion above, which varies rather dramatically across populations. However, there are illusions, such as the Perspective Drawing Illusion, for which perception does not vary much in the populations studied (Segall et al. 1966).

2) **Perceiving color:** While the number of basic color terms systematically varies across human languages (Regier, Kay, & Cook 2005), the ability to perceive different colors does
emerge in small-scale societies (Rivers 1901),¹ although terms and categories do influence color perception at the margins (Kay & Regier 2006).

3) Emotional expression: In studying facial display of emotions, Ekman and colleagues have shown much evidence for universality in recognition of the “basic” facial expressions of emotions, although this work has included only a small—yet convincing—sampling of small-scale societies (Ekman 1999a, 1999b). There is also evidence for the universality of pride displays (Tracy & Matsumoto 2008, Tracy & Robins 2008). This main effect for emotional recognition across population (approximately 58% of variance) is qualified by a smaller effect for cultural specificity of emotional expressions (approximately 9% of variance: Elfenbein & Ambady 2002).

4) Theory of mind: Comparative work in China, U.S., Canada, Peru, India, Samoa and Thailand suggests that theory of mind does emerge in all populations studied (Callaghan et al. 2004, Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh 2008), although the age at which subjects can pass the explicit version of the false belief task varies from 4 to at least 9 (Boesch 2007), with industrialized populations at the extreme low end.

5) Attraction to small feet in women: Comparative data from nine populations, including small-scale societies, show that small feet on women are considered more attractive, while average sized feet are preferred on men (D. M. T. Fessler et al. 2005).

There are also numerous studies in which dyadic comparisons have been made between a single small-scale society and a western population, or a pattern of western results in which cross-cultural similarities have been found. Examples are numerous but include the development of an understanding of death (Barrett & Behne 2005), shame (Daniel M. T. Fessler 2004) and cheater detection (L. S. Sugiyama, Tooby, & Cosmides 2002). Finding evidence for similarities across two such disparate populations is an important step towards providing strong evidence for universality (Norenzayan and Heine 2005); however, the case would be considerably stronger if it was found across a larger number of diverse populations.²

¹ Rivers examined whether cultures with a single color term for blue and green could tell the difference between a blue and a green thread. They could.

² To illustrate the limits of inferring universality from two-culture comparisons we note the finding that field independence on the Rod and Frame task is shown both for migratory foragers and Americans (Witkin & Berry 1975), yet East Asians and sedentary foragers show evidence for field dependence (Ji, Peng, & Nisbett 2000).
Summary for Contrast 1

Although there are several domains in which the data from small-scale societies appear similar to that from industrialized societies, comparative projects involving visual illusions, social motivations (fairness), folkbiological cognition, and spatial cognition all show industrialized populations as outliers. For these latter domains, it is problematic to assume that the findings from industrialized populations are generalizable to humans more broadly. If such seemingly basic psychological processes as these vary across populations, it is not clear how we can determine a priori which findings derived from industrialized populations do not need to be validated with systematic comparative research.

Contrast 2: Western\(^3\) vs. Non-Western Societies

For our second contrast, we review evidence comparing Western to non-Western populations. We emphasize that Westerners are, of course, behaviorally and psychologically very similar to the rest of the world in many ways. However, in much of the available work comparing Western and non-Western populations, Westerners are a frequent outlier (with some important exceptions), or are at least unusual. Here we examine four of the most studied domains, including social decision-making and punishment, independent vs. interdependent self-concepts (and associated motivations), analytic vs. holistic reasoning, and moral reasoning. We will also briefly return to spatial cognition.

Anti-social punishment and cooperation with anonymous others

In the previous contrast we reviewed decision-making experiments showing that industrialized populations occupy the extreme end of the behavioral distribution vis-à-vis a broad swath of smaller-scale societies. Here we show that even among industrialized populations, western populations are again clumped at the extreme end of the behavioral distribution. Notably, the behaviors measured in the experiments discussed below are strongly correlated with the strength of formal institutions, norms of civic cooperation, and GDP per capita.

In 2002 Fehr and Gächter published their classic paper, “Altruistic Punishment in Humans,” in the pages of *Nature*, based on public goods games with and without punishment conducted

\(^3\) We are using “Western” as a handy label for those countries clustered in the north-west of Europe (U.K. France, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, etc.), and British descent societies such the U.S. Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. In particular, we are concerned about those populations from which most subjects in behavioral and psychological experiments are drawn. To what degree this label captures relative homogeneity remains an open question, though the findings here suggest it captures something. We recognize that there are important limitations and problems with this label, but we use it for convenience.
with undergraduates at the University of Zurich (also see E. Fehr & Gachter 2000 for repeated games). The paper demonstrated that adding the possibility of punishment to a cooperative dilemma dramatically altered the outcome from a gradual slide towards little cooperation (and rampant free-riding) to a steady increase towards stable cooperation. Enough subjects were willing to punish non-cooperators at a cost to themselves to shift the balance from free-riding to cooperation.

To examine the generalizability of these results, which many took to be a feature of our species, Herrmann, Thoni and Gächter (2008) conducted systematic comparable experiments among undergraduates from a diverse swath of industrialized nations, including Oman, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Belarus, Turkey and Korea. In these repeated public good games, subjects played with the same four partners for 10 rounds and could contribute during each round to a group project. All contributions to the group project were multiplied by 1.6 and distributed equally among all four partners. Players could also pay to punish other players by taking money away from them. For each dollar paid to punish someone, the punishee lost three dollars.

In about half of these samples, Gächter’s team found something not observed beyond a trivial degree in Western subjects (see Figure 4): many subjects engaged in anti-social punishment; that is, they paid to reduce the earning of “overly” cooperative individuals (those who contributed more than the punisher). The effect of this behavior on levels of cooperation was dramatic, completely compensating for the cooperation-inducing effects of punishment in the Zurich experiment. Possibilities for altruistic punishment do not generate high levels of cooperation in these populations. Meanwhile, participants from a number of Western countries, such as the U.S., U.K, and Australia, behaved like the original Zurich students. Thus, it appears that the Zurich sample is fine for generalizing to the patterns of other Western samples (as well as the Chinese sample), but such findings cannot be readily extended beyond this.
Fig. 4. Mean punishment expenditures from each sample for a given deviation from the punisher’s contribution to the public good. The deviations of the punished subject’s contribution from the punisher’s contribution are grouped into five intervals, where [-20,-11]([-10,-1]) indicates that the punished subjects contributed between 11 and 20 less than the punishing subject; [0] indicates that the punished subject contributed exactly the same amount as the punishing subject and [1,10]([11,20]) indicates that the punished subject contributed between 1 and 10 (11 and 20) more than the punishing subject. Adapted from Herrmann et. al. (2008).

Independent and Interdependent Self-Concepts

Much psychological research has explored the nature of people’s self-concepts. Self-concepts are important as they organize the information that people have about themselves, direct attention to information that is perceived to be relevant, shape motivations, influence how people appraise situations that influence their emotional experiences, and guide their choices of relationship partners. In a seminal paper Markus and Kitayama (1991) posited that the self-concept can take on one of two forms along a continuum, with the exemplars termed independent and interdependent self-views. Do people conceive of themselves primarily as self-contained individuals, understanding themselves as autonomous agents that consist largely
of component parts, such as their attitudes, personality traits, and abilities? Or do they conceive of themselves as interpersonal beings intertwined with one another in social webs, with incumbent role-based obligations towards others within those networks? The extent to which people perceive themselves in ways similar to these independent or interdependent self-views has significant consequences for a variety of emotions, cognitions, and motivations.

Much research has underscored how Westerners have more independent views of self than non-Westerners. For example, research using the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn & McPartland 1954) reveals that people from Western populations (e.g., Australians, Americans, Canadians, Swedes) are far more likely to understand their selves in terms of internal psychological characteristics, such as their personality traits and attitudes, and are less likely to understand them in terms of roles and relationships, than are people from non-Western populations, such as Native Americans, Cook Islanders, Massai, Samburu, Malaysians, and East Asians (for a review see Heine 2008). Studies using other measures (G. Hofstede 1980, Morling & Lamoresux in press, Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier 2002) provide convergent evidence that Westerners tend to have more independent, and less interdependent, self-concepts than those of many other populations. Recent evidence indicates that Russian university students are more interdependent than their American counterparts in both explicit and implicit measures of self-construal (Grossman 2008). These data converge with much ethnographic observation, in particular Geertz’s (1974: 16) claim that the Western self is, “however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world cultures.”

There are numerous psychological patterns associated with self-concepts. For example, people with independent self-concepts (and people from individualistic cultures, more generally) are more likely to demonstrate (1) positively biased views of themselves, (2) tendencies to base long-term relationships more on feelings of romantic love, (3) a heightened valuation of personal choice, and (4) an increased motivation to “stand out” rather than to “fit in.” Each of these represents significant research enterprises within psychology, and we discuss them in turn.

**Positive Self-Views**

Perhaps the most widely endorsed assumption regarding the self is that people are motivated to view themselves positively. Brown (1986) famously declared this motivation to maintain high self-esteem an “urge so deeply human, we can hardly imagine its absence” (p. 534). The strength of this motivation has been perhaps most clearly documented by assessing the ways that people go about exaggerating the positivity of their self-views by engaging in self-serving biases, in which people view themselves more positively than objective benchmarks would justify. For example, in one study, ninety-four percent of American college professors rated themselves as a better-than-average professors (Cross 1977). However, meta-analyses reveals
that these self-serving biases tend to be far more pronounced in Western populations than in non-Western ones (Heine & Hamamura 2007, Mezulis 2004); for example, Mexicans (Tropp & Wright 2003), Native Americans (Fryberg & Markus 2003), Chileans (Heine & Raineri, in press), and Fijians (Rennie & Dunne 1994) score much lower on various measures of positive self-views than do Westerners (although there are some exceptions to this general pattern; Harrington & Liu, 2002). Indeed, in some cultural contexts, most notably East Asian ones, evidence for self-serving biases tends to be null, or in some cases, there are significant reversals, with East Asians demonstrating self-effacing biases (Heine & Hamamura 2007). The sharp self-enhancing tendencies of Westerners are not as pronounced as in much of the rest of the world, though self-enhancement has long been discussed as if it were a fundamental aspect of universal human psychology (e.g., Rogers 1951, Tesser 1988).

Romantic Love as a Basis of Marriage

While feelings of romantic love appear to be universally experienced (see meta-analysis of ethnographies by Jankowiak & Fischer 1992), romantic love as the basis of a marriage is not universally recognized. Marriages are less likely to be based on romantic love (i.e., they are arranged by other family members) in “collectivistic” societies where extended family ties are stronger (see meta-analysis by G. R. Lee & Stone 1980); in the absence of family and social pressures, apparently romantic love becomes more important to hold the relationship together. In one international survey of students from India, Pakistan, Thailand, United States, England, Japan, Philippines, Mexico, Brazil, Hong Kong, Australia, the vast majority of university students from Western countries (as well as Hong Kong) said that they would not marry someone unless they loved them, whereas students from most of the non-Western populations that were studied were more likely to entertain the possibility of marriage preceding love (R. Levine, Sato, Hashimoto, & Verma 1995). Ironically, the greater emphasis on romantic love in marriages in Western cultures is paralleled by a higher divorce rate (United Nations Statistics Division, 2004). Marriages which are largely based on romance in Western cultures appear to exist in more conditional and tenuous terms than they do in cultures where the marriages are not founded on feelings of romantic love. Much psychological research on relationships has attended to the loss of love, and dissolution of, long-term relationships (e.g., Gottman 1993, Rusbult 1983).

Personal Choice

Psychology has long been fascinated with how people assert agency by making choices (Bandura 1982, Kahneman & Tversky 2000, B. Schwartz 2004), and has explored the efforts that people go through to ensure that their actions feel freely chosen and that their choices are sensible. However, there is considerable variation across populations in the extent that people value choice and the range of behaviors over which they feel that they are making choices. For
example, one study found that European-American children preferred working on a task, worked on it longer, and performed better on it, if they had made some superficial choices regarding the task than if others made the same choices for them; in contrast, Asian-American children were equally motivated by the task if a trusted other made the same choices for them or if they had made the choices themselves (Iyengar & Lepper 1999). Another study found that Indian participants were slower at making choices, and were less likely to make choices consistent with their personal preferences, than were Americans (Savani, Markus, & Conner in press). Surveys conducted at bank branches in countries in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and the United States found that Americans were more likely to perceive having more choice at their jobs than those from the other countries (Iyengar & DeVoe 2003). A large-scale value survey administered in over 40 countries from around the world found, in general, that feelings of free choice in one’s life was considerably higher in Western nations (e.g., Finland, the US, and Northern Ireland) than in various non-Western nations (e.g., Turkey, Japan, and Belarus: Inglehart et al. 1998). This research reveals that perceptions of choice are experienced less often, and are a lesser concern, among those from non-Western cultures compared with Westerners.

Motivations to Conform
Many studies have explored whether motivations to conform are similar across populations employing an experimental procedure developed by Asch (1951, R. Bond, & Smith, P. B. 1996). In these studies, which were initially conducted with Americans, participants first heard a number of confederates making an obviously incorrect visual judgment, and then participants are given the opportunity to state their own judgment. A majority of American participants have been found to go along with the majority’s incorrect judgment at least once. This research sparked much interest, and a meta-analysis of studies performed in 17 societies (R. Bond & Smith 1996), including subjects from Oceania, the Middle East, South America, Africa, South America, East Asia, Europe, and the U.S., found that motivations for conformity are weaker in Western societies then elsewhere. Other research provides convergent findings to the notion that motivations for conformity are weaker in Western contexts than in non-Western ones. For example, Kim and Markus (1999) found that Koreans preferred objects that were more common whereas Americans showed a greater preference for objects that were more unusual.

Analytic vs. Holistic Reasoning
Variation in favored modes of reasoning has been compared across several populations. Most of the research has contrasted Western (American, Canadian, West European) and East Asian (Chinese, Japanese, Korean) populations with regard to their relative reliance on what is known as holistic vs. analytic reasoning (R. E. Nisbett 2003, K. Peng & Nisbett 1999). However, growing evidence from other non-Western populations point to a divide between Western nations and
everyone else, including groups as diverse as Arab, Malaysian, and Russians (see Norenzayan, Choi, & Peng 2007 for review), as well as subsistence farmers and sedentary foragers (Norenzayan, Henrich, & McElreath n.d., Witkin & Berry 1975), rather than an East-West divide. Holistic thought involves an orientation to the context or field as a whole, including attention to relationships between a focal object and the field, and a preference for explaining and predicting events on the basis of such relationships. Analytic thought involves a detachment of the object from its context, a tendency to focus on attributes of the object, and a preference for using rules about the categories to explain and predict the object’s behavior. This distinction between habits of thought rests on a theoretical partition made in psychology between two reasoning systems. One system is relatively associative, and its computations reflect similarity and contiguity (i.e., whether two stimuli share perceptual resemblance and co-occur in time); the other system relies on more abstract, symbolic representational systems, and its computations are a reflection of rule structure (e.g., Neisser 1963, Sloman 1996).

Although both systems of thought are in principle cognitively available to all normal adults, different environments, experiences, and cultural routines may encourage reliance on one system at the expense of another, giving rise to systematic population differences in the use of these different cognitive strategies to solve identical problems. There is growing evidence that a key factor in giving rise to analytic vs. holistic cognition is the different self-construals prevalent across cultures. First, independent self-construal primes facilitate analytic processing, whereas interdependent primes facilitate holistic processing (Oyserman & Lee 2008). Second, geographic regions with greater prevalence of independent self-construals show more holistic processing, as can be seen in comparisons of Northern and Southern Italians, Hokkaido Japanese and mainland Japanese, and Western and Eastern Europeans (Varnum, Grossman, Kitayama, & Nisbett 2008).

Furthermore, the analytic approach is culturally more valued in Western contexts, whereas the holistic approach is more valued in East Asian contexts, leading to normative judgments about cognitive strategies that differ across the respective populations (e.g., Buchtel & Norenzayan, in press). Below we highlight some findings from this research showing that, compared to diverse populations of non-westerners, Westerners (1) attend more to objects than fields, (2) explain behavior in more decontextualized terms, (3) rely more on rules rather than similarity relations to classify objects, and (4) rely less on dialectical and intuitive reasoning compared to logical reasoning (for further discussion of the cross-cultural evidence R. E. Nisbett 2003, Norenzayan et al. 2007).

**Westerners attend more to objects than fields.**

Using evidence derived mostly from the Rod and Frame Test and Embedded Figures Test, Witkin and Berry (1975) summarize a wide range of evidence from work with migratory and
sedentary foraging populations (Arctic, Australia and Africa), sedentary agriculturalists, and industrialized westerners. Only Westerners and migratory foragers consistently emerged at the field independent end of the spectrum.

Recent work among East Asians (Ji, Nisbett, & Zhang 2004) in industrialized societies using the Rod and Frame Test again shows Westerners at the field independent end of the spectrum, compared to East Asians. Research using the embedded figure test among Americans, Germans, Malaysians, and Russians (Kuhnen et al. 2001) finds both Americans and Germans to be field independent (and indistinguishable) compared to the more field dependent Malays and Russians (who were indistinguishable). On a variety of cognitive measures, Russian university students were more holistic than American students (Grossman 2008). Testing Canadian, Chinese, and Arabs on the Group Embedded Figures Test, Norenzayan et al (2008) found that Canadians showed less field-dependent processing than the Chinese, who in turn were less field-dependent than the Arabs. See also Zebian and Denny (2001).

East Asians’ recall for focal objects is worse than Americans if the background has been switched (Masuda & Nisbett 2001), indicating that they are attending to the field more. This difference in attention has also been found in saccadic eye-movements as measured with eye-trackers. Americans gaze at focal objects longer than East Asians, who in turn gaze at the background more than Americans (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett 2005).

**Westerners explain behavior in decontextualized terms**

If Westerners are more inclined to decontextualize objects, it follows that Westerners would be inclined to explain behavior by exclusive reference to properties of the person. A number of classic studies, (initially conducted with Western participants), found that people tend to make strong attributions about a person’s disposition, even when there are compelling situational constraints available (Jones & Harris 1967, Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz 1977). This tendency to ignore situational information in favor of personality information is so commonly observed—among typical subjects—it has been dubbed the “fundamental attribution error” (Ross et al. 1977).

However, consistent with much ethnography in non-Western cultures (e.g., Geertz 1975), experimental cross cultural work demonstrates stark differences in how people make sense of other’s behaviors. While Americans attend to dispositions at the expense of situations (Gilbert & Malone 1995), East Asians are more likely to infer that behaviors are strongly controlled by the situation (Miyamoto & Kitayama 2002, Morris & Peng 1994, Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett 2002, Van Boven, Kamada, & Gilovich 1999), particularly when situational information is made
salient (Choi & Nisbett 1998). Recently Grossman (2008) found that Russians also show less dispositional bias than Americans. In sum, the fundamental attribution error does not appear to be all that fundamental, and instead may represent a population-specific peculiarity.

Recently, in an investigation of people’s lay beliefs about personality across eight populations, Church et al. (2006) found that people from Western populations (i.e., American and Euro-Australian) strongly endorsed the notions that traits remain stable over time and predict behavior over many situations, while those from non-Western populations (i.e., Asian-Australian, Chinese-Malaysian, Filipino, Japanese, Mexican, and Malay) more strongly endorsed contextual beliefs about personality, such as ideas that traits do not describe a person as well as roles or duties, and that trait-related behavior changes from situation to situation. These patterns are consistent with earlier work comparing Euro-Americans with Hindu Indians (see Shweder and Bourne (1982) and Miller (1984)).

**Westerners rely on rules rather than similarity relations to group objects and reason about arguments.**

In one set of experiments Chinese subjects were more likely to group together objects which shared a functional (e.g., pencil-notebook) or contextual (e.g., sky-sunshine) relationship while Americans were more likely to group objects together if they belonged to the same category defined by a simple rule (e.g., notebook-magazine) (Ji et al. 2004). Similarly, work in the mid-twentieth century shows that Russian peasants showed strong tendencies to group objects according to their practical functions (Luria 1976). Even today, Grossman (2008) found Russian students were more likely to group objects according to functional and thematic relations compared to American students. This appears widespread, as Norenzayan et. al. (n.d.) examined classification among the Mapuche and Sangu subsistence farmers in Chile and Tanzania, respectively, and found that their classification resembled the Chinese pattern, although it was more exaggerated towards holistic reasoning.

In a similar vein, research with East Asians found they were more likely to group objects if they shared a strong family resemblance structure, whereas Americans were more likely to group the same objects if they could be assigned to that group on the basis of a deterministic rule (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett 2002). When those results are compared to Uskul and colleagues (Uskul, Kitayama, & Nisbett 2008) findings from herders, fishermen, and farmers living on the northeast coast of Turkey, it is evident that European Americans are again a clear outlier sample (Figure 5).

4 See also Knowles et. al. (2001); but, for contrary findings see Lieberman, Jarcho, & Oabayashi (2005).
Experimental work has revealed a “belief bias” in deductive reasoning: more plausible conclusions are judged as more logically valid than less plausible ones (Sloman 1996). In one study, Norenzayan et al. (2002) found that the belief bias was greater for Koreans than for Americans for equally valid arguments. In comparing the belief bias among Arabs, Euro Canadians and Chinese, Arabs showed the strongest bias, followed by Chinese. Euro Canadians showed this bias the least (Norenzayan et al. 2007).

In summary, a large body of evidence shows that the habitual use of what are considered “basic” cognitive processes, including those involved in attention, perception, categorization, deductive reasoning, and social inference, vary systematically across social groups in predictable ways, highlighting the difference between the West and Rest. We emphasize the Westerners are not completely unique in their cognitive styles. It may be that they share some cognitive patterns with nomadic foragers and herders (Uskul et al. 2008, Witkin & Berry 1975). However it is evident that generalizing from Western samples to humanity regarding such basic cognitive processes is highly problematic.

**Moral Reasoning**

One central concern in the developmental literature has been the way people acquire the cognitive foundations of moral reasoning. The most influential approach to the development of moral reasoning has been Kohlberg’s (1971, 1976, 1981) framework, in which people’s abilities to reason morally are seen to hinge on cognitive abilities that develop as individuals mature.
Kohlberg proposed that people progressed through the same three levels: (1) young children start out at a pre-conventional level and view what is right or wrong based on the physical or hedonistic consequences of their actions; 2) children then progress to a conventional level where moral behavior is perceived to be that which maintains the social order of their group; and 3) some people finally progress further to a post-conventional level and view what is right and wrong on the basis of abstract ethical principles regarding justice and individual rights—the moral code inherent in the US Constitution.

While all of Kohlberg’s levels are commonly found in WEIRD populations, much subsequent research has revealed scant evidence for post-conventional moral reasoning in many other populations. One meta-analysis of research carried out with data from 27 countries found consistent evidence for post-conventional moral reasoning in all the Western urbanized samples, yet found no evidence for this type of reasoning in small-scale societies (Snarey 1985). Furthermore, it is not just that formal education is necessary to achieve Kohlberg’s post-conventional level. Some highly educated non-Western populations do not show this post-conventional reasoning. At Kuwait University, for example, faculty members score lower on Kohlberg’s schemes than the typical norms for Western adults, and the elder faculty there scored no higher than the younger ones, contrary to Western patterns (Al-Shehab 2002, Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood 1990).

Research in moral psychology also indicates that non-Western adults and Western religious conservatives rely on a wider range of moral principles than a morality of justice (Baek 2002, Haidt & Graham 2007, Haidt, Koller, & Dias 1993, e.g., Miller & Bersoff 1992). Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park (1997) proposed that in addition to a dominant justice-based morality, which they termed an ethic of autonomy, there are two other ethics that are commonly found outside the West: an ethic of communion, in which morality derives from the fulfillment of interpersonal obligations, and an ethic of divinity in which moral decisions are based on the fit with a perceived natural order (for a further elaboration of alternative moral foundations see Haidt & Graham 2007). In sum, the high-SES, secular Western students that have been the primary target of study thus far appear unusual in a global context, based on their peculiar reliance on a single foundation for moral reasoning (based on justice and individual rights).

Other Differences

With reference to the spatial reasoning patterns discussed above, emerging evidence is suggesting that a geocentric bias (a type of allocentric bias) may be much more widespread than previously thought – indeed, it may be the common pattern outside of the West (even among non-Western speakers of languages which make regular use of egocentric linguistic markers). Comparative research contrasting children and adults in Geneva with samples in Indonesia, Nepal, and rural and urban India have found the typical geocentric reasoning pattern
in all of these populations except for the Geneva samples (Dasen, Mishra, Niraula, & Wassmann 2006). While many of these population-level differences are pronounced, more research is needed before we can assess whether the geocentric pattern is common across a broader swath of humanity.

There are many other psychological phenomena which have been shown to differ between Western samples and certain non-Western ones; however, at present a sufficient number of diverse populations have not yet been studied to allow us to assess whether the non-Western findings generalize broadly to other samples. For example, compared with Westerners, non-Westerners may (1) view enemies as a natural and important aspect of relationships (Adams 2005), (2) prefer lower to higher arousal positive affective states (Tsai 2007), (3) be less egocentric in their perspective-taking (Cohen, Hoshino-Browne, & Leung 2007, Wu & Keysar 2007), (4) have weaker motivations for consistency (Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus 2001, Suh 2002), (5) be less prone to social loafing (Earley 1993), and (6) have more pronounced avoidance motivations (Elliot, Chirkov, Kim, & Sheldon 2001, A. Y. Lee, Aaker, & Gardner 2000).

Data from a broader spectrum of samples are needed before any of these other core domains could be added to the list that distinguishes the West from the rest.

**Similarities Between Western and Non-Western Societies**

We expect that if more large-scale comparative studies of Western and non-Western populations were conducted, they would often reveal similarities in psychological processes. However, given the relative ease of conducting such studies (as compared to working in small-scale societies) there have been few comparative research programs that have put universality claims to the test. Here we highlight four examples of larger-scale comparative projects that show broad and important similarities across populations.

1) Buss (1989) compared people from 37 (largely industrialized) populations around the world and found some striking similarities in their mate preferences. In all 37 of the populations, males ranked the physical attractiveness of their mates to be more important than did females, and in 34 of the 37 populations (the exceptions being Colombians, Spanish, and South African Zulus), females ranked the ambition and industriousness of their mates as more important than did males (but for other interpretations see Eagly & Wood 1999). Interestingly, evidence indicates a somewhat different pattern in small-scale societies, see Marlowe (2004), Moore et al. (2006), and Pillsworth (forthcoming).

2) Recent efforts have taken personality instruments to university students in 51 different countries (McCrae et al. 2005). In most of these populations the same factor structure emerges that has previously been found with American samples, although note that the
factor structure was less evident in a number of developing populations (e.g., Botswana, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Puerto Rico, Uganda, arguably because the data quality was rather poor, suggesting that people may not have fully understood the questions. To the extent that unfamiliarity with Western measures can account for the anomalous factor structure in these populations this is good evidence that the Five Factor Model reflects the universal structure of personality (also see Allik & McCrae 2004, Yik, Russell, Ahn, Fernandez-Dols, & Suzuki 2002).  

3) Comparative research examining men’s preferred waist to hip ratios in potential mates finds that men in both industrialized and developing large-scale populations prefer a waist to hip ratio of around 0.7 (Singh 2006, Singh & Luis 1994, 2003, Swami, Neto, Tovée, & Furnham 2007).  

4) Research exploring the effects of reminders of death on subjects’ tendencies to defend their cultural worldviews has revealed parallel findings in at least 15 countries, including non-Western societies such as Japan, Iran, and among Australians of aboriginal descent (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, & Maxfield 2006). However, as each study employs a different dependent measure, the magnitude of these effects across populations cannot be directly compared.

Summary of Contrast 2
The above findings suggest that along a number of important dimensions, Western populations are unusual, and are frequently outliers. These domains include (1) anti-social punishment, (2) self-concept and associated motivations, (3) analytic and holistic reasoning, and (4) moral reasoning. In each case, the early experiments done in the West were assumed to be universal. The experiments reviewed are numerous, arise from different disciplines, use diverse methods, and are often part of systematically comparable data sets created by unified projects.

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5 The robustness of the Five Factor Model is considerably weaker when the model is derived from indigenous personality traits from other languages, although some of the five traits do still emerge (Benet-Martinez & Waller 1995, Cheung et al. 1996, Saucier, Georgiades, Tsousis, & Goldberg 2005).

6 While these effects are fairly robust in large-scale societies, efforts to replicate these finding in various small-scale societies have failed (Marlowe & Wetsman 2001, Lawrence S. Sugiyama 2004, Yu & Shepard 1998) These failures suggest a more complicated, and context-specific, set of evolutionary hypotheses (Marlowe, Apicella, & Reed 2005, Swami & Tovée 2007).
Contrast 3: Contemporary Americans vs. the Rest of West

Above we considered evidence that WEIRD populations respond differently from non-Western populations. However, there is variation within the West, and thus, given the dominance of American research within psychology (May, 1997), it is important to assess the similarity of American data with that from Westerners more generally. Is it reasonable to generalize from Americans to the rest of the West? Americans are, of course, people too, so they naturally must share many psychological characteristics with all other Homo sapiens. At present, we could find no systematic research program to compare Americans to other Westerners, so the evidence presented is assembled from many sources.

Individualism and Related Psychological Phenomena

Americans stand out relative to Westerners for phenomena that are associated with independent self-concepts and individualism. A number of analyses, using a diverse range of methods, reveal that Americans are, on average, the most individualistic people in the world (e.g., G. Hofstede 1980, Lipset 1996, Morling & Lamoresux in press, Oyserman et al. 2002). The observation that the US is especially individualistic is not new, and dates at least as far back as Toqueville (1835). The unusually individualistic nature of Americans may be caused by, or reflect, an American ideology that particularly stresses the importance of freedom and self-sufficiency, as well as various practices in education and child-rearing may help to inculcate this sense of autonomy. American parents, for example, were the only ones in a survey of 100 societies who created a separate room for their baby to sleep (Burton & Whiting 1961, also see Lewis 1995), reflecting that from the time they are born, Americans are raised in an environment that emphasizes their independence.

The extreme individualism of Americans is evident in many demographic and political measures. In American Exceptionalism, political sociologist Seymour Lipset (1996) documents a long list of the ways that Americans are unique in the Western world. At the time of Lipset’s surveys, compared with other Western industrialized societies, Americans were found to be the most patriotic, litigious, philanthropic, and populist (they have the most positions for elections and the elections are held the most frequently, although they have among the lowest turnout rates at elections). They were also among the most optimistic, and the least class-conscious. They were the most churchgoing in Protestantism, and the most fundamentalist in Christendom, and were more likely than others from Western industrialized countries to see the world in absolute moral terms. In contrast to other large Western industrialized societies, the US had the highest crime rate, the longest working hours, the highest divorce rate, the highest rate of volunteerism, the highest percentage of citizens that went on to post-secondary education, the highest overall productivity rate, the highest GDP, the highest poverty rate, the highest income inequality rate, and were in the least support of various governmental
interventions. The US is the only industrialized society that never had a viable socialist movement, and was the last country to get a national pension plan, unemployment insurance, accident insurance, and remains the only industrialized nation that does not have a general allowance for families or a national health insurance plan. In sum, one does not need to turn to experimental data to see evidence, as Tocqueville himself did almost two centuries ago, that the US is an outlier among Western nations.

Given the centrality of the self-concept to so many psychological processes, it follows that the unusual emphasis on individualism and independence of Americans would be reflected in a wide spectrum of self-related phenomena. For example, self-concepts are clearly implicated when people make choices (e.g., Vohs et al. 2008). While Westerners tend to value choices more than non-Westerners (e.g., Iyengar & DeVoe 2003), Americans appear to value making choices more still, and prefer more opportunities, than do those from other cultures (Savani et al. in press). For example, in a survey of people from six Western countries, only Americans would prefer a choice from 50 different ice cream flavors compared with 10 different flavors. Likewise, Americans (and Britons) prefer to have more choices on menus from upscale restaurants than do those from other European countries (Rozin, Fischler, Shields, & Masson 2006). The array of choices available, and people’s motivation to make such choices, are more extreme in the US.

In the previous section, we discussed Herrmann et. al.’s (2008) work showing substantial differences in anti-social punishment and cooperation between Western and non-Western societies. While Western countries all clump at one end of Figure 4, the Americans anchor the extreme end of the West’s distribution. Perhaps it is for this same reason that Americans have the world’s highest worker productivity.

**Similarities between Americans and Westerners**

As we proceed down our set of telescoping contrasts we expect the amount of similarity to increase; thus, American populations should be even more similar to other Western societies than the West is to the rest. However, even this is not firmly established. We are unable to locate any research program (other than the ones reviewed in the first two telescoping contrasts) that has demonstrated that American psychological and behavioral patterns are similar to other Westerners. We suspect that many researchers share our impression of the similarity between the US and the rest of the West, and perhaps this is why we are not able to find studies that have been explicitly conducted to establish these similarities—many researchers likely wouldn’t see such studies as worth the effort. And, in the absence of comparative evidence for a given phenomenon it might not be unreasonable to assume that the Americans will look similar to rest of the West. However, the above findings provide a hint that, at least along some key dimensions, Americans are extreme.
Contrast 4: Typical Contemporary American Subjects vs. Other Americans

The previous contrasts have revealed that WEIRD people frequently occupy the tail-end of distributions of psychological and behavioral phenomena. However, it is important to recognize, as a number of researchers have noted (e.g., Arnett Forthcoming, Sears 1986), that the vast majority of behavioral research on non-clinical populations within North America is conducted on undergraduates (Peterson 2001, Wintre et al. 2001). Further, within psychology, the individuals are usually psychology majors, or at least taking introductory psychology courses. In the case of child participants, they are quite often the progeny of high socioeconomic status (SES) people. Thus, there are numerous social, economic, and demographic dimensions that tentatively suggest these subjects might be unusual. But, are they?

Social Psychology

While highly educated Americans are still people, and thus similar to other people in innumerable ways, they have been found to differ from other Americans in many important respects. For a number of the phenomena reviewed above in which Americans were identified as global outliers, highly educated Americans occupy an even more extreme position than less educated Americans. These findings are summarized below:

1) Although college-educated Americans have been found to rationalize their choices in dozens of post-choice dissonance studies, Snibbe and Markus (2005) found that non-college educated American adults do not (c.f., Sheth 1970).

2) Although Americans are the most individualistic people in the world, American undergraduates tend to score higher on some measures of individualism than do their non-college educated counterparts, particularly for those aspects associated with self-actualization, uniqueness, and an internal locus of control (Kusserow 1999, Snibbe & Markus 2005).

3) Conformity motivations were found to be weaker among college-educated Americans than non-college-educated Americans (Stephens, Markus, & Townsend 2007), who acted in ways more similar to that observed in East Asian samples (cf., Kim & Markus 1999).

4) Non-college educated adults tend to be embedded in more tightly-structured social networks than do college students (Lamont 2000), which raises the question of whether research on relationship formation, dissolution, and interdependence conducted among students will generalize to the population at large.

5) Consistent with the above observation, a large study that sampled participants from the general population in Southeast Michigan found that working class people were reliably more
interdependent and more holistic than middle class people (Na, Grossmann, Varunum, Kitayama, & Nisbett 2009).


A large scale second-order meta-analysis ($N > 650,000$, $K > 7000$) of studies that either included college student samples or non-student adult samples revealed that the two groups differed either directionally or in magnitude for approximately half of the phenomena studied (e.g., attitudes, gender perceptions, social desirability: Peterson 2001). However, no clear pattern regarding the factors that accounted for the differences emerged. In addition, other research has found that American undergraduates have higher degrees of self-monitoring (Reifman, Klein, & Murphy 1989), are more susceptible to attitude change (Krosnick & Alwin 1989), and are more susceptible to social influence (Pasupathi 1999) compared to non-student adults.

Behavioral Economics

Research in behavioral economics indicates substantial differences between undergraduate and non-student adults. For example, in both the Ultimatum and Dictator Games non-student Americans (both rural and urban participants) make significantly higher offers than undergraduate subjects (N. S. Henrich & Henrich 2007). The difference is most pronounced in Dictator games in which samples of non-student American adults from Missouri (urban and rural Missouri did not differ) offered a mean 47% of the total stake while undergraduate freshman gave 32%, well within the typical range for undergraduates in this game (Camerer 2003, Ensminger & Cook under review, J. Henrich & Henrich under review). The seemingly high Missouri non-student adult offers in the Dictator Game are similar to those found in other non-student adult samples in the U.S. (Carpenter, Burks, & Verhoogen 2005, N. S. Henrich & Henrich 2007). Similarly, research comparing students to a representative random sample of adults using the Trust Game show that undergraduates provide a lower bound in measures of both trust and trustworthiness (Bellemare & Kroger 2007). Other studies also show the peculiarity of student subjects (Bosch-Domenech & et al. 2002, Ernst Fehr & List 2004, Gaechter, Herrmann, & Thoni 2004, Haigh & List 2005).

Research also indicates that within the age range of undergraduates developmental or acculturative behavioral changes are still occurring (J. Henrich 2008). For example, Ultimatum Game offers continue to change over university years, with freshman making lower offers than seniors (Carter & Irons 1991). Other work shows that in the Ultimatum Game offers do not hit
their adult plateau in behavioral games unit around age 24 (Carpenter et al. 2005), after which time offers do not change with age until people reach old age. In trust games, measures of trust and trustworthiness increase with age until they reach a plateau, close to age 30 (Sutter & Kocher 2003), at which time they level off.

Dictator Game treatments involving double-blind setups, such that the experimenter cannot know how much a subject contributes, have dramatically smaller effects on offers among non-student adults, and sometimes no effect at all in adult populations outside the U.S. (Lesorogol & Ensminger under review).

Variation Within Subpopulations of American children

Although studying young children is one important strategy for discerning universals, it does not completely avoid these challenges since developmental studies are frequently biased toward middle- and upper-class American children. Recent evidence indicates that something as seemingly basic as the differences in spatial reasoning between males and females (Hyde 1981, Mann, Sasanuma, Sakuma, & Masaki 1990, Voyer, Voyer, & Bryden 1995) does not generalize well to poor American children. On two different spatial tasks, repeated four times over two years with 547 second and third graders, low SES children did not show the sex differences observed in middle and high SES children from Chicago (S. C. Levine, Vasilyeva, Lourenco, Newcombe, & Huttenlocher 2005). Such findings, when combined with other research indicating no sex differences on spatial tasks among migratory foragers (Berry 1966), suggest that a proper theory of origins of sex differences in spatial abilities needs to explain why both poor Chicago children and foragers do not show any sex differences.

Research on IQ using analytical tools from behavioral genetics has long shown that IQ is highly heritable, and not particularly influenced by shared family environment (Dickens & Flynn 2001). However, recent work using 7-year old twins drawn from a wide range of socioeconomic statuses, shows that relative contributions of genetic variation and shared environment varies dramatically from low to high SES children (Turkheimer, Haley, Waldron, D’Onofrio, & Gottesman 2003). For high SES children, where environmental variability is negligible, genetic differences account for 70-80% of the variation with shared environment contributing less than 10%. For low SES families, where there is far more variability in environmental contributions to intelligence, genetic differences account for 0-10% of the variance, with shared environment contributing about 60%. This raises that specter that much of what we think we have learned from behavioral genetics may be misleading, as the data are disproportionately influenced by WEIRD people, and their children.
Contemporary Americans compared with Previous Generations of Americans

Contemporary Americans may also be psychologically unusual compared to their forbearers 50 or 100 years ago. Some documented changes among Americans over the past few decades include increasing individualism and a decrease in group-participation (Putnam 2000), and a lower need for social approval (Twenge & Im 2007). Again, these findings suggest that the unusual nature of Americans in these domains, as we reviewed earlier, may be a relatively recent phenomenon. These findings raise doubts as to whether research on contemporary American students (and WEIRD people more generally) is even generalizable to American students in previous decades.

The evidence of temporal change is probably best for IQ. Research by Flynn (1987, 2007) shows that IQ scores increased over the last half century by 18 points in all nations for which there were adequate data. Moreover, this rise was driven primarily by increasing scores on the analytic subtests. This is a striking finding considering recent work showing how unusual Westerners are in their analytic reasoning styles. Given such findings, it seems plausible that Americans of only 50 or 100 years ago were reasoning in ways much more similar to the rest of the non-Western world than Americans of today.

Similarities between typical contemporary experimental subjects vs. other Americans

Of course, we expect that typical American subjects would be very similar to other Americans in myriad ways. The problem with this expectation, however, is that it is not immediately apparent in which domains they should be similar. We think that there are enough differences between these two groups to raise concerns about speaking incautiously on the thoughts and behaviors of Americans, in general. There have been rather few studies that have explicitly contrasted whether undergraduates or college-educated Americans differ in various psychological measures from those who are not currently students, or who were never college-educated. There are numerous meta-analyses that include data from both college student and non-student samples that speak partially to this issue. Although the meta-analyses do not specify the national origin of the participants, we assume that most of the subjects were American. Some of these analyses indicate considerable similarity between student and non-student samples. For example, a second-order meta-analysis (Peterson 2001) revealed similarities between students and non-student samples for about half of the phenomena. Similarly, the relation between attribution styles and depression (Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey 1986), and the relations among intentions, attitudes, and norms (Farley, Lehmann, & Ryan 1981) do not show any appreciable differences between student and non-student samples. In these instances, there do not appear to be any problems generalizing from student to non-
student samples, which may suggest that college-education, and SES more generally, are not related to these phenomena.

Summary of Contrast 4

A number of findings from multiple disciplines indicate that, in addition to numerous similarities, there are differences among typical subjects and the rest of the American populations in unexpected domains. In some of these domains (e.g., individualism, moral reasoning, and perceptions of choice) the data from American undergraduates are an even more dramatic departures from the patterns identified in non-Western samples. Further, contemporary American college students appear further along some of these dimensions than did their predecessors a few decades earlier. Typical subjects may be outliers within an outlier population.

General Discussion

As the four contrasts summarized above reveal, WEIRD subjects are unusual in the context of the world in some key ways. In this section we first discuss the main conclusions and implications of our empirical review. We then address two common challenges to our claim that WEIRD subjects are frequent outliers. Finally, we make some recommendations for how the behavioral sciences may address these scientific challenges.

Summary of Conclusions and Implications

_Pronounced Population Variation is Commonplace in the Behavioral Sciences._

There are now enough sources of experimental evidence, using widely differing methods from diverse disciplines, to indicate that there is substantial psychological and behavioral variation among human populations. The reasons that account for this variation may be manifold, including behavioral plasticity in response to different environments, divergent trajectories of cultural evolution, and less commonly, differential distribution of genes across groups in response to different selection pressures. We think the existence of this population-level variation alone should suffice to energize course corrections in the direction of behavioral research.

At the same time, we have also identified many domains in which there are striking similarities across populations. These similarities could indicate reliably developing pan-human adaptations, byproducts of innate adaptations (such as religion), or independent cultural inventions or cultural diffusions of learned responses that have universal utility (such as counting systems, or calendars). We have no doubt that there are many more cross-population similarities than we’ve mentioned (e.g., the capacity of short-term memory, or social facilitation...
effects); however, thus far there are few databases sufficient to evaluate the similarities or differences across populations.

Many of the processes identified above that vary dramatically across populations would seem to be “basic” psychological processes. The reviewed findings identified variation in aspects of visual perception, memory, attention, fairness motivations, folkbiological categorization and induction, spatial reasoning, self-enhancement, moral reasoning, and heritability estimates of IQ. These domains do not appear to be any less “fundamental” than those domains for which much similarity has been identified. We submit that there are not strong grounds to make a priori claims to the “fundamentalness” of a given psychological process. We cannot easily tell, without doing the comparative work, what will vary and what will not. It is worth noting that there are various “short-cut” comparative strategies that can provide tentative yet compelling assessments of universality (see Norenzayan & Heine, 2005).

The application of evolutionary theory does not provide grounds for such a priori claims of “fundamental” or “basic,” at least in general. Evolutionary theory is a powerful tool for generating and eliminating hypotheses. However, despite its power, it is often overly fecund, as it generates multiple competing hypotheses, with predictions dependent on unknown aspects of human ancestral environments. Adjudicating among alternative evolutionary hypotheses often requires comparative work. Moreover, theoretical work is increasingly recognizing that natural selection has favored ontogenetic adaptations that allow humans, and other species, to adapt epigenetically to local environments (J. Henrich 2008).

*WEIRD subjects may often be the worst populations from which to make generalizations.*

The empirical foundation of the behavioral sciences comes principally from experiments with American undergraduates. The patterns we have identified in the available (albeit limited) data indicate that this sub-sub-subpopulation is highly unusual along many important psychological and behavioral dimensions. It is not merely that researchers frequently make generalizations from a single or narrow subpopulation. The concern is that this particular subpopulation is highly unrepresentative of the species. The fact that WEIRD people are the outliers in so many key domains of the behavioral sciences renders them—perhaps—one of the worst subpopulations one could study for generalizing about *Homo sapiens.*

To many anthropologically-savvy researchers it is not surprising that Americans, and people from modern industrialized societies more generally, appear unusual vis-à-vis the rest of the species. For the vast majority of its evolutionary history, humans have lived in small-scale societies without formal schools, governments, hospitals, police, complex divisions of labor, markets, militaries, formal laws, or mechanized transportation. Every household provisioned much or all of their own food, made their own clothes, tools, and shelters, and, aside from
various kinds of sexual divisions of labor, everyone had to master the same skills and domains of knowledge. Children grew up in mixed age play-groups, received little active instruction except in certain domains, and learned largely by observation and imitation. By age 10 children in some foraging societies obtain sufficient calories to feed themselves, and adolescent females take on most of the responsibilities of women. WEIRD people, in contrast, grow up in, and adapt to, a highly unusual environment. It should not be surprising that their psychological world is unusual as well.

Research Topics have been Limited by the Heavy Reliance on WEIRD Populations.

Relying on WEIRD populations may cause researchers to miss important dimensions of variation, and devote undue attention to behavioral tendencies that are unusual in a global context. There may be good arguments for choosing topics that are of primary interest to the readers of the literature (i.e., largely WEIRD people); however, if the goal of the research program is to shed light on the human condition, then this narrow unrepresentative sample may lead to an uneven and incomplete understanding. We suspect that some topics such as conformity, cognitive dissonance, fairness, analytic reasoning, and individual rights might not have been pronounced concerns for most humans at most times throughout history. Alternatively, the behavioral sciences have shown a rather limited interest in such topics as family, food, ethnicity (not race), religion, and rituals (see Rozin 2001 for further critiques on this point, Rozin et al. 2006). Had the behavioral sciences developed elsewhere, important theoretical foci and central lines of research would likely look very different.

Universal Theories Based on American Data Discourage International Research.

It is informative to question why American samples are so common in the behavioral sciences. More so than any of the other sciences, psychological research is dominated by researchers employed at American universities (May, 1997). There likely are a number of reasons for this. One reason for this trend may be that because most theoretical models in the behavioral sciences have been derived by American researchers studying undergraduates, there is little opportunity for researchers from other cultures to advance this research. As our above review indicated, many classic findings from American participants do not replicate well in some other populations. The tendency for researchers to embrace universal theories that are derived from WEIRD populations likely serves to further discourage researchers from working with non-WEIRD populations. Research with non-WEIRD populations is more likely to produce findings that would be interpreted as “failed replications.” In contrast, if researchers would attend more to the nature of their samples, then contrary findings from non-WEIRD populations could be seen as theoretically interesting in their own right.

Studying Young Children and Primates is Crucial, But not a Replacement for Comparative Work
Working with children and non-human primates is essential for understanding human psychology. However, it is important to note that despite its great utility and intuitive appeal, such research does not fully obviate these challenges. First, in the case of primate research, finding parallel results in great apes and one human population is an important step, but it doesn’t tell us how reliably developing a particular aspect of psychology is. As the spatial cognition work indicates, since language or cultural practices can—but need not—influence the cognition we acquired from our phylogenetic history as apes, then establishing the same patterns of cognition in apes and Westerners is insufficient to make any strong claims about universality. Suppose most psychologists were Hai\om speakers (instead of Indo-European speakers), they might have studied only Hai\om-speaking children and adults, as well as non-human apes, and concluded (incorrectly) that allocentric spatial reasoning was universal. Similarly, imagine if Tsimane behavioral economists compared Ultimatum Game results for Tsimane adults to chimpanzees (Gurven 2004, J. Henrich & Smith 2001, K. Jensen, Call, & Tomasello 2007). These researchers would have found the same results for both species, and concluded that standard game theoretic models (assuming pure self-interest) and evolutionary analyses (Nowak et al. 2000) were a fairly accurate predictors in ultimatum game behavior for both chimpanzees and humans—a very tidy finding. In both of these cases, the conclusions would be opposite to those drawn from studies with WEIRD populations.

These examples illustrate a parallel problem for those interested in the differences between human and non-human cognition. Since most ape-human comparisons involve WEIRD People (or their children) as subjects, some seeming ape-human differences may not represent real species-level contrasts, but may instead reflect the psychological eccentricities of WEIRD people (Boesch 2007).

Second, studying children is, of course, crucial for developing universal theories. However, evidence suggests that psychological differences among populations can emerge relatively early in children (as with folkbiological reasoning), and sometimes differences are even larger in children than in adults, as with the Mueller-Lyer Illusion. Moreover, developmental patterns are likely different in different populations, as with sex differences in spatial cognition between low income vs. middle and high income subpopulations in the U.S., and with passing the false belief task.

This suggests a need for converging lines of research. The most compelling conclusions regarding universality would derive from comparative work among diverse human populations with both adults and with children, including infants if possible. Human work can then be properly compared with work among non-human species (including but not limited to primates), based on a combination of field and laboratory work.
Understanding Human Diversity is Crucial for Constructing Evolutionary Theories of Human Behavior.

There is little doubt that evolution has equipped us with ontogenetic programs, including cultural learning, that help us adapt our bodies and brains to the local physical and social environment. Over human history convergent forms of cultural evolution have effectively altered our physical environments with tools, technology, and knowledge, our cognitive environments with numbers, written symbols, novel grammatical structures, categories, and heuristics, and our social environments with norms, institutions, laws, and punishments. Modern languages and cultures, for example, include all kinds of linguistic-cultural technologies such as (1) multiple references systems for talking about space (instead of 1 or 2 as in some small-scale societies) as well as organizing practices that put these to work, (2) a system of integers that goes to infinity (instead of to three, four or twenty-eight, as in many small-scale societies) as well as associated cultural routines based on these numbers, (3) eleven basic color terms (instead of only the “dark” and “light” as in some groups), and (4) an easy-to-use, efficient set of communicative tools for embedding clauses, communicating tense, aspect and emotional content, and assigning possession (all language are not equally efficient and these tools have cultural evolved over historical time along certain cultural trajectories Deutscher 2005, Everett 2005). Broad patterns of psychology may be—in part—a product of our genetic program’s common response to culturally-constructed environments that have emerged and converged over thousands of years. This means the odd results from small-scale societies, instead of being dismissed as unusual exceptions, ought to be considered as crucial data points that help us understand the ontogenetic processes that build our psychologies in locally adaptive and context-specific ways.

Concerns with our argument

In discussing this argument with colleagues we have encountered two quite different sets of concerns. Those with the first set of concerns, which we elaborate below, worry that our findings are not valid, because (1) we may have cherry-picked only the most extreme cases that fit our argument and have thus exaggerated the degree to which WEIRD people are outliers, and/or (2) the observed variation across populations may be due to various methodological artifacts that arise from translating experiments across diverse contexts. The second concern is quite the opposite: some researchers dismissively claim that we are making an obvious point, which everyone already recognizes. Perhaps the most productive thing we can offer is for these two groups of readers to confront each other.

We preface our response to the first concern with an admonition: of course, many patterns and processes of human behavior and psychology will be generally shared across the species. We recognize that human thought and behavior is importantly tethered to our common biology
and our common experiences. Given that many human universals exist, the real challenge is to design a research program that can actually identify them.

We offer three general responses to the concern that our review presents a biased picture. To begin, we constructed our empirical review targeting studies involving important psychological or behavioral concepts which were, or still are, considered to be universal, and that have been tested across diverse populations. We also listed and discussed major comparative studies we were aware of that have identified important cross population similarities. Since we have surely overlooked relevant material, we invite commentators to add to our efforts in identifying phenomena which have been widely tested across diverse subpopulations.

Second, we acknowledge that since proper comparative data is lacking for most studied phenomena, we cannot accurately evaluate the full extent of how typical or unusual WEIRD people actually are. This is, however, precisely the point. We hope research teams will be inspired to span the globe and prove our claims of non-representativeness wrong. The problem is that we simply do not know how well many key phenomena generalize beyond the extant database of largely WEIRD people. The evidence we present aims only to challenge (provoke?) those who assume samples of American undergraduates are sufficient to make claims about human psychology and behavior.

Third, to address the concern that the observed population-level differences originate from the methodological challenges of working across diverse contexts, we emphasize that the above evidence derives from diverse disciplines, theoretical approaches, and methodological techniques. They include experiments involving (1) incentivized economic decisions, (2) perceptual judgments, (3) deceptive experimental practices that prevented subjects from knowing what task was being measured, and from (4) children, who are less likely than adults to have motivations to shape their responses in ways that they perceive are desirable (or undesirable) to the experimenter. These findings, often published in the best journals of their respective fields, hinged on the researchers making a compelling case that their methodology was comparably meaningful across the cultural groups being studied. Furthermore, the same methods that have yielded population differences in one domain, have demonstrated similarities in other domains (S. Atran 2005, Haun, Rapold et al. 2006, J. Henrich & McElreath 2002, J. Henrich et al. 2006, Herrmann et al. 2008, Norenzayan, Choi et al. 2002, Segall et al. 1966). If one wants to highlight the demonstrated similarities, one cannot then ignore the demonstrated differences which relied on the same or similar methodologies. Note also that the findings that we reviewed are not based on self-report measures, due to well-known challenges in making cross-cultural comparisons across means of such scales (Chen, Lee, & Stevenson 1995, Hamamura, Heine, & Paulhus 2008, Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz 2002, K. Peng, Nisbett, & Wong 1997). Thus, while methodological challenges may certainly be an
issue in some of our cases, we think it strains credulity to suggest that such issues plague all comparative studies we have reviewed, and thus can eliminate our concerns about the non-representativeness of typical subjects.

Recommendations

Our experience is that most researchers who work exclusively with WEIRD subjects would like to establish the broad generalizability of their experimental findings. Even if they strongly suspect that their findings will robustly generalize across the species, most will agree that it would be better to have systematic comparative data across diverse populations. The problem, then, is not principally a scientific or epistemological disagreement, but one of institutionalized incentives. Hence, addressing this issue will mostly require adjusting the existing incentive structures for researchers. The central focus on these adjustments should be that in presenting our research designs to granting agencies, or our empirical findings in journals, we must explicitly address the questions of generalizability and representativeness. With this in mind, we offer the following recommendations.

Journal editors and reviewers should press authors to both explicitly discuss and defend the generalizability of their findings. Claims and confidence regarding generalizability must scale with the strength of the empirical defense. This does not imply that all experimentalists need to shift to performing comparative work across diverse subject pools! As comparative evidence accumulates in different domains, researchers will be able to compare with a growing body of systematic comparative research and thus be able to calibrate their confidence in the generalizability of their findings. The widespread practice of subtly implying universality by using statements like “people’s reasoning is biased...” should be avoided. “Which people?” should be a primary question for reviewers. We recommend that editors require authors to be explicit about their claims, and if they are claiming generalizability, they need to discuss the evidence that supports their inferential extension. If a result is novel, being explicitly uncertain about generalizability should be fine, but one should not imply universality without an empirically-grounded argument. We think this practice alone will energize more comparative work.

The experience of evolutionary-oriented researchers attests to the power of such incentives. More than other researchers in the social sciences, evolutionary researchers have led the way in performing systematic comparative work, drawing data from diverse societies. This is not because they are interested in cultural variation per se (though some are), but because they are compelled, through some combination of their scientific drive and the enthusiasm of their critics, to test their hypotheses in diverse populations (e.g., Billing & Sherman 1998, Buss 1989, Daly & Wilson 1988, D. M. T. Fessler et al. 2005, Gangestad et al. 2006, Low 2000, Medin & Atran 2004, Schmitt 2005, L. S. Sugiyama et al. 2002).
Meta-analyses are often compromised because many studies provide little background information about the subjects. We recommend that journal editors should also require explicit and detailed information on subject pool composition. Some granting agencies already require this information. Comparative efforts would also be greatly facilitated if researchers would make their data readily available to any who asked, or, better yet, data files should be made available online. Sadly, a recent investigation, found that only 27% of authors in psychology journals shared their data when an explicit request was made to them in accordance with APA guidelines (Wicherts, Borsboom, Kats, & Molenaar 2006). Tests of generalizability require broad access to published data.

Given the general state of ignorance with regard to the generalizability of so many findings, we think granting agencies, reviewers, and editors would be wise to give researchers credit for tapping and comparing diverse subject pools. Work with undergraduates and the children who live around universities is much easier than going out into the world to find subjects. As things stand, researchers dealing with granting agencies who count publications, and journals that seem to perceive humans as generic, suffer a competitive disadvantage in seeking a more diverse sampling of subjects. Because many of the best journals routinely require that papers include several studies to address concerns about internal validity (Carver 2004), the current incentives greatly favor targeting the easiest subject pool to access. There is an often unrecognized tradeoff between the experimental rigor that multiple studies can bring and the concomitant lack of generalizability that easy-to-run subject pool studies entail. If the incentive structure came to favor non-student subject pools, we anticipate that researchers could also be more persuasive in encouraging their universities and departments to invest in building non-student subject pools, for example by setting up permanent psychological and behavioral testing facilities in bus terminals, rail stations, airports, and anywhere diverse subjects might find themselves with extra time.

Beyond this, departments and universities should build research links to diverse subject pools. There are literally untapped billions of people around the world who would be willing to participate in research projects, as both paid subjects and research assists. The amounts of money necessary to pay people who might normally make less than $12 per day are trivial vis-à-vis the average research grant. Development economists, anthropologists, geographers and public health researchers already do extensive research among diverse populations, and already possess many valuable contacts and collaborations. Experimentalists merely need to work on building the networks.

Funding agencies, departments, and universities can encourage and facilitate both professors and graduate students to work on expanding sample diversity. By supplying research leaves, adjusted expectations of student progress, special funding sources, and institutionalized
relationships to populations outside the university, these organizations can make an important contribution for building a more complete understanding of human nature.

Closing Words

While we are certainly not the first to sound this call to arms (Gergen 1973, Medin & Atran 2004, Norenzayan & Heine 2005, Rozin 2001, Sears 1986, Sue 1999) we think that our efforts to compile an empirical case has revealed an even more alarming situation than previously recognized. The sample of contemporary American undergraduates that so overwhelms our database is not just an extraordinarily restricted sample; it is frequently a distinct outlier from other global samples. It represents possibly the worst sample on which to base our understanding of Homo sapiens sapiens. Behavioral scientists now face a choice – they can either recognize that their claims for many domains cannot be generalized beyond this eccentric subpopulation (and leave it at that), or they can begin to take the difficult steps necessary to become a true science of human nature.

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