Social Psychology of Prejudice:
Historical and Contemporary Issues

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Understanding and Addressing Racial Bias: Insights from Allport

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The nature and expression of prejudice are shaped by history, politics, economics, and culture (Jones, 1997), as well as by the individual-level factors that social psychologists typically study in the laboratory. Historically, for example, White Americans developed racial ideologies associated with prejudice that helped to justify the laws that enabled them to achieve important types of economic exploitation, such as slavery (Fields, 1990). Although the belief that race is a biological construct is fundamental to racism, race is actually a social construction that permits the exploitation of one group over another. What particular groups become racialized depends upon the function it serves for the dominant group. For instance, in the early 1900s significant immigration from southern Europe to the United States generated social and economic threats to many Americans. It is not surprising, therefore, that during this period Italians were characterized as racially intellectually inferior. Similarly, in Nazi Germany, Jews were racialized primarily for political gain (Allport, 1954/1958).

The social and historical forces that shape prejudice and racism also influence the orientation with which psychologists study these phenomena. The present chapter examines historical trends in the study of prejudice over time and considers the influence of this work on contemporary research. We then specifically consider how Gordon Allport’s (1954/1958) ideas, presented in his classic volume The Nature of Prejudice, concerning the causes, operation, and consequences of
prejudice, anticipated and shaped contemporary research on the social-cognitive foundations of bias, the potential conflict and ambivalence that characterizes current racial attitudes, and the strategies for change. Subsequently, we review work on the nature of contemporary prejudice and on stereotype change, as well as summarize some of our own research, that illustrates developments rooted in the ideas presented in Allport’s book. We conclude by exploring the pragmatic implications and limitations of these lines of research.

**Trends in the Study of Prejudice**

Duckitt (1992) identified decade-by-decade shifts in how psychologists approached the study of prejudice in the twentieth century (see also Dovidio, 2001; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986). In the early 1900s in the United States, psychologists contributed to a social and intellectual climate that emphasized essential (assumed to be genetic) group differences and a “natural” hierarchy of racial and ethnic groups. For example, armed with IQ test results, psychologists concluded that 87% of the Russian, 83% of the Jewish, 79% of the Hungarian, and 79% of the Italian immigrants to the United States passing through Ellis Island were “feeble-minded” (Goddard, 1913, 1917). However, by the 1920s and into the 1930s, racial prejudice and bias came to be recognized more generally in U.S. society as unfair, and prejudice and stereotyping were conceived of as irrational processes, with the measurement of these phenomena becoming the new focus for psychologists (e.g., D. Katz & Braly, 1933).

Stimulated politically by the Nazis’ rise to power in Germany and the holocaust, and intellectually by the classic work on the authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), prejudice and other forms of bias were viewed in the 1930s through the 1950s not as simply disruptions in rational processes but as dangerous aberrations from normal thinking. Racism was perceived as not only as nonnormative but also as evil. As McConahay (1986) remarked, “Hitler [gave] racism a bad name” (p. 121). Guided strongly by the psychodynamic approach and influenced by movements in other areas of psychology, (e.g., aggression research; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939), the emphasis was on prejudice as a manifestation of unconscious psychological defense mechanisms and the expression of pathological needs.

Duckitt (1992) identified a critical shift in paradigm in the 1960s, a decade characterized by great civil unrest in the United States and by the successful passage of Civil Rights legislation. During this period, psychologists recognized sociocultural influences in prejudice, stereotyping, and bias and began focusing on the role of social learning and norms in the development and maintenance of racial biases (e.g., Pettigrew, 1958). In the 1970s, the classic work of Tajfel and his colleagues (e.g. Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) on social identity theory and theorizing by European social psychology more generally
influenced psychology’s approach to prejudice by emphasizing intergroup dynamics and motivation. Prejudice research in the 1980s and 1990s was based largely on the explosion of research on social cognition and stereotyping. Racial biases were seen as by-products of the processes by which people process, store, and retrieve information as “cognitive misers” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).

The ideas of Allport (1954/1958) expressed in his classic book, The Nature of Prejudice, foreshadowed many of the important theoretical developments typically associated with this later research. He identified the central role of categorization, particularly in terms of the distinction between ingroups and outgroups, which became the cornerstone for social-cognitive (Hamilton, 1979) and social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) approaches to prejudice. Allport (1954/1958) argued, “The human mind must think with the aid of categories” (p. 19), and he added that “in-groups are psychologically primary .... Hostility toward out-groups helps strengthen our sense of belonging but it is not required” (p. 41).

Allport recognized the importance of social structure and cultural values on the expression of prejudice (see, for example, p. 202), and he suggested how different cultural, social, and psychological forces could produce “inner conflict in the person harboring prejudice” (p. 316).

Many current perspectives concerning the social-cognitive basis of bias and the potential conflicts between self-image and intergroup feelings and beliefs have developed, directly or indirectly, from Allport’s (1954/1958) insights. In particular, recent work in the areas of implicit and explicit social cognition (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) and of motivation and ambivalence (I. Katz, 1981) suggest that people may be unaware of their contemporary forms of racial bias (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998) such as aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), symbolic racism (Sears, 1988), and modern racism (McConahay, 1986).

As Allport proposed, these contemporary prejudices may be characterized by a discrepancy, or “inner conflict,” between one’s perceived or desired self-image and underlying (and perhaps unconscious) intergroup feelings and beliefs (which may be rooted, in part, in normal social-cognitive processes).

**Inner Conflict and Contemporary Racism**

Over the past 25 years, we, along with a number of our colleagues, have investigated one prevalent type of contemporary racial bias, aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kovel, 1970). In contrast to “old-fashioned” racism, which is expressed directly and openly, aversive racism represents a subtle, often unintentional form of bias that characterizes many White Americans who possess strong egalitarian values and who believe that they are nonprejudiced. Aversive racists also possess negative racial feelings and beliefs of which they are unaware or which they try to dissociate from their nonprejudiced self-images. The negative feelings that aversive racists have for Blacks do not reflect open hostility or hate.
Instead, their reactions involve discomfort, uneasiness, disgust, or sometimes fear. They find Blacks “aversive,” while at the same time find any suggestion that they might be prejudiced “aversive” as well.

In contrast to traditional research that focused on the psychopathological aspects of prejudice, the aversive racism framework suggests that biases related to normal human functioning may also predispose a person to develop racial prejudice. In particular, racial biases may be based in part on almost unavoidable cognitive (e.g., informational processing biases that result when people are categorized into ingroups and outgroups; see Allport, 1954/1958; Hamilton & Trollier, 1986), motivational (e.g., personal or group interest, Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and socio-cultural (e.g., social learning; see Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) processes. Nevertheless, in societies with strong egalitarian traditions and norms such as the United States, which was founded on the principle that “all men [sic] are created equal,” there are strong forces that promote racial equality. Allport, drawing on the work of Mydal (1944), referred to this conflict between a person’s prejudiced reactions and his or her egalitarian values as the “American Dilemma” (p. 313). The aversive racism framework further suggests that contemporary racial bias is expressed, as Allport (1954/1958) described, in indirect and rationalizable ways that do not threaten the aversive racist’s nonprejudiced self-image.

**Raising Consciousness and Reducing Contemporary Racial Bias**

Understanding the causes, dynamics, and consequences of contemporary forms of prejudice can help to identify effective strategies for combating racial bias. Attempts to reduce the direct, traditional form of racial prejudice have typically involved educational strategies designed to enhance knowledge and appreciation of other groups (e.g., multicultural education programs) or emphasize norms that prejudice is wrong. Other techniques are aimed at changing or diluting stereotypes by presenting counterstereotypic or nonstereotypic information about group members (e.g., Weber & Crocker, 1983). However, when nonstereotypical information is concentrated in a single outgroup member, the person may be perceived to be an isolated exception and therefore the overall group stereotype remains intact (see Hewstone, 1996). Allport originally described this process as “re-fencing”: “When a fact cannot fit into a mental field, the exception is acknowledged, but the field is hastily fenced in again and not allowed to remain dangerously open” (p. 23). This process is related to what current researchers term as subtyping. People are likely to maintain their overall stereotype of the group while subtyping group members who disconfirm the general group stereotype (e.g., Black athletes; Hewstone, 1996).

Approaches for dealing with the traditional form of prejudice are generally less effective when employed to combat contemporary forms of racism. With respect to aversive racism, for example, Whites already have internalized egalitarian, nonprejudiced norms, already disavow traditional
stereotypes, and are very guarded about discriminating overtly against Blacks. Emphasizing social norms that proscribe the avoidance of negative behavior toward Blacks and other people of color is hence not likely to influence aversive racists. Thus, contemporary forms of bias have to be combated at implicit and less conscious levels, as well as explicit, conscious levels.

One general approach for addressing contemporary biases has involved making people aware of biases that they might harbor without full awareness. Engaging people to discover inconsistencies among their self-images, values, and behaviors may arouse cognitive dissonance (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 1994) or other negative emotional states (Devine & Monteith, 1993; Rokeach, 1973) that can produce more favorable attitudes towards members of stereotyped groups in general and Blacks in particular.

Procedures that involve providing genuine insight into the dissociation, conflict, or contradictions among people’s attitudes, values, feelings, and beliefs have been found to have both immediate and longer-term impact on changing intergroup orientations. In Rokeach’s (1973; see also Rokeach & McClellan, 1972) value confrontation procedure, for example, Whites are guided to recognize contradictions between their core value of equality and other core values (e.g., freedom), and the potential impact of this conflict on their racial attitudes. This discovery of contradictions among self-conceptions, values, and attitudes arouses a state of dissatisfaction that motivates participants to increase the importance of equality as a core value and to behave in ways that are more consistent with their nonprejudiced self-concept (Grube, Mayton, & Ball-Rokeach, 1994). These effects may be quite enduring. Rokeach and his colleagues found that this procedure increased the likelihood that participants would join a civil rights group four months following the confrontation (Rokeach & McClellan, 1972). In another domain, Altemeyer (1994) demonstrated increased support for Canadian Native land claims seven months following value confrontation.

Recent theorizing on modern prejudice proposes that a major source of anxiety for people in mainstream society today is the fear of being labeled as “sexist” or “racist,” not only by others but also by themselves (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998). Due to the powerful and pervasive norms against the expression of prejudice, when people’s behavior may be interpreted as reflecting prejudice, they may feel threatened and thus become more vigilant to intergroup issues and bias. Thus, even procedures that confront people with false feedback that they might be biased can have immediate impact on their overt responses to members of other groups (e.g., Dutton & Lake, 1973; Dutton & Lennox, 1974; Sherman & Gorkin, 1980).

Additional research suggests that these attempts to behave in a nonprejudiced or positive manner may be related to personal motivation. In their process model of prejudice reduction, for instance, Devine and
Monteith (1993; see also Monteith, 1993) posited that perceived discrepancies between personal egalitarian standards and self-reported responses to a particular group (that is, discrepancies between what they should do and would do) produce feelings of guilt and compunction, which are associated with a motivation to reduce subsequent biased responses. This work is also rooted in the insights of Allport (1954/1958). In his chapter on inner conflict, he talks about prejudice with and without compunction: “All in all, we are forced to conclude that prejudice in a life is more likely than not to arouse some compunction, at least some of the time. It is almost impossible to integrate it consistently with affiliative needs and human values” (p. 312-313).

Devine and Monteith (1993) further hypothesized that these feelings of compunction would be associated with motivations for change primarily among people who have internalized nonprejudiced standards as their own, that is, mainly for people low in prejudice and not for people high in prejudice. Supportive of this reasoning, Monteith (1993) found that low prejudiced people who had been confronted with prejudice-related discrepancies involving homosexuals subsequently rated jokes about homosexuals as less funny than did low prejudiced people presented with an unrelated discrepancy or high prejudiced people in either discrepancy conditions. These findings were later replicated in studies involving prejudice toward Blacks (Zuwerink, Monteith, Devine & Cook, 1996; Monteith & Voils, 1998). Consistent with Devine and Monteith’s (1993) model, these studies demonstrated that confronting low prejudiced people with their own prejudice related discrepancies can activate a self-regulatory cycle that reduces bias.

Within the stereotyping and bias literature, however, an important distinction has been made between explicit and implicit responses. Explicit responses, which are exemplified by traditional self-report measures, are conscious and readily subject to volitional control. In contrast, implicit responses are automatically activated by the mere presence (actual or symbolic) of a category member and commonly function without a person’s full awareness (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Implicit and explicit attitudes may or may not be consistent, and they commonly diverge for socially sensitive issues (Blair, 2001; Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001). In addition, implicit reactions are less amenable to conscious control than are explicit responses. In a chapter tellingly titled “The cognitive monster,” Bargh (1999) described just how difficult it is to try to influence these automatic stereotypic responses. Mere motivations to be nonprejudiced are often assumed to be insufficient to inhibit implicit stereotyping. In examining the previous research related to prejudice feedback, these studies have for the most part focused on the impact of this information on explicit responses related to the target categories under more controlled processing conditions.
Reducing Automatic Stereotype Activation

Simply because implicit stereotypes and attitudes are automatically activated, it does not mean that they are immutable and inevitable. There is considerable empirical evidence that people can avoid the influence of stereotypes in their conscious evaluations of others when they are appropriately motivated and have sufficient cognitive resources, (Bargh, 1999; Devine, 1989; Fiske, 1989). In addition, some evidence suggests that people might be able to moderate the activation of automatic negative attitudes and stereotypes, at least temporarily (Blair & Banaji, 1996; cf. Bargh, 1999).

Because automaticity develops through repeated occurrence, practice, and ultimately overlearning (Wyer & Hamilton, 1998), differences in the personal endorsement and application of negative attitudes and stereotypes can, over time, lead to systematic differences in their automatic activation. For example, Kawakami, Dion, and Dovidio (1998) found that Whites high in prejudice personally endorsed stereotypes about Blacks more strongly than those low in prejudice. Moreover, in contrast to Devine’s (1989) findings that demonstrated equal automatic stereotype activation for high and low prejudiced individuals, Kawakami et al. (1998) found that only high and not low prejudiced Whites showed automatic activation of stereotypes about Blacks (see also Lepore & Brown, 1997). If implicit attitudes and stereotypes can be learned, we propose that they can also be unlearned or inhibited through extensive retraining. As Devine and Monteith (1993) observed, “Although it is not easy and clearly requires effort, time, and practice, prejudice appears to be a habit than can be broken” (p. 336).

Practice. With extensive practice, it has been hypothesized that individuals can develop “auto-motive” control of their actions through frequent and persistent pursuit of a goal, such as to not stereotype (Bargh, 1990). As Monteith, Sherman, and Devine (1998) note, “Practice makes perfect. Like any other mental process, thought suppression processes may be proceduralized and become relatively automatic” (p. 71). Consistent with this line of reasoning, we found in a series of studies (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000) that automatic stereotype activation can be reduced and eliminated with training in not stereotyping members of a group.

Specifically, Kawakami et al. (2000) presented participants in one study with photographs of Blacks and Whites on a computer screen with stereotypic and nonstereotypic traits located under each photograph. Participants in the Stereotype Negation Condition were instructed to negate racial stereotypes by pressing “NO” on a button box when they saw a photograph of a White person paired with a White stereotype or a photograph of a Black person paired with a Black stereotype. They were further instructed to press “YES” to stereotype inconsistent word-picture pairings. Participants in the Stereotype Maintain Condition, alternatively,
were given the opposite instructions. All participants received extensive practice in the task (i.e., 384 trials).

On an index of automatic stereotype activation, the person categorization task (Blair & Banaji, 1996; Kawakami et al., 2000), participants in the Stereotype Maintain Condition exhibited a general and persistent stereotype activation effect. That is, both before and after training, these participants responded faster to stereotypic rather than nonstereotypic associations on the person categorization task. Although participants in the Stereotype Negation Condition displayed the same stereotypic bias on the initial task prior to the training, after extensive practice, the difference in categorization latencies of stereotypic versus nonstereotypic associations was no longer significant. Thus after receiving sufficient training, these participants learned to reduce the activation of racial stereotypes so that stereotypes no longer facilitated their responses for up to 24 hours following the training.

Although such direct strategies appear to be promising, these kinds of intensive and time-consuming approaches may be limited in their general applicability. Alternative promising strategies, however, take advantage of aversive racists’ genuine interest in being nonprejudiced to motivate significant and enduring change.

Motivation and self-regulation. Because aversive racists consciously endorse egalitarian values and truly want to be nonprejudiced, it may be possible to capitalize on their good intentions and induce efforts to reduce implicit biases upon becoming aware of them. As we noted earlier, the work of Monteith, Devine, and their colleagues (e.g., Devine & Monteith, 1993; Monteith & Voils, 1998) indicates that when low prejudice people became aware of discrepancies between their potential behavior toward minorities (i.e., what they would do) and their personal standards (i.e., what they should do) they feel guilt and compunction, which produces motivations to respond without prejudice in the future. In their process model of prejudice reduction, Devine and Monteith (1993) further suggest that individuals who are committed to maintaining egalitarian standards learn to reject old stereotypical ways of responding and to adopt new nonprejudiced ways. Over time and with practice, these people learn to reduce prejudicial responses to category members and to respond in ways that are consistent with their nonprejudiced personal standards. Thus, this process of self-regulation, which is initiated by making people aware of their potential for racial bias may produce changes in even previously automatic, implicit negative responses when extended over time.

We directly investigated whether the type of self-regulatory processes outlined in the Devine and Monteith (1993) model can reduce implicit stereotyping. In one study (Dovidio, Kawakami, Gaertner, ten Vergert, & Hodson, 2001), White college students were categorized as low or high in prejudice based on a median split of their scores on Brigham’s (1993)
Attitudes Toward Blacks Scale, which was administered at the beginning of the semester. After completing a person categorization task (see Blair & Banaji, 1996; Kawakami et al., 2000) to assess baseline levels of implicit racial stereotyping, participants were made aware of discrepancies between what they would do in interracial situations and what they should do, using Monteith and Voils’ (1998) procedure. Next, to evaluate the immediate impact of the would-should procedure, the participants performed the categorization task again in the same session. Finally, to assess the longer-term impact of becoming aware of prejudice-related discrepancies, participants returned to the laboratory two to three weeks later to perform the person categorization task one last time. Our index of implicit racial stereotyping was the extent to which participants were faster in identifying photographs of Blacks (relative to Whites) after Black stereotypic words and in identifying photographs of Whites (relative to Blacks) after White stereotypic traits.

In support of the Devine and Monteith model (1993; Monteith, 1993; Monteith & Voils, 1998), our results revealed that making low prejudiced people become aware of their racial biases can lead to reductions of even implicit biases, such as automatic stereotype activation, given sufficient time. Both low and high prejudiced White participants initially showed equivalent evidence of implicit racial stereotyping on the baseline categorization task (62 msec bias for each group). After the would-should exercise (Monteith & Voils, 1998), low and high prejudiced participants showed some decline in the strength of implicit stereotypes (25 msec and 52 msec bias, respectively), but neither decline was statistically significant, and both groups still exhibited a significant overall level of implicit stereotyping.

After two to three weeks, however, the differences between low and high prejudice people became more pronounced. Low prejudiced participants showed further decreases in implicit stereotyping to the point that no significant implicit bias was observed (7 msec bias). In contrast, high prejudiced participants continued to display comparably strong and significant evidence of implicit racial stereotyping (47 msec bias). These data offer preliminary evidence that making people who are presumed to be genuinely committed to egalitarian principles (that is, those low in prejudice) aware of race-related discrepancies between their ideals and actions can stimulate self-regulatory motivations to eliminate even “habitual,” implicit stereotypes. However, as our previous research on training suggest, these motivations require sufficient time, and presumably practice, to be effective.

In other research, we explored the effects associated with this self-regulatory process more fully. In this study (see Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2000), White participants first completed, in counterbalanced orders, an explicit measure of prejudice (Brigham, 1993), an implicit measure of stereotyping (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993), and an implicit
measure tapping the attribution of stereotypically Black characteristics to another person unidentified by race after being subliminally primed with racially stereotypic characteristics (Devine, 1989). Participants then completed a task, modeled after the procedures of Devine and Monteith (1993), making them aware of discrepancies between what they would do and what they should do (i.e., their personal standards) in interracial situations. Finally, we administered a measure of emotional reactions. Three weeks later participants returned to the laboratory and performed the two implicit stereotyping (response latency and attribution) tasks and completed another measure of the “would-should” discrepancy.

As in the other study, participants were categorized as low or high in prejudice on the basis of a median split of explicit prejudice pretest scores. It was hypothesized, in accordance with Devine and Monteith’s (1993) model, that initial discrepancies between one’s actions (what one would do) and personal standards (what one should do) would produce stronger feelings of guilt and compunction and produce more self-initiated efforts at change among low prejudiced participants, but not necessarily among high prejudiced participants. The effects of this self-regulatory process were expected to be reflected in decreased discrepancies and implicit stereotyping.

As anticipated, greater discrepancies between what one would do and should do produced higher levels of guilt in the first session \( r = .25 \), and this relationship occurred primarily for low prejudiced participants \( r = .50 \) and not for high prejudiced participants \( r = .04 \). These findings indicate the potential initiation of self-regulatory processes for low but not high prejudiced participants. When participants returned three weeks later, we found an overall decrease in the reported discrepancies between what one would and should do \( \rho < .01 \). In addition, this decrease was greater among participants who had larger initial discrepancies \( r = -.66 \)—and this relationship was comparable for low \( r = -.70 \) and high \( r = -.72 \) prejudiced Whites. Thus, awareness of discrepancies between one’s actions and standards seemed to motivate changes by Whites in general toward greater adherence to general standards to be nonprejudiced. However, as hypothesized, low and high prejudiced Whites differed in terms of the extent to which they internalized these changes. Low prejudiced Whites who had larger initial discrepancies showed greater reductions in implicit stereotyping on both the attribution \( r = -.51 \) and response latency \( r = -.56 \) measures; in contrast, for high prejudiced Whites the relationships were weaker \( r_s = -.25 \) and -.07 \) and nonsignificant. These results are not only consistent with Devine and Monteith’s (1993) model of prejudice reduction, but also support Allport’s (1954/1958) original insights. Specifically, they both suggest that the good intentions of low prejudiced people who inadvertently express racial bias—the characteristics of aversive racists—can be harnessed to
produce self-initiated change with appropriate awareness, effort, and practice over time.

**Summary and Conclusions**

*The Nature of Prejudice* (Allport, 1954/1958) has long been recognized as a classic in the field. In this chapter, we have attempted to illustrate how Allport’s ideas about the processes underlying prejudice have been validated, refined, and extended by contemporary research. Together with contemporary research, these ideas support Lewin’s (1951) proposition that “there is nothing so practical as a good theory” (p. 169). In particular, as Allport suggested, understanding the nature of prejudice is critical to developing effective and efficient strategies for combating bias.

Specifically, in this chapter, we have traced some of the historical roots of contemporary theorizing about the nature of racial biases of Whites toward Blacks in the United States and about techniques for addressing racial biases. We have argued that contemporary racial biases, such as aversive racism, may reflect a discrepancy between egalitarian ideals, which are socially normative and personally internalized, and negative beliefs (such as stereotypes) and feelings, which may have their basis in normal cognitive, motivational, and socio-cultural processes (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). As Allport (1954/1958) recognized, because of the propensity to think in terms of social categories and to value one’s own social groups more highly than others, even well-intentioned people who believe that they are nonprejudiced, may develop racial biases. Recent work on implicit social cognition indicates that these biases may be in the form of implicit, automatically-activated racial stereotypes and attitudes that are largely dissociated from explicit and conscious stereotypes and attitudes (Blair, 2001; Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001).

Also consistent with the aversive racism framework, Allport proposed that, because of this “inner conflict” between consciously endorsed values and unconscious biases, the racial biases of Whites may be expressed in subtle, indirect or rationalizable ways. Expressing biases in these ways insulates Whites from having to confront the possibility that their actions may be racially motivated. We note, however, that although the operation of contemporary forms of prejudice may be more difficult to recognize, their impact may be as harmful as the consequences of old-fashioned racism. As previously noted, “Like a virus that has mutated, racism has also evolved into different forms that are more difficult not only to recognize but also to combat. This subtle processes underlying discrimination can be identified and isolated under the controlled conditions of the laboratory. However, in organizational decision-making, where the controlled conditions of an experiment are rarely possible, this process presents a substantial challenge to the equitable treatment of members of disadvantaged groups” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998, p. 25). For instance, a recent study examining university admissions decisions
found that discrimination against Blacks occurred under ambiguous circumstances, where attributions of prejudice can be rendered less compelling, and was accompanied by rationalizations that “justified” discriminatory decisions limiting educational opportunities for Blacks (Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2002).

In contrast to this pessimistic view of contemporary racism, the ideas of Allport (1954/1958), along with recent theorizing (e.g., Devine & Monteith, 1993), suggest an alternative, more optimistic perspective. Allport (1954/1958) hypothesized that the responses of well-intentioned people who nonetheless exhibit bias (e.g., aversive racists) do not necessarily represent hypocrisy. These people may be truly unaware of their biases. By making them aware of their biases, such individuals may experience feelings of guilt and compunction and become motivated to change their less conscious beliefs and feelings to conform to their nonprejudiced ideals and self-image. Considerable research demonstrates how feedback, even false-feedback, that one is prejudiced can elicit more positive interracial responses in the future. Moreover, the work by Monteith, Devine, and their colleagues (e.g., Devine & Monteith, 1993; Monteith & Voils, 1998) provides compelling evidence of the motivational underpinnings of these changes. Among people who have internalized nonprejudiced standards, making them aware of prejudice-related discrepancies between what they would do and should do in interracial situations stimulates a self-regulatory process in which people attempt to suppress biased responses and respond instead without prejudice. The studies reported in this chapter extend this line of thinking by demonstrating that with sufficient practice and time even automatic stereotype activation can be reduced in enduring ways. From this perspective, contemporary forms of prejudice, such as aversive racism, may represent a transitional stage between traditional bias and a truly nonprejudiced society.

We recognize, however, that techniques to eliminate prejudice centering on making people aware of their own biases could also have some less favorable, unanticipated consequences. First, although the arousal of guilt and compunction in individuals could produce a motivation to reduce one’s biased behavior or attitudes, under other conditions these negative emotions may lead to adverse reactions. Allport (1954/1958) mentioned denial, rationalization, and projection as other potential responses to relieve these negative feelings. Several researchers have warned that the arousal of negative emotions, especially for individuals high in prejudice, could in fact lead to feelings of anger and rejection towards either the agents of change (Devine & Monteith, 1993) or the victims of discrimination (Tatum, 1997).

Second, consistent with the research on stereotype suppression (Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998), conscious efforts to control one’s stereotypes could actually result in an increase of automatic stereotype activation. One of our studies did indeed find evidence of a rebound effect.
of prejudice labeling on the automatic activation of gender stereotypes (Kawakami & Dovidio, 2001). Specifically, participants who had received false feedback that they were prejudiced against women demonstrated more stereotype activation after the feedback than before. Notably, level of prejudice did not qualify these findings; the results occurred both for people high and low in sexism. Thus, even for low prejudiced people, labeling them as prejudiced could have some negative side effects, at least in the short term.

Finally, we acknowledge that the effectiveness of techniques that make people aware of their biases may apply to only a subset of the population who truly experience “inner conflict”—people who have internalized nonprejudiced ideals but whose actions do not meet these ideals (see Devine & Monteith, 1993). In many ways, therefore, interventions aimed at Whites who are already well-intentioned can be construed as “preaching to the choir.” We note, however, that subtle biases such as aversive racism characterize the racial attitudes of highly educated people (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Sears, Henry, & Kosterman, 2001) who have the potential to be leaders of the society. Thus, even strategies that target people with positive motivations can have a profound impact on the lives of Blacks and a significant and enduring constructive impact on race relations in the future.

References


