

Social Psychology of Prejudice:

*Historical and
Contemporary Issues*

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The justification-suppression model of prejudice: An approach to the history of prejudice research

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The modern study of prejudice is the study of conflict. Two competing motives battle for supremacy, the urge to express an emotion, and the desire to be (or to appear) unprejudiced. The study of prejudice was not always so—Bogardus (1923) found open hostility toward immigrant groups, Katz & Braly (1935) looked at the open expression of negative stereotypes, and Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford's (1950) authoritarian participants were openly dismissive, hostile, and aggressive in their expressions of prejudice. This is no longer the case; religious, ethnic, and racial prejudice is no longer so openly tolerated, and most Americans who hold such prejudices actively seek to suppress them. Research and theory in prejudice has closely tracked this change; this chapter focuses on a theoretical perspective that forms a coherent account of this research in what we call the Justification-Suppression Model of expressed prejudice (which we abbreviate JSM).

The scientific literature on the psychology of prejudice is long and large, but the theories and studies tend to be about specific problems and *prejudices*, not the phenomenon of *prejudice*. We develop the JSM to encompass the best-known and empirically supported theories, incorporating many of their common elements. The JSM offers an integrative framework that helps to organize a range of previous studies and theories into a coherent review and analysis. We provide a simple structure for conceptualizing the process of prejudice expression and the experience of prejudice. The JSM leads to a new understanding of the psychological experience of prejudice, generating several hypotheses about the expression and suppression of prejudice.

Definition of Prejudice

We define prejudice as a negative evaluation of a social group, or a negative evaluation of an individual that is significantly based on the individual's group membership. This simple and broad definition differs from other definitions in a number of ways. Unlike Allport, we do not require prejudice to be “unfounded” or “irrational.” While Allport (1954) argued that a prejudice must “lack basis in fact” (p. 7), he conceded that it is not typically possible to determine what is true about social groups. In addition, we do not define prejudice as “irrational”, because it is virtually

impossible to ascertain rationality (see Brown, 1995). Most importantly, the reason to avoid stipulations of prejudice being unfounded or irrational is that the psychological processes that lead to prejudice and its expression are identical for "rational" and "irrational" prejudices. All kinds of prejudice share a core of commonality. Race prejudice, gender prejudice, sexual prejudice and so on, are all special cases of prejudice, and these special cases are more alike than different. We suggest that prejudice is an affective state, and like other affective states, it has motivational force (Brehm, 1999; Frijda, 1986). When people meet (or think about) a target of their prejudice, they experience a tension or energy. This emotional state can serve as a spur to action (e.g., Brehm, 1999; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1994).

Two-Factor Theories of Racial Prejudice. Most of the current theories of racial prejudice should be characterized as "two-factor" theories. These theories hypothesize that people are trying to simultaneously satisfy two competing motivations, based on (1) racial prejudice and (2) motivation to suppress prejudice. This conflict creates ambivalent emotions, behavioral instability, and cognitive inconsistency.

The first factor is *genuine prejudice*. In the two-factor theories, genuine prejudice is primary, primal, underlying, powerful, early-learned, automatic, cognitively simple and relatively effortless. It is affectively negative and has motivational force; it need not be based on rational assessment of the target. Most of the two-factor theories argue that most all White Americans have genuine (primary and unadulterated) prejudice against Blacks.

The second factor is the motivation to control the first factor. White Americans do not wish to express prejudice in word or deed, for reasons that include liberalism, egalitarianism, sympathy for the underdog, maintaining a non-prejudiced self-image, social norms, "political correctness," and humanitarian values. It is the tension between expression and suppression that characterizes Whites' attitudes toward Blacks. We begin with a review of the historical foundation of the two-factor idea and describe prominent modern two-factor theories.

The "American Dilemma". The earliest prominent account of this tension is found in Gunnar Myrdal's (1944) classic *An American Dilemma*. Myrdal argued that the most important political tension in America was between the racial prejudice and inferior treatment afforded Black Americans and the deeply held civic, political, and religious attitudes about democracy, equality, and opportunity for all.

The ever-raging conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations preserved on the general plane which we shall call the "American creed," where the American thinks, talks, and acts under the influence of high national and Christian precepts, and, on the other hand, the valuations on specific planes of individual and group living, where personal and

local interests; economic, social, and sexual jealousies; consideration of community prestige and conformity; group prejudice against particular persons or types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits dominate his outlook (Myrdal, 1944, xliii).

Jones (1997) argued that Myrdal set the "stage upon which the social and behavioral sciences could frame the nature and scope of the problems in race relations" (p. 45). Myrdal's formulation affected all of the two-factor theories, especially through Gordon Allport (1954).

Allport's Compunction. The study of prejudice in social psychology was both crystallized and energized by the publication in 1954 of Allport's timeless *The Nature of Prejudice*. In it, Allport distinguished between the bigot, for whom prejudice dominates and is expressed freely, and most of America, who experience their own racial prejudice with compunction: "More common seems to be prejudice with compunction. Anti-attitudes alternate with pro-attitudes. Often the see-saw and zig-zag are almost painful to follow . . . Such inconsistency is bewildering; it must be awkward to live with" (p. 326-327). Allport believed that the values that produced guilt were secondary and intellectual in nature, whereas the prejudice itself was affective and primary. "Defeated intellectually, prejudice lingers emotionally" (Allport, 1954, p. 328).

Modern two-factor theories. Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1981) identified *regressive racism*, where a genuine, underlying prejudice is masked by norms for appropriate interracial behavior (based on egalitarian values). Normally Whites behave consistently with non-racist norms, but when emotionally aroused, stressed, angered, or insulted, Whites would revert to an "older, traditional pattern of discrimination" (p. 71). Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) argued most Americans exhibit what they call *aversive racism*, a style of prejudice that results from (1) prejudice that develops from historical and culturally racist contexts, and cognitive mechanisms that promote the development of stereotypes, and (2) having an egalitarian value system. The prejudice that aversive racists feel is not open hostility, but rather discomfort, uneasiness and fear of Blacks, manifested in avoidance.

McConahay (1986; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981) developed a theory of *modern racism*, based on work by Sears and colleagues (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & McConahay, 1973; Sears, 1988), which argues that racism is based in beliefs about the actions and values of racial outgroups. Although Whites recognize that old-fashioned racial beliefs are socially undesirable, they nonetheless have these beliefs encoded in them from an early age. According to McConahay, the conflict between American Creed-based values and underlying deep-seated racism creates ambivalence.

Katz and Hass (1988) have argued that modern-day White American racial attitudes toward Black Americans are a mix of anti-Black and pro-

Black attitudes, a state they describe as *ambivalent racism*. Ambivalent racism is driven by the independent but conflicting American values of (1) humanitarianism and egalitarianism, which promote sympathy based on Black's societal disadvantages, and (2) the Protestant work ethic and individualism, which promote anti-Black affect (Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986). Racial ambivalence results from the intra-psychic clash between pro- and anti-Black affect; highly racially ambivalent people have high levels of both pro- and anti-Black affect.

Devine (1989) has argued that there are both *automatic* and *controlled* processes which determine prejudice expression. Stereotypes can be automatically activated. Stereotyped beliefs and category information are immediately and effortlessly available to influence perception; a stereotype is "well established in children's memories before children develop the cognitive ability and flexibility to question or critically evaluate the stereotype's validity or acceptability" (Devine, 1989, p. 6). A countervailing personal commitment to reducing expressions of prejudice, coupled with adequate cognitive resources to inhibit them, can reduce expressions of prejudice. Commitment to non-expression of prejudice is based on "personal beliefs" which may not be congruent with stereotypes.

Finally, Pettigrew and Meertens (1995; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997) have a theory of Western Europeans' prejudice that encompasses a range of ethnic groups, which they call *subtle and blatant prejudice*. They acknowledge the older, more fundamental, unrepressed blatant prejudice, and also "a more subtle form of out-group prejudice [that] has emerged in recent years" (p. 54). Subtle prejudice, they argue, is a combination of genuine prejudice and social norms that proscribe blatant discrimination and other expressions of prejudice.

All of the theories we have reviewed can be reduced to the following structure. People acquire, early and firmly, prejudice toward racial outgroups. As cultural norms become increasingly negative toward straightforward prejudice, and as people mature, they become motivated and skilled at suppressing many of their prejudices. A simple equation summarizes these two-factor theories of prejudice:

$$\text{Prejudice} + \text{Suppression} = \text{Expression}$$

Prejudice itself is usually not directly expressed, but rather is modified and manipulated to meet social and personal goals. There is a reliable alienation between the underlying genuine prejudice that people have and the "inauthentic" prejudice that they report and integrate into their self-concepts. As a result, theories of prejudice that are based on the kinds of behaviors people emit are rarely theories of prejudice, per se; they are theories of the *expression* of prejudice.

The Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice

The two-factor theories focus on processes that are common to most members of a society—all people are subject to the processes that lead to

prejudice, and all are subject to social norms about prejudice. However, another more mature tradition in prejudice research links a wide variety of personality, belief, and attitudinal underpinnings to prejudice. With a few exceptions, this individual differences approach to prejudice has not been in the mainstream of prejudice theorizing for the last three or four decades.

In the earlier conceptualizations of prejudice, beliefs, values, and ideology *cause* prejudice. This simple model characterizes a wide range of thinking and research in prejudice, and we suggest that it is incorrect. By contrast, we conceptualize most of the personality, attitudinal, and religious variables that correlate with prejudice not as causes, but as beliefs that serve as *justifiers* of prejudice. As a result, we treat most attitudinal, belief, and value variables as *releasers* of genuine underlying prejudice. Some models of prejudice imply that if people could simply figure out that they were prejudiced, they would quickly take steps to suppress it. Instead, we suggest that people are often highly motivated to seek out justifications that allow the unsanctioned expression of their prejudices.

The basic outline of the Justification-Suppression Model is presented in Figure 1. The JSM states that several social, cultural, cognitive, and developmental factors create within people a variety of prejudices—racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, patriotic, and so on. These forces create a "genuine" prejudice. This genuine prejudice is an authentically negative reaction that is usually not directly accessible, but which is primary and powerful. The genuine prejudice is an affective reaction that has motivational force. Other forces suppress this prejudice, including social norms, personal standards, beliefs and values. In general, suppression processes will reduce the appearance of prejudice—both reported publicly and experienced privately. Still, prejudice that is normally suppressed can be expressed, and justification processes facilitate the expression of genuine prejudice. Beliefs, ideologies, and attributions can liberate prejudice, leading to public communication and private acceptance of prejudices. Justification allows the expression of prejudice without guilt or shame; adequately justified prejudices are not even labeled as prejudices (e.g., prejudice toward rapists, child abusers, enemy soldiers).




Figure 1. *The justification-suppression model of prejudice.*

We hypothesize that underlying "raw" prejudices almost always go through the processes of suppression and justification before they are reported, and before they are accepted into one's own self-belief system. Although the prejudice that is expressed publicly (or measured on an attitude scale) is correlated with the underlying construct, it is contaminated by the justification and suppression processes.

In the JSM, we treat the factors that affect the public report of prejudice and the private acceptance of prejudice almost interchangeably. Public report and private acceptance depend upon the same psychological processes of suppression and justification, and factors that enhance, suppress, or release one will tend have the same effect on the other. When there is little suppression of prejudice, the correspondence between genuine and measured prejudice is high. When suppression is high and there is a relative absence of justifications, then the correspondence can be quite low. Justification processes serve to enhance the correspondence between genuine prejudice and the prejudice that is expressed.

Figure 1 is not a structural equation model, but rather a diagram of how three factors work together to create reported and experienced prejudice *in a single iteration*. Genuine prejudice affects experienced and reported prejudice directly, but the desire to express prejudice is also met with suppression factors, which lower prejudice reports. To relieve the tension created by unexpressed emotion, Genuine Prejudice is released through the pathway of justifications, increasing prejudice reports. Suppression Factors are depicted to the left of Justification Factors in the figure to emphasize which occurs earlier. Although logically the fact of suppression creates the need for justification (hence the arrow), the motivational force for expression flows from its affective source—Genuine Prejudice.

Structural Elements of the JSM

We review the structural elements of the JSM in turn: genuine prejudice, suppression, justification, and reported/experienced prejudice. The order in which we discuss the elements of the model is the same order in which the elements of the prejudice processes typically develop within the individual. This is also the sequence of activation in the expression or experience of a prejudice for a particular expression incident. In each section, we can make only the barest list of a variety of phenomena and relevant psychological processes. We give an idea of how the research literature can be characterized by the JSM, but our present intent is merely to sketch an illustration of how the concept can be fit

into the existing theoretical and empirical literature. (An expanded version of this argument can be found in Crandall & Eshleman, 2003.)

Genuine Prejudice

Genuine prejudice refers to the first-formed affective component of the evaluation of a group or one of its members; it is an emotional state with motivational force. By "genuine" prejudice, we mean pure, unadulterated, original, unmanaged, and unambivalently negative feelings toward members of a devalued group. The prejudice that people express is usually not "genuine" in that it is altered, self-conscious, and manipulated to meet the expectations and needs of its audience—it is what some psychologists call "inauthentic" (see Jourard, 1971). Genuine prejudice is an affective force that serves as the engine for the entire suppression–justification–expression process.

Genuine prejudices develop through a wide range of social, cultural, and psychological processes. We hypothesize that prejudices toward individual groups are learned piecemeal and individually, although the various processes that lead to prejudice tend to act in concert, confederating their forces. Everyone has a wide variety of different prejudices (Fox, 1992), but some prejudices are common and uniformly distributed in the population, others are arcane and rare. We do not suggest that everyone has every prejudice, but that everyone has *some* prejudices.

In the JSM, genuine prejudice results from psychological processes that *directly* create the negative affect. Because so much of our review points to what is *not* prejudice, but rather factors that enhance or minimize its expression, we begin with a sampling of factors that we conceptualize as creating direct, unmediated negative affect toward groups.

Family processes and direct training. Children learn prejudices from their parents (Aboud, 1988); interracial dating is often strictly limited by parents (e.g., Marshall & Markstrom-Adams, 1995), and the greater the identification with parents, the stronger the socialization of prejudice (Anisfeld, Munoz, & Lambert, 1963).

Cultural learning: Neighborhoods & mass media. Neighborhoods pass on prejudices to inhabitants (Radke, Trager, & Davis, 1949), and adolescents tend to share prejudice with their peers (Bagley & Verma, 1979). Television presents racial minorities in negative or marginalized roles (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, Signorielli, & Shanahan, 2002; Foster-Carter, 1984), and emphasizes negative news about minorities (Milner, 1983).

Instrumental attitudes. Prejudice may develop from a rational evaluation of the danger presented by a group, even in the absence of direct intergroup conflict, leading to primarily negative instrumental attitudes (Stangor & Crandall, 2000; Stephan, Boniecki, & Ybarra (2002).

Social categorization and identity processes. Tajfel (1969) showed that categorization increases perceived ingroup similarity and bias perceptions

toward the category prototype. A long history of research on minimal groups (see Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Brewer, 1979; Brown, 1995) has shown that the simple categorization of groups into ingroups and outgroups is sufficient to generate discrimination.

Negative group contact. Experience with a social group can lead to prejudice against it (Amir, 1976). Generally, people have little prejudice against groups with which they have had no contact; but prejudice can build rapidly once contact begins (e.g., Richmond, 1950). Casual contact often increases prejudice (e.g., Harlan, 1942; Henderson-King & Nisbett, 1996), and so can unequal contact (e.g., Stroebe, Lenkert, & Jonas, 1988; Watson, 1950).

Novelty, deviation, strangeness. People who look different or act in ways outside the norm are often shunned as the objects of ridicule (Goffman, 1963). Langer, Fiske, Taylor, and Chanowitz (1976) found that students avoided physically unusual people (pregnant or physically handicapped). They also found that reducing the novelty of the target, by giving the students an opportunity to stare surreptitiously at these "novel stimuli," eliminated the avoidance. By contrast, mere exposure to stimuli (Zajonc, 1968) can breed liking.

Intergroup conflict. Conflict between any two groups can lead to prejudice (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). In the Robber's Cave experiments, Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) found that conflict between the groups created stereotypes, anger, and overt acts of physical violence directed toward outgroup members.

Religion. Some religious training and socialization can cause prejudice. For example, the Bible can be interpreted as prescribing prejudice and discrimination toward homosexuals, women, and members of other religions (e.g., Isherwood & McEwan, 1994).

Summary. A wide range of factors contributes to genuine, underlying, "true" prejudices. There is no grand, underlying theme that ties together all the sources of prejudice; in fact, we argue that prejudices are acquired piecemeal by a wide range of independent sources. Our list of "first causes" has not been exhaustive, but the sheer variety of fountainheads of prejudice reveals the difficulty of eliminating prejudice altogether.

Suppression

In the previous section, we reviewed some of the many ways genuine prejudice can be generated. The research basis of these prejudice sources is well established. Still, the data are quite clear that people do not report unalloyed prejudice; what is openly reported may bear only a modest resemblance to affect and behavior measured through subtle means. Attitudes toward racial and ethnic minorities appear to be increasingly positive and less prejudiced; many sociologists and psychologists interpret these trends as evidence that the broad normative climate has turned against racial prejudice (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Smith, 1985; Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). But racial prejudice and discriminatory behavior

are more prevalent when prejudice is measured unobtrusively than when prejudice is measured overtly and reactively (Crosby, Bromley & Saxe, 1980). When social norms do not overtly sanction prejudice, discrimination is significantly more prevalent (Gaertner, 1973; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). A significant amount of the "reduction" of prejudice is likely to be merely an increase in suppression.

What is Suppression?

Suppression is an externally or internally motivated attempt to reduce the expression or awareness of prejudice (cf. Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998; Plant & Devine, 1998). Suppression can take place through the public denial of prejudice, through social controls of the expression of prejudice, and through intentional attempts to control prejudiced thoughts and expressions. Suppression is a motivated or controlled process; it requires attention and effort. People suppress prejudice both to maintain a non-prejudiced appearance, and also to deny prejudice to themselves and maintain a non-prejudiced self-concept. Crandall and Eshleman (2003) review three independent lines of research, 1) eliciting prejudice through taxing the respondents emotionally or cognitively, 2) eliciting prejudice through unobtrusive means, and 3) "reverse discrimination paradigms" where participants show a pro-minority bias based in an "overcorrection" of prejudice, all of which suggest the presence of independent suppression mechanisms.

Prejudiced attitudes sometimes bubble up past suppression, and the less controlled aspects of communication—nonverbal expression (Vanman, Paul, Ito, & Miller, 1997; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974) and behavior in situations where standards are ambiguous (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986)—telegraph the presence of prejudice. People internally correct to overcome their own prejudice, and may over-correct in favor of the prejudiced targets (Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997; Carver, Glass, & Katz, 1978; Dienstbier, 1970). More and stronger prejudice appears when affect is unmanaged (Crosby et al., 1980); this tells us that what is felt and what is reported are two different things.

Source of Prejudice Suppression: Public and Audience Motives

Social norms. Willingness to express prejudice has been decreasing for several decades in the USA (Dowden & Robinson, 1993), and this contributes to a generally anti-prejudice normative climate in local social groups. In a paradigmatic study, Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, and Vaughn (1994) found that a single confederate expressing anti-racist views could dramatically reduce tolerance for racist acts. When the same confederate expressed benign acceptance of racist acts, participants also recommended acceptance.

Playing for an audience. Public, accountable behavior shows less evidence of prejudice than private, anonymous behavior. Crosby et al. (1980) found "discrimination was more marked in the relatively anonymous situations than in the face-to-face encounters" (p. 557). Bogus pipeline

studies suggest that people believe that they are publicly under-reporting their true attitudes (e.g., Allen, 1975; Sigall & Page, 1971).

Self as audience. Not only do some people wish to appear non-prejudiced to others, but they also wish to appear non-prejudiced to themselves. Devine, Monteith, and their colleagues have shown that people are conscious of the attempt to suppress their own prejudice; violating these personal, internal standards of non-prejudice led to feelings of guilt (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1993; Plant & Devine, 1998).

Empathy. Feelings of empathy can suppress prejudice. Gray and Ashmore (1975) created empathy for "poor urban Blacks" and reduced prejudice reports, and Batson et al. (1997) induced empathy toward a woman with HIV/AIDS, and decreased prejudice toward all people with AIDS. We suggest that empathy makes people rethink the appropriateness of the prejudice, adding an explicit value of tolerance (Devine & Monteith, 1993; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000), leading to a more favorable outward expression (but without changing the genuine prejudice).

Source of Prejudice Suppression: Value Systems and Private Motives

Religion. In many cases, religious belief actively serves to suppress prejudice. Although in some cases religiosity is associated with higher levels of prejudice, very high levels of religious belief are sometimes associated with low levels of prejudice (Batson & Burris, 1994; Gorsuch & Aleshire, 1974). Some religious groups are characterized by their humanitarian and anti-discrimination work and their anti-prejudice teachings of tolerance and acceptance of all.

Politics. Some political value systems also directly teach non-prejudice. Political liberalism (of the modern sort) emphasizes social tolerance, and is associated with less negative attitudes toward racial minorities, the physically handicapped, homosexuals and other groups (e.g., Crandall, 1994; Lambert & Chasteen, 1997).

Egalitarianism. Egalitarianism is a value system that is characterized by democratic and humanitarian precepts, a value for equality of opportunity, social justice, and the worth of all human beings. Egalitarian values are associated with positive reported attitudes toward a wide range of disadvantaged groups, and it is associated with low levels of reported prejudice across countries and languages (e.g., Perkins, 1992; Tyson, Doctor, & Mentis, 1988).

Personal standards. Devine and Monteith (1993) have argued that many people develop internal standards—based on values and beliefs—that they should be entirely nonprejudiced. The course of becoming nonprejudiced is a controlled, effortful, process of suppression of stereotypic thought, prejudicial feelings, and discriminatory behavior (Crandall, Eshleman & O'Brien, 2002), people "make a commitment to replace 'old' unacceptable responses with the 'new' nonprejudiced

responses" (Devine & Monteith, 1993, pp. 318-319). Following Allport (1954), they call this "prejudice with compunction"; a primary and automatic prejudice followed by a concerted effort to suppress and deny it.

Suppression and Mental Resources

The act of suppressing the thoughts, emotions, and feelings associated with prejudice require an ongoing supply of a limited resource—mental energy. When cognitive resources are unavailable for suppression, attempts to suppress may fail or even lead to a rebound effect (Wegner, 1992; 1994; Wegner & Erber, 1992). Because suppression siphons off mental energy, Wegner (1989) suggested that it might decrease the individual's ability to think carefully, leading to superficial judgments (Richards & Gross, 1999). Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Wheeler (1996) found that when perceiving highly stereotypical targets, participants who were suppressing their stereotypes had grave difficulty in remembering anything counter-stereotypic about elderly and skinhead targets. Suppression takes mental energy, and a resultant mental fatigue can lead to suppression failures, inadvertent slips, and less ability to self-regulate. The mental suppression of prejudice is not always reliable, and acting on the motivation to reduce expressions of prejudice may serve to create the very problems the suppressor sought to solve.

Suppression as Justification

McConahay et al. (1981) have argued that White Americans' suppression of prejudice may exacerbate racism at the societal level, as the denial of prejudice can lead to failure to perceive racism and discrimination. The suppression of a genuine underlying prejudice can become a moral victory, leading to the self-perception of non-prejudice (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). With this moral victory in hand, the person may then express prejudice in ambiguous ways, feigning rejection of the stereotype, but still managing to express it.

The stereotype of the extremely racist person can lead to self-justification as unprejudiced. Feagin and Vera (1995) note that the American stereotype of the "racist person" is someone who is uneducated, hostile, violent, Southern, coarse and common. They argue that this extreme stereotype of a racist provides "cover" for the everyday racist. If the cultural definition of a prejudiced person is someone who is distinctly different from *me*, then the rejection of the extreme form of prejudice, in combination with some suppression of my own prejudice, can leave me feeling distinctly non-prejudiced. This may allow me to discriminate on ambiguous tasks without creating self-image threat.

Suppression release is rewarding

Suppression requires mental energy, and deflects resources from other pursuits. Failing to express emotional states can lead to feelings of anxiety and an uncomfortable cognitive pressure (Pennebaker, 1990; Wegner, 1989). By contrast, the expression of suppressed emotions reduces this

tension and anxiety. Reducing anxiety and releasing tension is inherently pleasurable. To test this idea, O'Brien and Crandall (2000) had students freely express negative thoughts about either a suppressed prejudice (against fat people), a non-suppressed prejudice (against child abusers or Iraqi soldiers), or on a negative topic unrelated to prejudice (pollution). Compared to the other groups, the suppressed-then-released prejudice group experienced an elevated mood, and enjoyed the group discussion more. Tension release—the expression of suppressed prejudice—is accompanied by positive emotions.

Summary. Suppression is the motivated attempt to reduce, deny, or avoid the expression of prejudice, and the desire to maintain a sense of self that is innocent of prejudice. It is motivated by internal and external forces, and is subject to forces that can augment it or subdue it. Because suppression involves the thwarting of a motivational state that energizes expression, suppression may have negative affective consequences and cost mental energy. As energetic tension builds up, a person is motivated to seek ways to express the suppressed prejudice; this is the function of justification.

Justification: The Release of Prejudice

Justification undoes suppression, it provides cover, it protects a sense of egalitarianism, and a non-prejudiced self-image. Justifiers both allow for the expression of prejudice and cover the roots of discrimination.

Definition of Justification

A justification is any psychological or social process that can serve as an opportunity to express genuine prejudice, without suffering external or internal sanction. A justification may be based in ideology, allowing or even mandating a negative evaluation of a group or its members. A justification may be a cognition, a role, or a social situation that affords an opportunity for the expression of prejudice without internal or external punishment. Justifications are secondary to suppression, because a prejudice does not need a justification unless there is some countervailing belief, attitude, ideological factor, or social norm that identifies the negative emotional attitude as improper.

People may have beliefs or values that serve as justifications but that pre-exist the prejudice, for example, they may believe people's choices are the sole source of what happens to them in their lives. This belief, which may have been acquired while reading Ayn Rand, can subsequently function as a justification for prejudice against homosexuals, poor people, and the obese. This justification will not be present in consciousness to serve as a justification until a prejudice is suppressed. The instantiation of the justification is secondary to suppression; the belief may preexist. Justifications are akin to exaptations (Gould, 1991), innovations that develop in one area but have useful function in another.

Justifications appear in the expression process when they are needed—when one wishes to express a genuine prejudice, and one

experiences a simultaneous desire to suppress the prejudice. They can be identified by their "explanatory" nature; genuine prejudice has little cognitive content—it is primarily affective and largely nonverbal. Justifications, on the other hand, may be explanations for why a prejudice may be acceptable or even desirable. Stereotypes, value violations, blaming the victim, etc. form a "logical" argument in favor of a prejudice, but we argue that they generally do not form the prejudice itself. However, in some of the research we review below, there is little empirical evidence that can be used to sort out whether the justification is a releaser or a cause of genuine prejudice. Although we make a strong claim that all of what follows can and should be conceptualized as justifications, the data do not yet exist to test this hypothesis in many cases.

Suppressors of prejudice tend to be broadly aimed, and can affect large categories of prejudices (e.g., egalitarian and religious values, personal standards, and desire for a non-prejudiced self-image). By contrast, justifications are often releasers on a more narrow scale. Suppression is caused by a relatively small number of processes, which cover a large number of prejudices. Justifications, on the other hand, may have a more narrow applicability, and often are constructed with the expression of particular prejudices in mind (e.g., negative stereotypes about Gypsies do not justify anti-Semitism). Because justifications tend to work on single prejudices, they are more prevalent, varied, and individualized. Based on some previous conceptualizations of the structure of justification (e.g., Crandall, 2000), we have classed justifications into six categories: Naturalistic Fallacy and the Preservation of the Status Quo; Celebration of Social Hierarchy; Attributions and Personal Responsibility; Covering; Beliefs, Values, Religion, and Stereotypes; and Intergroup Processes.

Naturalistic Fallacy and the Preservation of the Status Quo

One set of beliefs about the nature of the social world that supports and justifies prejudice is beliefs that support the status quo. Generally, these beliefs support the naturalistic fallacy, that "what is, is good."

Belief in a just world. Lerner (1980) suggests that people tend to believe that the social world is just and fair, where "people 'get what they deserve.' The judgment of deserving is based on the outcome that someone is entitled to receive" (p. 11). The belief in a just world can have a profound effect on the perception of victims (see Lerner, 1980 for a review), and people who believe in the just world report higher levels of prejudice (Staub, 1996). Belief in the just world has been correlated with prejudice against Blacks (Rim, 1988), fat people (Crandall, 1994), depressed people (Crandall & Cohen, 1994), and people with cancer (Stahly, 1988), among many others.

Right wing authoritarianism. The most famous example of personality-oriented prejudice research is *The Authoritarian Personality* program of

Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950). Altemeyer (1981) has characterized right-wing authoritarians (RWAs) as people who submit to established authority, aggressively expect submission from "others perceived to be socially inferior, and strictly adhere to social conventions. RWAs not only endorse the status quo, they vigorously defend it. People who score high in RWA report high levels of many different prejudices; "right-wing authoritarians are 'equal opportunity bigots'" (Altemeyer, 1994, p. 136). RWAs are people for whom negative attitudes toward the oppressed and weak, the low in social prestige, and the unconventional are justified by an ideological perspective that accepts authority for its own sake, endows the powerful with positive qualities, and restricts the opportunities and freedoms of people low in power or authority.

Celebration of Social Hierarchy

Many of the beliefs about the status quo are closely related to beliefs about social hierarchy. Indeed, the goal of preserving the status quo is the crystallization and justification of the current status arrangements.

Social Darwinism. Social Darwinism is an ideology that raises the naturalistic fallacy to pseudo-scientific principle. Applying biological evolution to society, social inequalities are considered natural, inevitable, and even *good*, by appeal to the idea that societal success implies the survival of the fittest (Hawkins, 1997). Social Darwinism elevates hierarchies to a state where mistreatment of "inferior" races or cultures is not only natural but necessary—a way of improving the human race through natural selection. In this way, prejudice and discrimination are not only acceptable, but inevitable, necessary, natural, and *moral*.

Reification of social status beliefs. The belief that social status reflects actual social value justifies prejudice. High status consciousness (Blalock, 1959) and a sense of superior social status (Allport, 1954) are correlated with prejudice, although high levels of prejudice tend to be concentrated in social groups that are only modestly above average in the overarching social structure (e.g., Pavlak, 1973; Schutte, 1995). Kluegel (1990) found that White Americans have reached an "era of stable acceptance of the Black-White economic gap" (p. 512), which in turn justifies prejudice and discriminatory behavior.

Prosperity theology. Prosperity theology is the belief that God shows approval through unequal distribution of mammon from heaven (Cantril & Sherif, 1938; Hadden & Shupe, 1987; Mariano, 1996). This idea has its roots in the doctrines of John Calvin, whose theology has served to promote competitive economic activity and the private accumulation of wealth (Appling, 1975; Marshall, 1980). Calvinist beliefs (e.g., "Believers are members of God's Elect") have been used as part of the ideological justification of apartheid in South Africa (Schutte, 1995).

Protestant ethic. The Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) is a widely endorsed value system that promotes the notion that hierarchy is good. People who

believe in the PWE tend to be racist (Katz & Hass, 1988), anti-fat (Crandall, 1994), and anti-homosexual (Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996). One of the most common explanations of the socioeconomic superiority of Whites compared to other racial groups is that minorities lack motivation, preferring the comfort of their families and holidays to work (e.g., Kluegel, 1990; Kluegel & Smith, 1986).

Social dominance. Social dominance orientation (SDO) is the degree of one's preference for inequality among social groups, and the desire that one's ingroup dominate and be superior to outgroups (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). People who endorse SDO beliefs prefer hierarchical (as opposed to equal) relations among groups and support a variety of beliefs that align social groups on a superior/inferior dimension. As a result, people who are high in SDO score high in racial/ethnic prejudice, as well as sexism, nationalism, anti-Arab racism, patriotism, separation between "high" and "low" culture, meritocracy, and political conservatism (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993).

System justification. Hierarchy exists in all social settings, and most people believe that these hierarchies serve important functions, be they based on race, social class, education, GRE scores, age, experience, or the fashionableness of one's clothing. Jost and Banaji (1994) have argued that stereotypes can serve a system justification function. They write that "stereotypes serve ideological functions, in particular that they justify the exploitation of certain groups over others . . . in ways that make these differences seem legitimate and even natural" (p. 10).

Political orientation. Support for the superiority of the status quo is an element of many belief systems; conservative political rhetoric often refers to the past, and emphasizes stability and tradition (Lane, 1965). Many researchers have found political conservatism to be correlated with prejudice of various kinds (e.g., Bierly, 1985; Crandall, 1994; Crandall & Cohen, 1994; Crandall & Martinez, 1996; Gaertner, 1973; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Lane, 1965; Pratto et al., 1994; Wilson, 1970). Political conservatism is based, in part, on a preference for stability and the status quo, which in turn can support the relative elevation of Whites, heterosexuals, males, and so on, compared to other groups (e.g., Lambert & Chasteen, 1997). Conservatism is associated with social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), as well as Protestant Ethic and other religious and social ideologies that are indigenous to White suburban middle class values. Endorsing these values, and perceiving their violation, can form the basis of the justification of a wide range of prejudice (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Sears, 1988). Another characteristic of conservative political thought is the belief in individual responsibility—conservatives hold people responsible for what happens to them. Attributions of responsibility for negative life events lead to anger, rejection, and refusal to help, and can serve as a justification for the expression of prejudice (Weiner, 1993; 1995).

Attributions and Personal Responsibility

Victim blaming. We do not like people who harm themselves. William Ryan's powerful *Blaming the Victim* (Ryan, 1972) showed that Americans reliably find responsibility among the suffering that justifies prejudice and discrimination. He reviews the many ways in which people who have been victimized in some way—due to social organization, history, and structural inequality—are held accountable for their own state. This accountability, in turn, justifies prejudice and discrimination.

Attributions as justifications. The judgment that a person is responsible for his/her fate leads to increased expression of prejudice toward many different groups (e.g., Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). Most models of attribution suggest that the negative evaluation and affective reaction to a person or group follows from the attribution (e.g., Feather, 1984; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967; Weiner, 1993; 1995). We do not dispute this argument, but in the context of the JSM we conceptualize attributions differently: Attributions of control and judgments of responsibility are conceptualized as justifications that can release prejudice.

Covering

Covering is the process in which the underlying prejudice that motivates an emotion, behavior, or cognition is obscured by focusing attention on a plausible alternative motivation that is socially or personally acceptable.

Situational ambiguity. When a discriminatory behavior might be mistaken for neutral or socially acceptable action, or can masquerade as a more benignly motivated act, then prejudice may be released. When choosing with whom to affiliate, prejudice might lead us to avoid some people. If one can appear to be choosing to affiliate on some other basis, then discriminatory patterns may be justified. Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, and Mentzer (1979) found that people avoided a handicapped confederate more often when the opportunity to escape his presence was presented as a choice between seeing different movies in separate theaters. When choice-of-movie "covered" the prejudice, most participants chose to avoid him. When the same movie was shown in both theaters, avoiding the stigmatized confederate was not covered, and the majority of participants chose to share a theater.

Legitimacy credits. One covering strategy that can release prejudice is the building up of legitimacy credits, which can counteract the expression of opinions or behavior that might be construed as prejudiced. Legitimacy credits are "memory capital" of evidence on previous non-prejudiced behavior, which can be called upon to offset a given release of prejudice.

Legitimacy credits can emerge from over-favoring groups toward which one has a socially unacceptable antipathy. Dutton (1976) argues that reverse discrimination typically occurs for relatively trivial types of interaction (e.g., signing a petition), which serves to maintain discrimination in more important interactions. If a White can establish an

egalitarian self-image quickly and easily by trivial compliance, s/he may not have to face the larger challenge of alleviating significant racial problems.

Monin and Miller (2001) gave some participants an opportunity to express a pro-equality attitude toward women, and gave other participants a scale that limited their ability to express pro-equality attitudes. They then asked participants to recommend a candidate for a stereotypically male job. Participants who had been given an opportunity to express pro-equality attitudes were more likely to recommend hiring a man than participants who had not been able to express pro-equality attitudes. They argued that responses on the attitude scale created an egalitarian self-image, which provided participants cover in a subsequent task to discriminate in favor of men.

Social roles. A social role can provide cover for prejudice and discrimination, by perceptually disconnecting the individual person from the action. Police who use racial profiling in deciding when to make traffic stops or enforce drug laws can use the cover of their role to express their prejudices. Roles can be conceived as justifications—roles can *promote* prejudiced expressions by prescribing behaviors. Roles can serve as releasers of suppression by *obscuring* prejudice. People may seek social roles that allow them to discriminate, for example, anti-Arabic prejudice might be expressed by joining the U.S. military to fight in the Middle East.

Shifting standards. Biernat and colleagues have argued that, when evaluating individuals who are members of social groups (based on gender, race, class, age, etc.), targets are evaluated based on a standard that comes from the stereotype of their group (Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991; Biernat, Crandall, Young, Kobrynowicz, & Halpin, 1998). The use of subjective language can mask the use of stereotypes. In this way, an "outstanding" athletic performance by a woman may be substantially inferior to an "outstanding" athletic performance by a man. By contrast, when using objective language (e.g., batting averages, time trials, shooting percentages) or ipsative measures that collapse across groups (e.g., ranking), males are reliably rated more athletic than females. When members of different groups are evaluated using different standards, the evaluator can describe both high and low status groups in identical language, but mean—and successfully communicate—different things (Biernat & Vescio, 2002).

Beliefs, Values, Religion, and Stereotypes

Beliefs, values and religion promote the suppression of prejudice, but they can also promote the release of prejudice as justifications. Some of these justification beliefs have been covered in the previous section, including Protestant Ethic, beliefs about individual responsibility, social dominance, and political orientation. In this section, we review the role of

several beliefs in providing adequate justification for the expression of prejudice.

Belief incongruence. Belief congruence theory (Rokeach, 1960; 1968; Rokeach & Rothman, 1965) suggests that prejudice is based to an important extent on the assumption that members of outgroups hold attitudes, beliefs, and values that are different from one's own (Byrne & Wong, 1962). Belief incongruence is a justification for prejudice, because "we tend to value people in proportion to the degree that they exhibit beliefs, subsystems, or systems of belief congruent with our own" (Rokeach & Rothman, 1965, p. 128). When people do not share our beliefs and values, we interpret this as evidence of moral inferiority, and we can practice *moral exclusion* (Nagata, 1990), in which people are considered outside of the boundary in which moral rules and fairness apply (Opatow, 1990). Once excluded from our ingroup's moral reality, the amount of justice that needs to be extended shrinks dramatically (Opatow, 1995), and prejudice and discrimination can be justified (Staub, 1990).

Value violation. Rokeach (1960) argued that members of other racial, ethnic, and religious groups are perceived to have different values from our own, a belief which can justify prejudice. Of course, sometimes groups in fact do traduce one's values, and value violations themselves can directly justify prejudice. Sniderman and his colleagues (Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick, 1991) found that greater rejection was expressed toward both Whites and Blacks when they were described as violating the Protestant Ethic. Biernat, et al. (1996) found that laziness at work led to the rejection of Blacks, especially when Protestant Ethic value had been primed.

Symbolic racism and value violation. The influential theory of prejudice known as symbolic racism (e.g., Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & McConahay, 1973) suggests that racial prejudice in America is a mixture of old-fashioned, dominative, unvarnished racial prejudice, and a set of values and beliefs that combine with the prejudice. Together with the early-learned negative affect toward Blacks, symbolic racism is created through the endorsement of a set of non-egalitarian values that include individualism, hard work and self-reliance, and a belief that no group deserves "special treatment." Although these values do not directly cause racism, symbolic racists believe that Blacks do not live by or support these values. Blacks' disrespect for Whites' "traditional American values" leads to prejudice. Symbolic racism can be thus characterized as a value-violation theory of prejudice.

Religion. In earlier sections of this paper, religious belief was conceptualized as a direct cause of prejudice (e.g., the Bible and homosexuality) and as a suppressor of prejudice (e.g., Baha'i faith, Christian charity). Similarly, religion can serve as a justification of prejudices. One famous example is the medieval Christian Church's

justification of the Crusades, whose historic purposes were based more in the desire for economic exploitation and anti-Islamic prejudice than Christian principles (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990). Christian religion has been used as a justification of prejudice toward the unemployed and single mothers (Jackson & Esses, 1997). Several studies (e.g., Herek, 1987; Johnson, 1987) have found that homosexuals can serve as scapegoats for moral decay and the failure of Christian evangelism. When social norms within the church favor prejudice, church members show very high individual levels of prejudice (Griffin, Gorsuch, & Davis, 1987).

Stereotyping. Stereotypes are beliefs about the attributes of a group of people (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Ellemers & van Knippenberg, 1997; Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Stereotypes serve a cognitive efficiency function, and they also serve a prejudice justification function (see Allport, 1954; Katz & Braly, 1935; Williams, 1989). Early measures of racial attitudes were permeated with "old-fashioned inferiority beliefs," stereotypic justifications of prejudice of the most basic kind. Stereotypes also guide cognitions in a way that releases prejudice. Leyens, Yzerbyt, and their colleagues (e.g., Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994) developed a theory of the use and expression of stereotypes, which they call *social judgeability theory* (SJT). They argue that social norms prohibit negative overgeneralizations to members of social groups, and so people suppress stereotypes when *only* group membership is known, because membership is not a socially valid basis for judgment. In such cases, stereotype suppression and refusals to make judgments are characterized by "don't know" responses (e.g., Yzerbyt et al., 1994). When people believe that they have enough individual information to make a judgment, judgments are released which prove to be highly influenced by stereotypes, even when the individual information is placebic, bogus, or vacuous (Leyens et al., 1994).

Intergroup processes

In addition to group categorization and identification (which we have argued above lead to genuine prejudice), several intergroup processes lead to the justification of prejudice. Intergroup conflict can serve as an instigator to genuine prejudice, and it can also serve as a justification for a preexisting prejudice.

Intergroup contact. Contact was originally suggested as a method of prejudice reduction (Allport, 1954), but the large amount of research on intergroup contact has shown that it can both decrease and increase intergroup hostility (Amir, 1976). When contact is inadequate, role-constricted, or largely negative, underlying prejudice can be justified. Stangor, Jonas, Stroebe, and Hewstone (1996) found that U.S. college students spending a year in Germany or Britain became increasingly negative toward the host country. This effect was limited to those students who lacked warm personal contact, close friendships with locals, and had fewer interpersonal contacts overall.

Perceived threat. When nearby groups are widely considered to be a physical threat, prejudice can be justified. Young (1985) found that proximity to a Black population was associated with Whites' fears about crime, which in turn was sufficient to increase gun ownership; this effect was especially true among more highly prejudiced Whites. When Henderson-King and Nisbett (1996) had participants "overhear" a telephone conversation about an assault by a Black man, as compared to the same conversation regarding a White man, prejudice and the perceived antagonism of Blacks increased.

When a group is perceived as threatening, and this threat can be communicated, perceived threat can serve as a justification for prejudice. However, it is essential for the establishment of justification that one expects that others would accept the threat posed by the to-be-prejudiced-against group as an authentic threat. Some forms of threat, such as to self-esteem, prestige, and loss of privilege are insufficient to justify prejudice. For a threat to provide justification, that threat must be perceived to be significantly unjust.

Intergroup anxiety. When meeting members of an unusual, exotic, or simply unfamiliar group, one may feel anxious about how to behave, and how one's behavior will be interpreted by the outgroup member; Stephan and Stephan (1985) label this phenomenon *intergroup anxiety*. This anxiety can create cognitive biases, intensify emotional reactions, and enhance the expression of prejudice, by creating a negative emotional state that can be attributed to the outgroup target. For example, Britt, Boniecki, Vescio, and Biernat (1996) found that when anticipating interacting with a Black target, White participants high in intergroup anxiety exhibited high degrees of state anxiety, perceived their partners as very dissimilar, and anticipated a high degree of difficulty in the interaction. Intergroup anxiety can justify the expression of prejudice, by associating anxiety with outgroup targets, enhancing perceived threat (Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; Monteith et al., 1998; Staub, 1996).

Summary. Justifications serve the function of releasing prejudice. Whereas only a relative handful of motives are needed to lead to widespread suppression, justifications are often more narrowly focused, and thus there are a very large number of justifications, each tailored to their own prejudice. Although the justification may merely be a "just-so story" one tells one's self, it must have the veneer of truth. Justifications are positively correlated with reports of prejudice; when experimentally manipulated they appear to cause prejudice (e.g., Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996; Katz & Hass, 1988). But we suggest the experimental introduction of a justification may simply approve it for expression. Justifications release prejudice in two ways. First, justifications allow the public expression of prejudice. Second, justifications allow a person to integrate a negative attitude toward a group into one's self without labeling one's self as "prejudiced." These two functions represent public

avowal and private acceptance, which comprise the final element of the JSM, the topic of the next section of this paper.

Expressed and Experienced Prejudice

Genuine, unexpurgated prejudice is rarely directly expressed; prejudice almost always makes it into expression through the filters of suppression and justification. To the extent that suppression and justification play a role in the expression of any given prejudice, the underlying prejudice will only be modestly correlated with the prejudice people are willing (or able) to report. The end results of the justification and suppression processes are (1) the public expression of prejudice, which includes outright derogation, discriminatory behavior, public displays, and paper-and-pencil measures of prejudice, and (2) experienced prejudice, which includes the private acceptance (and acceptability) of negative evaluations of people based on disliked group membership.

Expressed and experienced prejudices are conceptualized as the result of the same processes; genuine prejudice makes it both into expression and into the self-image through the processes of suppression and justification. This is not to say that public reports isomorphically map onto private belief—the evidence against such a hypothesis is overwhelming. Still, the processes that lead to expression and self-concept come from the same place, experience the same hurdles, and exhibit the same tension between the justification and suppression (cf. Crandall, O'Brien and Eshleman, 2002).

Summary. The expression of prejudice and the prejudice people integrate into their self-concept come from the same underlying genuine prejudice, filtered through the processes of justification and suppression. Reports of prejudice are not genuine prejudice; the reports are biased in reliable and predictable ways. Prejudice is often under-reported, but there are situations in which prejudice is over-reported (in the locker room, when passing, etc.). Because prejudice is so closely tied to important values, discrepancies between experienced and expressed prejudice can lead to guilt and shame.

Conclusion

The Justification-Suppression Model suggests the pathways by which the urge of an emotion becomes an outward act of expression. The expression of genuine, unmanaged prejudice becomes thwarted by suppression processes, but can be loosed into expression by justification processes. The JSM focuses on the internal processes that create each individual's personal rules of expression. These personal rules are based on beliefs, values, and the cultural rules about what justifies prejudices. The very same processes that lead to prejudice expression also lead to one's self-image as a prejudiced or unprejudiced person. We propose that people's genuine, underlying prejudice is only one aspect of the prejudice process, but it provides the motivational impetus that drives the suppression and justification.

Note: This chapter is based on Crandall & Eshleman (2003).

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