A Justification–Suppression Model of the Expression and Experience of Prejudice

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The authors propose a justification–suppression model (JSM), which characterizes the processes that lead to prejudice expression and the experience of one’s own prejudice. They suggest that “genuine” prejudices are not directly expressed but are restrained by beliefs, values, and norms that suppress them. Prejudices are expressed when justifications (e.g., attributions, ideologies, stereotypes) release suppressed prejudices. The same process accounts for which prejudices are accepted into the self-concept. The JSM is used to organize the prejudice literature, and many empirical findings are recharacterized as factors affecting suppression or justification, rather than directly affecting genuine prejudice. The authors discuss the implications of the JSM for several topics, including prejudice measurement, ambivalence, and the distinction between prejudice and its expression.

I do not ask for final honesty,
Since none can say,
“This is my motive, this is me.”
—Donald Hall, “A Friend Revisited

The expression of prejudice is marked by a deep conflict between a desire to express an emotion and, at the same time, to maintain values and self-concepts that conflict with prejudice. In this article, we examine the nature of this conflict and develop a general framework for understanding how this conflict can lead to the expression of prejudice. The scientific literature on the psychology of prejudice is long and large, but the theories and studies tend to be about specific problems and prejudices, not the phenomenon of prejudice. We develop the justification–suppression model (JSM) to encompass the best known and empirically supported theories, incorporating many of their common elements. The goal of the JSM is to provide an integrative framework that helps to organize a range of previous studies and theories into a coherent review and analysis. We provide a simple structure for conceptualizing the process of prejudice expression and the experience of prejudice; this structure leads to several hypotheses about the expression and suppression of prejudice.

Definition of Prejudice

We define prejudice as a negative evaluation of a social group or a negative evaluation of an individual that is significantly based on the individual’s group membership. This simple and broad definition differs from other definitions in a number of ways.

Allport (1954) argued that a prejudice must be “unfounded”; it must “lack basis in fact” (p. 7). After 43 pages of discussion on determining whether a prejudice has a basis in fact, he concluded that it is a nearly hopeless task to establish when prejudice is rational or justified: “The study of groups, so far as it has gone, does not permit us to say that hostility toward a group is to any appreciable extent based on ‘well-deserved reputation’” (Allport, 1954, p. 125).

With regard to our theoretical assumptions, we do not define prejudice as “irrational,” because it is virtually impossible to ascertain rationality (see Brown, 1995). A more important reason to avoid the issue of rationality is, we argue, that the psychological processes that lead to prejudice and its expression are identical for “rational” and “irrational” prejudices. Regardless of their foundation in fact—whether they are complete fantasies, based on a kernel of truth, the whole cob, or an entire silo of truth—the psychological processes of prejudice do not depend on a hypothetical “objective” observer’s evaluation of accuracy.

The basic unit in a psychological theory should be a psychological process, and it is the phenomenological reality of the perceiver that is the explanandum of psychological theory, not the meta-analytic results of carefully conceived social researches. As such, we eschew the psychologically false dichotomy of rational–irrational in our definition of prejudice.

Although “positive prejudice” may exist, we emphasize negative prejudice for three reasons. First, negative prejudice is more harmful, damaging, and disruptive to social interaction and social justice (Brown, 1995; J. M. Jones, 1997). Second, the empirical literature on positive prejudice toward out-groups is scanty. Third and most important, our model describes the process by which an underlying prejudice becomes experienced and expressed. A positive prejudice is likely to be expressed and experienced in its
“raw” form, and so the processes of justification and suppression that characterize our model are significantly less necessary and may be absent from the experience of positive prejudice (Gross, John, & Richards, 2000).

All kinds of prejudice share a core of commonality. Race prejudice, gender prejudice, sexual prejudice, and so on are all special cases of prejudice, and these special cases are more alike than different. These relatively well-studied prejudices are structured, experienced, and expressed according to the same social rules as prejudice toward Croatsians, immigrants, the physically handicapped, staff at a competing firm, or Wallonians, Danireans, and Pireneans.

In our definition of prejudice, no group receives a special exemption from prejudice. Prejudice is common across cultures, time, national boundaries, and languages; no culture, race, ethnic group, or gender has a monopoly on prejudice (Brewer, 1979; Brown, 1995; Fowers & Richardson, 1996; Triandis, 1994). Some theorists have suggested that relatively powerless groups, although they may have negative attitudes toward relatively powerful groups, are not capable of prejudice per se, because of their position (e.g., Walker, 1995; see also Inman & Baron, 1996).

Although we do not deny that the prejudice of relatively powerful groups can be more damaging than the prejudice of relatively powerless groups, the psychological processes that give rise to prejudice, and decisions to act on these attitudes, are essentially the same for the powerful and the weak. In addition, our definition of prejudice does not require that negative affect be directed toward out-group members. We do not define away the possibility of self-directed prejudice, and there is reason to believe it occurs (Crandall & Biernat, 1990; Hetrick & Martin, 1987; Lewin, 1948; Poussaint, 1983).

In this conceptualization of prejudice, no amount of justification for a negative evaluation of a group disqualifies that evaluation as prejudice. Despite the substantial justification a prisoner of war might have for hating citizens of a country that captured, imprisoned, and tortured him, this emotion would still be labeled prejudice.

Finally, we suggest that prejudice is an affective state, and like other affective states, it has motivational force (J. W. Brehm, 1979; Frijda, 1986). When people meet (or think about) a target of their prejudice, they experience a tension or energy. This emotional state can serve as a spur to action (e.g., J. W. Brehm, 1999; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1994).

Having defined prejudice, we turn to a review of recent theory in prejudice. With a few exceptions, advances in prejudice theory have come in the area of Whites’ racism toward Blacks (J. M. Jones, 1972, 1997). In this area of prejudice, recent theories have focused on the intrapsychic tension between prejudice and the attempt to suppress or deny it.

Current Racial Prejudice Conceptualizations: Two-Factor Theories

Many recent theories of racial prejudice can be characterized as “two-factor” theories. These theories hypothesize that people are trying to simultaneously satisfy two competing motivations, based on (a) racial prejudice and (b) motivation to suppress prejudice. This conflict creates ambivalent emotions, behavioral instability, and cognitive inconsistency.

The first factor is genuine prejudice. In the two-factor theories, genuine prejudice is primary, primal, underlying, powerful, early-learned, automatic, cognitively simple, and relatively effortless. It is affectively negative and has motivational force; it need not be based on rational assessment of the target. Most of the two-factor theories argue that almost all White Americans have genuine (primary and unadulterated) negative prejudice toward Blacks.

The second factor is the motivation to control the first factor. White Americans do not wish to express prejudice in word or deed, for reasons that include liberalism, egalitarianism, sympathy for the underdog, maintaining a nonprejudiced self-image, social norms, “political correctness,” and humanitarian values. It is the tension between expression and suppression that characterizes Whites’ attitudes toward Blacks. We begin with a review of the historical foundation of the two-factor idea and describe prominent modern two-factor theories.

The “American Dilemma”

The earliest prominent account of this tension is found in Gunnar Myrdal’s (1944) classic An American Dilemma. Myrdal (1944) argued that the most important political tension in America was between the racial prejudice and inferior treatment afforded Black Americans and the deeply held civic, political, and religious attitudes about democracy, equality, and opportunity for all:

The ever-raging conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations preserved on the general plane which we shall call the “American creed,” where the American thinks, talks, and acts under the influence of high national and Christian precepts, and, on the other hand, the valuations on specific planes of individual and group living, where personal and local interests; economic, social, and sexual jealousies; consideration of community prestige and conformity; group prejudice against particular persons or types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits dominate his outlook (p. xiii)

J. M. Jones (1997) argued that it set the “stage upon which the social and behavioral sciences could frame the nature and scope of the problems in race relations” (p. 45). Myrdal’s formulation affected all of the two-factor theories, especially through Gordon Allport (1954).

Allport’s Compunction

The study of prejudice in social psychology was both crystal- lized and energized by the publication in 1954 of Allport’s time- less The Nature of Prejudice. In it, Allport (1954) distinguished between the bigot, for whom prejudice dominates and is expressed freely, and most of America, who experience their own racial prejudice with compunction: “More common seems to be prejudice with compunction. Anti-attitudes alternate with pro-attitudes. Often the see-saw and zig-zag are almost painful to follow. . . . Such inconsistency is bewildering; it must be awkward to live with” (pp. 326–327).

Allport (1954) believed that the values that produced guilt were secondary and intellectual in nature, whereas the prejudice itself was affective and primary: “Defeated intellectually, prejudice lingers emotionally” (p. 328).
Modern Two-Factor Theories

Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1981) identified regressive racism, in which a genuine, underlying prejudice is masked by norms for appropriate interracial behavior (based on egalitarian values). Normally, Whites behave consistently with nonracist norms, but when emotionally aroused, stressed, angered, or insulted, Whites would revert to an “older, traditional pattern of discrimination” (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1981, p. 71).

Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) argued most Americans exhibit what they called aversive racism, a modern style of prejudice that results from (a) prejudice that develops from historical and culturally racist contexts, and cognitive mechanisms that promote the development of stereotypes, and (b) an egalitarian value system. The prejudice that aversive racists feel is not open hostility but rather discomfort, uneasiness, and fear of Blacks, manifested in avoidance.

McConahay (1986; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981) developed a theory of modern racism, based on work by Sears and colleagues (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988; Sears & McConahay, 1973), which argues that racism has its basis in beliefs about the actions and values of racial out-groups. Although Whites recognize that old-fashioned racial beliefs are socially undesirable, they nonetheless have these beliefs encoded in them from an early age. According to McConahay, the conflict between American creed-based values and underlying deep-seated racism creates ambivalence.

I. Katz and Hass (1988) argued that modern-day White American racial attitudes toward Black Americans are a mix of anti-Black and pro-Black attitudes, a state they described as ambivalent racism. Ambivalent racism is driven by the independent but conflicting American values of (a) humanitarianism and egalitarianism, which promotes sympathy based on Black’s societal disadvantages, and (b) the Protestant work ethic (PWE) and individualism, which promote anti-Black affect (I. Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986). Racial ambivalence results from the intrapsychic clash between pro- and anti-Black affect; highly racially ambivalent people have high levels of both pro- and anti-Black affect.

Devine (1989) argued that there are both automatic and controlled processes that determine prejudice expression. Stereotypes can be automatically activated. Stereotyped beliefs and category information are immediately and effortlessly available to influence perception; a stereotype is “well established in children’s memories before children develop the cognitive ability and flexibility to question or critically evaluate the stereotype’s validity or acceptability” (Devine, 1989, p. 6). A countervailing personal commitment to reducing expressions of prejudice, coupled with adequate cognitive resources to inhibit the stereotype, can reduce expressions of prejudice. Commitment to nonexpression of prejudice is based on “personal beliefs” that may not be congruent with stereotypes.

Finally, Pettigrew and Meertens (1995; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997) have a theory of Western Europeans’ prejudice that encompasses a range of ethnic groups, which they called subtle and blatant prejudice. They acknowledged the older, more fundamental, unexpressed blatant prejudice and also “a more subtle form of out-group prejudice [that] has emerged in recent years” (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997, p. 54). Subtle prejudice, they argued, is a combination of genuine prejudice and social norms that proscribe blatant discrimination and other expressions of prejudice.

Summary

All of the theories we have reviewed can be reduced to the following structure. People acquire, early and firmly, prejudice toward racial out-groups. As cultural norms become increasingly negative toward straightforward prejudice, and as people mature, they become motivated and skilled at suppressing many of their prejudices. A simple equation summarizes these two-factor theories of prejudice:

prejudice + suppression = expression.

Prejudice itself is usually not directly expressed but rather is modified and manipulated to meet social and personal goals. There is a reliable alienation between the genuine prejudice that people have and the “inauthentic” prejudice that they report and integrate into their self-concepts. As a result, theories of prejudice that are based on the kinds of behaviors people emit are rarely theories of prejudice, per se; they are theories of the expression of prejudice.

The Justification–Suppression Model of Prejudice

The two-factor theories focus on processes that are common to most members of a society—all people are subject to the processes that lead to prejudice, and all are subject to social norms about prejudice. However, another, more mature tradition in prejudice research links a wide variety of personality, belief, and attitudinal underpinnings to prejudice. With a few exceptions, this individual-differences approach to prejudice has not been in the mainstream of prejudice theorizing for the past 3 or 4 decades.

In the earlier conceptualizations of prejudice, beliefs, values, and ideology cause prejudice. Implicitly using this model, psychologists have looked for correlates of prejudice and conceptualized them as direct causes of prejudice. Similarly, experimenters (e.g., I. Katz & Hass, 1988; Rokeach, 1960) have manipulated values or beliefs and shown that these manipulations increase prejudice. This simple model characterizes a wide range of thinking and research in prejudice, and we suggest that it is incorrect.

By contrast, we conceptualize most of the personality, attitudinal, and religious variables that correlate with prejudice not as causes but as beliefs that serve as justifiers of prejudice. As a result, we treat most attitudinal, belief, and value variables as releasers of genuine underlying prejudice. We integrate the older models of prejudice that focus on individual-difference correlates of prejudice with modern two-factor approaches that focus on public and private suppression of prejudice. Some models of prejudice imply that if people could simply figure out that they were prejudiced, they would quickly take steps to suppress it. Instead, we suggest that people are often highly motivated to seek out justifications that allow the unsanctioned expression of their prejudices (see Allport, 1954; Jost & Banaji, 1994).

The basic outline of the JSM is presented in Figure 1. The JSM states that several social, cultural, cognitive, and developmental factors create within people a variety of prejudices—racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, patriotic, and so on. These forces create a “genuine” prejudice. This genuine prejudice is an authentically negative reaction that is usually not directly accessible but that is
primary and powerful. The genuine prejudice is an affective reaction that has motivational force.

Other forces suppress this prejudice, including social norms, personal standards, beliefs, and values. Suppression processes will reduce prejudice’s public expression; they will also minimize its private experience.

Still, prejudice that is normally suppressed can be expressed, and justification processes facilitate the expression of genuine prejudice. Beliefs, ideologies, and attributions can liberate prejudice, leading to public communication and private acceptance of prejudices. Justification allows the expression of prejudice without guilt or shame; adequately justified prejudices are not even labeled as prejudices (e.g., prejudice toward rapists, child abusers, enemy soldiers).

We hypothesize that underlying “raw” prejudices almost always go through the processes of suppression and justification before they are reported and before they are accepted into one’s own self-belief system. Although the prejudice that is expressed publicly (or measured on an attitude scale) is correlated with the underlying construct, it is contaminated—and sometimes completely polluted—by the justification and suppression processes.

In the JSM, we treat the factors that affect the public report of prejudice and the private acceptance of prejudice almost interchangeably. Public report and private acceptance depend on the same psychological processes of suppression and justification, and factors that enhance, suppress, or release one will tend to have the same effect on the other.

When there is no suppression of prejudice, the correspondence between genuine and measured prejudice is high. When suppression is high and there is a relative absence of justifications, then the correspondence can be quite low. Justification processes serve to enhance the correspondence between genuine prejudice and the prejudice that is expressed.

Figure 1 is not a depiction of a structural equation model but rather is an illustration of how three factors work together to create reported and experienced prejudice in a single iteration. Genuine prejudice affects experienced and reported prejudice directly, but the desire to express prejudice is also met with suppression factors, which lower prejudice reports. To relieve the tension created by unexpressed emotion, genuine prejudice is released through the pathway of justifications, increasing prejudice reports. Suppression factors are depicted to the left of justification factors in the figure to emphasize which occurs earlier. Although logically the fact of suppression creates the need for justification (hence the arrow), the motivational force for expression flows from its affective source—genuine prejudice.

### Structural Elements of the JSM

Here, in the heart of the article, we review the structural elements of the JSM in turn: genuine prejudice, suppression, justification, and reported—experienced prejudice. The order in which we discuss the elements of the model is the same order in which the elements of the prejudice processes typically develop within the individual. This is also the sequence of activation in the expression or experience of a prejudice for a particular expression incident.

In the next several sections, we define the concepts and give an overview of the research literature in that area. Table 1 illustrates the basic components of the JSM and describes their psychological characteristics. It represents a series of statements about the interaction between the cognition, motivation, and emotion of prejudice expression, and hypotheses are derived from this view throughout the article.

The JSM categorizes the many correlates of prejudice as genu-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychological characteristic</th>
<th>Genuine prejudice</th>
<th>Suppression</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mental energy</td>
<td>Is source of energy, has motivational force</td>
<td>Uses energy</td>
<td>Releases energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attentional resources</td>
<td>Spontaneous and uncontrolled</td>
<td>Usurps attentional resources</td>
<td>Requires attention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion experienced</td>
<td>Is negative emotion</td>
<td>Creates mildly negative mood</td>
<td>Creates positive mood, relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutability</td>
<td>Hard to achieve, long lasting</td>
<td>Easy to achieve, short-lived</td>
<td>Ranges from easy to difficult; typically stable once in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily affective or cognitive?</td>
<td>Affective</td>
<td>Both affective and cognitive</td>
<td>Primarily cognitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific or general?</td>
<td>Focuses on one group</td>
<td>Usually very general</td>
<td>Can be specific or general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Early, effortless</td>
<td>Response to internal, external pressures</td>
<td>In response to pressure of suppression</td>
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ine prejudice, suppressors, or justifiers. Because the research literature on correlates of prejudice is vast, we hope the JSM can reduce the many, many variables statistically associated with prejudice into a much smaller number of constructs. Much of the argument of the JSM is that many of the correlates and apparent causes of prejudice are not, in fact, causes (or reducers) of prejudice, but instead factors that affect the expression of the underlying prejudice.

In the following sections, we first list a number of factors that directly create genuine prejudice. We list a sample of direct causes of prejudice, to provide the reader with an understanding of how the JSM conceptualizes its development.

We then review the evidence that prejudice is not directly expressed but instead is often suppressed, inhibited, or forced out of expression and consciousness. We review where the motivation for suppression comes from, the costs and consequences of suppression, factors that enhance or stymie suppression, and how suppression might both decrease and increase expressions of prejudice.

Next, we develop the notion that prejudice, once suppressed, can still be expressed in some circumstances—by justifications. The JSM suggests that just as people are motivated to suppress their prejudice, they are also beset by a conflicting motive to express their prejudices. Justifications are defined, and we show how a wide variety of affective, cognitive, and behavioral variables that have been construed in the past as causes of prejudice may serve instead as releasers of prejudice.

Finally, we look at how prejudice is outwardly expressed and compare that with how prejudice is internally represented in consciousness. We suggest that what we are willing to report to others and what we are willing to admit to ourselves are very closely related—both result from justification and suppression processes. We also consider the implications of the JSM for the measurement of prejudice.

In presenting each of these topics, we review a sample of the relevant literature, covering only a few examples of the relevant psychological processes. We give an idea of how the research literature can be characterized by the JSM, but our review is not exhaustive—our intent is to illustrate how the concept can be fit into the existing theoretical and empirical literature.

Genuine Prejudice

Genuine prejudice refers to the first-formed affective component of the evaluation of a group or one of its members; it is an emotional state with motivational force. By “genuine” prejudice, we mean pure, unadulterated, original, unmanaged, and unambiguously negative feelings toward members of a devalued group. The prejudice that people express is usually not “genuine” in that it is altered, self-conscious, and manipulated to meet the expectations and needs of its audience—it is what some psychologists call “inauthentic” (see Jourard, 1971). Genuine prejudice is an affective force that serves as the engine for the entire suppression–justification–expression process.

Genuine prejudices toward out-groups can develop through a wide range of social, cultural, and psychological processes. We hypothesize that prejudices toward individual groups are learned piecemeal and individually, although the various processes that lead to prejudice tend to act in concert, confederating their forces. Everyone has a wide variety of different prejudices (Fox, 1992), but some prejudices are common and uniformly distributed in the population, whereas others are arcane and rare. We do not suggest that everyone has every prejudice, but that everyone has some prejudices.

In the JSM, genuine prejudice results from psychological processes that directly create the negative affect. Because so much of our review points to what is not prejudice, but rather factors that enhance or minimize its expression, we begin with a sampling of factors that we conceptualize as creating direct, unmediated negative affect toward groups.

Family

First, and perhaps most powerfully, children learn prejudices from their parents (Aboud, 1988; Epstein & Komorita, 1966; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948; Hassan, 1977; Mosher & Scodel, 1960; Raman, 1984; Rohan & Zanna, 1996). Ward (1985) showed that parents directly socialized racial prejudice in their children; the adult children of men studied by Lane (1965) displayed remarkable consistency in racial prejudice across generations.

Interracial and cross-religious dating are often strictly limited by parents (e.g., S. K. Marshall & Markstrom-Adams, 1995), and the greater the identification with parents, the stronger the socialization of prejudice (Anisfeld, Munoz, & Lambert, 1963).

Direct Cultural Learning

Neighborhoods can have characteristic prejudices, which they pass on to inhabitants (Radke, Trager, & Davis, 1949), and adolescents tend to share prejudice levels with their peers (Bagley & Verma, 1979; Patchen, 1982). These effects often occur through quite subtle means; the mere contiguity of a social group and negative evaluative tone can classically condition prejudice (Staats & Staats, 1958).

The mass media teach stereotypes and prejudice (J. M. Jones, 1997). Television presents racial minorities in negative or marginalized roles (Foster-Carter, 1984) and emphasizes negative news about minorities (Milner, 1983); increased television watching is associated with greater racial and gender prejudice (D. M. Zuckerman, Singer, & Singer, 1980).

Instrumental Attitudes

Prejudice may develop from a rational evaluation of the danger presented by a group, even in the absence of direct intergroup conflict (e.g., Stangor & Crandall, 2000; Stephan et al., 2002). People or groups that interfere with one’s goals will meet with prejudice, hostility, or aggression (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939).

Prejudice will develop from the perception of danger, and peril comes from the barrel of a gun. The Cold War perception of the Soviet Union as a danger to American interests and safety led to a prejudice toward citizens of that country, which has significantly attenuated (Holt, 1989). Similarly, the rejection of people infected with HIV–AIDS (Crandall, Glor, & Britt, 1997) is significantly based in perceiving the infected as contagious; the more severe and
exposure to stimuli (Zajonc, 1968) can breed liking.

**Social Categorization and Identity**

Categorization is an important and pervasive cognitive process (Bruner, 1957); it is largely inevitable (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and requires little in the way of effort or cognitive resources (Glass & Holyoak, 1986). Tajfel (1959, 1969; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) showed that categorization increases perceived in-group similarity and bias perceptions toward the category prototype. A long history of research on minimal groups (see Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Brewer, 1979; Brown, 1995) has shown that the simple categorization of groups into in-groups and out-groups is sufficient to generate discrimination.

**Group Contact**

Experience with a social group can lead to prejudice against it (Amir, 1976; Bloom, 1971). Although Allport (1954) conceptualized intergroup contact as a way to reduce prejudice, he recognized that many forms of contact might increase conflict. Generally, people have little prejudice against groups with which they have had no contact, but prejudice can build rapidly once contact begins (e.g., Richmond, 1950). Casual contact often increases prejudice (e.g., Harlan, 1942; Henderson-King & Nisbett, 1996) and so can unequal contact (e.g., Stroebe, Lenkert, & Jonas, 1988; Watson, 1950).

**Novelty, Deviation, and Exposure**

Novel stimuli can be negatively arousing (Berlyne, 1971). People from different ethnicities, from different religions, or of variant physical appearance can cause negative affective reactions. People who look different or act in ways outside the norm can be shunned as the objects of ridicule (Goffman, 1963). Langer, Fiske, Taylor, and Chanowitz (1976) found that students avoided physically unusual people (those who were pregnant or had a physical disability). They also found that reducing the novelty of the target, by giving the students an opportunity to stare surreptitiously at these “novel stimuli,” eliminated the avoidance. By contrast, mere exposure to stimuli (Zajonc, 1968) can breed liking.

**Intergroup Conflict**

Conflict between any two groups can lead to prejudice (Le Vine & Campbell, 1972). Realistic group conflict theory (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Sherif & Sherif, 1953) says that competition over scarce resources leads to increased loyalty to the in-group, derogation of the out-group, and biased evaluation of in-group and out-group work products. In the Robbers Cave experiments, Sherif et al. found that conflict between the groups created stereotypes, anger, and overt acts of physical violence directed toward out-group members. Intergroup conflict enhances the distinction between groups and serves to highlight the boundaries between groups (Coser, 1956).

**Religion**

Some religious training and socialization can cause prejudice. For example, the Bible can be interpreted as prescribing prejudice and discrimination toward homosexuals, women, and members of other religions (e.g., Isherwood & McEwan, 1994).\(^1\)

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\(^1\) Although we have covered religious belief in the Genuine Prejudice section, religion’s relation to prejudice is complex, and religious belief has been associated with low levels of prejudice as well as high (Batson & Burris, 1994). Religious belief may serve as a suppressor, as a justification ideology, and as a direct source of prejudices.
Jones, 1988; Herek, 1989). Several recent events in the United States point to continuing high levels of racial discrimination, including the practices of racial exclusion in the Texaco Corporation (Brenner, 1996), Boeing (L. Zuckerman, 1999), and Shoney’s restaurants (Fears, 1993) and the deterrence of Black customers at Denny’s (Doyle, 1993).

Racial prejudice and discriminatory behavior are more prevalent when prejudice is measured unobtrusively than when prejudice is measured overtly and reactively (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980). When social norms are ambiguous, and do not overtly sanction prejudice, discrimination is significantly more prevalent (Gaertner, 1973; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Whether prejudice is assessed by professional scientists or naive observers, by an external observer or introspection, the assessment of prejudice is almost always the result of both the “genuine” prejudice and suppressive forces.

**Definition of Suppression**

In the JSM, suppression is an externally or internally motivated attempt to reduce the expression or awareness of prejudice (cf. E. A. Plant & Devine, 1998). Suppression can take place through the public denial of prejudice, through social control of the expression of prejudice, and through intentional attempts to control prejudiced thoughts and expressions. Suppression is a motivated or controlled process; it requires attention and effort. People suppress prejudice both to maintain a nonprejudiced appearance and to deny prejudice to themselves and maintain a nonprejudiced self-concept.  

**Research Evidence of Prejudice Suppression**

Prejudice and stereotype suppression is one of the most active areas in social–personality psychology, and it has a long history (see Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998, for an excellent review of the suppression of stereotypical thoughts). Not only do prejudice and prejudice suppression characterize the modern two-factor theories, the clash between prejudice and values and beliefs that suppress it has long been noted (e.g., Campbell, 1947; Lincoln, 1860/1991; Myrdal, 1944; Radke et al., 1949). When prejudice appears in some contexts but not others, one might suspect that it is sometimes being suppressed.

Three ways that researchers have empirically demonstrated the suppression of prejudice include (a) eliciting prejudice through taxing the respondents emotionally or cognitively, (b) eliciting prejudice through unobtrusive means, and (c) using “reverse discrimination paradigms” in which participants show a priming bias based on an “overcorrection” of prejudice.

**Emotional and cognitive taxation.** Because suppression is a motivated—controlled process, demands on cognitive or emotional resources can interrupt it (Wegner, 1994). Cowen, Landes, and Schaeft (1959) pretested college students on a racial prejudice measure, frustrated them with a set of insoluble tasks, and then insulted their performance on the tasks. This frustration significantly increased overt racist sentiment. Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1981) found that White participants delivered more shock to other Whites than to Blacks, but following an insult, these angry participants delivered more shock to Black confederates than to White.

Taxing cognitive resources also undoes suppression. Gilbert and Hixon (1991) found that, when a stereotype has been activated, adding a distracting cognitive task enhanced stereotype-consistent responding. A large number of other researchers have found similar results (e.g., Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993).

**Unobtrusive measurement, uncontrolled behaviors, and unclear norms.** Crosby et al. (1980) found that when prejudice was measured unobtrusively, prejudice toward Blacks was stronger and more reliable than when it was measured in reactive ways (e.g., attitude surveys). When the opportunity to express prejudice arises covertly, Whites aggress more, help less, and have more negative nonverbal behavior toward Blacks. When a behavior cannot be obviously interpreted as prejudicial, discrimination based on race becomes more prevalent.

Prejudice also “leaks” out when the behavior cannot be consciously suppressed. Vanman, Paul, Ito, and Miller (1997) measured facial electromyograms and found more negativity by Whites toward Blacks than they were willing to admit on a rating scale. Word, Zanna, and Cooper (1974) found that White interviewers made more speech errors, sat further away, and cut the interview short when interviewing a Black “job applicant” compared with a White one.

Implicit negative attitudes toward Blacks have been shown in a variety of studies. Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983; see also Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986) found positive traits were primed by the word Whites compared with Blacks. Indirect measures are essential for capturing implicit cognitions that may be able to reveal suppressed prejudice and stereotypical beliefs (see Banaji & Greenwald, 1994; Greenwald et al., 1998; Kawakami, Dion, & Dovidio, 1998; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). This issue is discussed below in the section The Measurement of Prejudice.

Gaertner and Dovidio’s (1986) influential article on aversive racism was based on carefully created situations in which underlying prejudice might be denied to a person’s self, but the prejudice was nonetheless expressed because the situation was sufficiently ambiguous to justify a wide range of responses. The ambiguous situations removed the need to suppress prejudice, and it brought out discriminatory behavior toward Blacks.

**“Reverse” discrimination.** Although it has been widely believed that college students and the general population are prejudiced against Blacks, a sizable literature shows exactly the opposite—White students often evaluate Blacks more favorably than Whites. Black targets may be rated more highly than White targets (e.g., Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997; Carver, Glass, & Katz, 1978; Dienstbier, 1970), and Blacks may receive overly positive evaluations (Harber, 1998; Jussim, Coleman, & Lerch, 1987; Weitz, 1972). Racial and ethnic minority groups are sometimes treated better than majority groups (e.g., Allen, 1975; Dutton, 1976; Rosenberg & Hitt, 1986), which may indicate self-monitoring for
prejudice and overcorrection for one’s own prejudices (Petty, Fleming, & White, 1999; White & Harkins, 1994).

Summary. This research points to the management and mini-
mization of prejudice. Prejudiced attitudes sometimes bubble up
past suppression, and the less controlled aspects of communica-
tion—nonverbal expression and behavior in situations in which
standards are ambiguous—telegraph the presence of prejudice.
Finally, people internally correct to overcome their own prejudice
and may overcorrect in favor of the prejudiced targets.

More and stronger prejudice appears when affect is unmanaged;
this tells us that what is felt and what is reported are two different
things. The well-established existence of suppression makes nec-

essary the conceptualization of two different prejudice states.

Source of Prejudice Suppression: Social Norms,
Audiences, and Empathy

In the JSM, suppression is conceptualized as a unitary concept.
Although there are many reasons to suppress prejudice expression
and restrain admission of prejudice into the self-concept, the result
of these motives is the same: the appearance of prejudice is banned
from expression and the self. In this section, we list some of the
reasons for suppression.

Social norms. A changing normative climate makes prejudice
“old-fashioned” and socially unacceptable in its raw form; open
prejudice has been unpopular for some time (Campbell, 1947).
Willfulness to express prejudice has been decreasing for several
decades (Dowden & Robinson, 1993), and this contributes to a
generally antiprejudice normative climate.

The expression of prejudice is remarkably malleable; behavioral
models of prejudice or nonprejudice are particularly powerful (E.
Donnerstein & Donnerstein, 1973; M. Donnerstein & Donnerstein,
1978; Glaser & Gilens, 1997). Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, and
Vaughn (1994) found that a single confederate expressing antira-
cist views could dramatically reduce tolerance for racist acts.
When the same confederate expressed benign acceptance of racist
acts, participants also recommended acceptance. The manipulated
social norm affected attitudes when measured publicly and pri-

vately, suggesting that the single confederate affected private
acceptance.

Playing for an audience. Public, accountable behavior shows
less evidence of prejudice than private, anonymous behavior.
Crosby et al. (1980) found “discrimination was more marked in
the relatively anonymous situations than in the face-to-face encoun-
ters” (p. 557). When performing in front of an audience of people
whose prejudice levels are not well-known to the actor, people
underreport prejudice. Discrimination is less likely in face-to-face
situations (e.g., Dutton & Lake, 1973; Gaertner, 1975) than in
conditions in which the target is remote (e.g., Gaertner, 1973;

Several bogus-pipeline studies suggest that people believe that
they are publicly underreporting their true attitudes. Sigall and
Page (1971) found that when participants believed that researchers
had a “window into their true attitudes,” participants reduced their
highly positive image of Negroes [sic] to one significantly below
that of Whites. Carver et al. (1978) found that the bogus pipeline
increased reports of prejudice against Blacks, and Allen (1975)
found Whites admired Black public figures more than White

public figures, but in a bogus pipeline condition the order of
preference was reversed.

People change reports of prejudice depending on the audience
(e.g., Lambert, Cronen, Chasteen, & Lickel, 1996). Hatchett and
Schuman (1975–1976) found White respondents gave more pro-
Black answers to questions about integration, housing and inter-
marrriage to a Black interviewer than a White one (see also Fazio,
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995).

Self as audience. Not only do some people wish to appear
nonprejudiced to others but they also wish to appear nonprejudiced
to themselves. Crandall, Eschleman, & O’Brien (2002) found high
levels of endorsement of some items that measured a personal
desire not to feel nor express prejudice (“I don’t want to appear
racist or sexist, even to myself”) as did E. A. Plant and Devine
(1998; “I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonpreju-
diced toward Black people”) and Dunton and Fazio (1997; “I get
angry with myself when I have a thought or feeling that might be
considered prejudiced”).

In several articles, Devine, Monteith, and their colleagues have
shown that people are conscious of the attempt to suppress their
own prejudice: violating these personal, internal standards of non-
prejudice led to feelings of guilt (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink,
& Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1993, 1996a; Monteith, Devine, &

Dutton (1971, 1976) has found that when White men wearing a
turtleneck arrived at a restaurant with a “ties only” dress code, the
maître d’ enforced the rule and refused them. When a Black
confederate dressed similarly followed, he too was denied. How-
ever, when the Black confederate arrived first, he was often seated.
The ambiguity of enforcing the rule on the Black customer (is it the
dress rule, or is it racism?) led to leniency when the Black
confederate arrived first. If the rules had been enforced on the
White confederate first, refusing to seat the Black confederate
could be attributed to policy rather than prejudice.

Because enough time had passed between the two confederates,
the audience of waiting restaurant patrons had changed. Because
the maître d’ stopped the Black and White confederates in both
conditions in front of an entirely new audience, seating the Black
confederate when he arrived first and refusing him when he arrived
second is behavior played to only one constant audience: the
maître d’. To avoid appearing prejudiced to the self, the gatekeeper
was biased in the nonprejudiced direction in the ambiguous
situation.

Empathy. Feelings of empathy can suppress prejudice. Gray
and Ashmore (1975) created empathy for “poor urban Blacks”
through role-playing (writing an essay from the perspective of the
target) and thereby reduced prejudice reports. Feelings of empathy
for a single member of a group can reduce prejudice toward the
group as a whole. Batson et al. (1997) induced empathy toward a
woman with HIV–AIDS and decreased prejudice toward all people
with AIDS. Empathy effects can be quite powerful; Batson et al.
succeeded in creating empathy for (and reducing prejudice against)
convicted murderers. We suggest that empathy makes people
rethink the appropriateness of the prejudice, adding an explicit
value of tolerance (Devine & Monteith, 1993; Galinsky & Mos-
kowitz, 2000; T. D. Wilson et al., 2000), leading to a more
favorable outward attitude (but without changing the genuine
prejudice).
Source of Prejudice Suppression: Value Systems

We suggest that a range of social, political, and religious values lead to the suppression of prejudice. There is a great deal of data showing that various value systems are correlated with prejudice, and we reconceptualize most of these findings in terms of suppression.

Religion. In many cases, religious belief actively serves to suppress prejudice. Although in some cases religiosity is associated with higher levels of prejudice, very high levels of religious belief are sometimes associated with low levels of prejudice (Gorsuch & Aleshire, 1974). The New Testament proscribes prejudice: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3:28, Revised Standard Version). Some religious groups are characterized by their humanitarian and antidiscrimination work (e.g., Quakers; Jennings, 1997) and their antiprejudice teachings of tolerance and acceptance of all (e.g., the Baha’i faith; Universal House of Justice, 1985).

Allport (1954) argued that the Judeo-Christian ethic is in conflict with the expression of prejudice. The experience of prejudice among the religious leads to feelings of guilt, and the suppression of prejudice—“practicing nondiscrimination”—is a virtue that religious Jews and Christians can admire.

One religious orientation appears to be related to low levels of prejudice, what Batson, Naifeh, and Pate (1978) called quest, the tendency to perceive religion as a personal and ongoing search for morals, values, and religious meaning, but resisting clear-cut answers. People high in quest score lower on measures of prejudice against Blacks, women, homosexual persons, and communists (Batson et al., 1978; McFarland, 1989). This is true regardless of the proscribed or nonproscribed nature of the prejudice (Batson & Burris, 1994).

Politics. Some political value systems also directly teach nonprejudice. During the civil rights movement in the 1960s in the United States, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee was a politically activist organizing group that engaged in antiracist political socialization (Perlstein, 1990).

Political liberalism (of the modern sort) emphasizes social tolerance and is associated with less negative attitudes toward racial minorities, those with physical disabilities, homosexuals, and other groups (e.g., Crandall, 1994; Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992; Lambert & Chasteen, 1997). In general, liberalism is associated with the social value of tolerance toward social deviance, which in turn can translate into less reported prejudice (e.g., I. Katz & Hass, 1988; Kurdek, 1988).

Egalitarianism. Egalitarianism is a value system that is characterized by democratic and humanitarian precepts and the values of equality of opportunity, social justice, and the worth of all human beings. We suggest that egalitarians are people who expend effort in suppressing prejudice, by veneering over the underlying negative affect and beliefs with contrasting positive beliefs and emotions toward disadvantaged groups (I. Katz et al., 1986).

Egalitarian values are associated with positive attitudes toward a wide range of disadvantaged groups. People who endorse egalitarianism are more likely to accept Blacks (Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996; I. Katz & Hass, 1988; Monteith & Walters, 1998), homosexuals (Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996), people with obesity (Crandall, 1994), women (McHugh & Frieze, 1997; Sidanius, 1993), older people (Lambert & Chasteen, 1997), Jews (Campbell, 1947), and the disabled (Newman, 1987; S. J. Taylor & Bogdan, 1989). Egalitarianism is associated with low levels of reported prejudice across countries and languages (e.g., Perkins, 1992; Tyson, Doctor, & Mentis, 1988).

Personal standards. Devine and Monteith (1993) argued that many people develop internal standards—based on values and beliefs—that they should be entirely nonprejudiced. The course of becoming nonprejudiced is a controlled, effortful process of suppression of stereotypical thought, prejudicial feelings, and discriminatory behavior:

Our focus is on individuals who have consciously decided that prejudice is personally unacceptable and as such have deliberately renounced prejudice. In renouncing prejudice, these people commit themselves to changing their ways of responding to members of a stereotyped group. That is, they make a commitment to replace “old” unacceptable responses with the “new” nonprejudiced responses. (Devine & Monteith, 1993, pp. 318–319)

Following Allport (1954), they called this prejudice with compunction—a primary and automatic prejudice followed by a concerted effort to suppress and deny it. People are motivated by the desire to be nonprejudiced and feel obligated to follow their internal standards (Devine et al., 1991). There are several measures of chronic motivation to suppress prejudice (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002; Dunton & Fazio, 1997; E. A. Plant & Devine, 1998; Monteith, Devine, and their colleagues expressed optimism about the effectiveness of suppression; people who are motivated and experienced at suppression can become effective at it (Monteith et al., 1993; see especially Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998).

Suppression and Mental Resources

The act of suppressing the thoughts, emotions, and feelings associated with prejudice requires an ongoing supply of a limited resource—mental energy. When cognitive resources are unavailable for suppression, attempts to suppress may fail or even lead to a rebound effect (Wegner, 1992, 1994; Wegner & Erber, 1992).

Because suppression siphons off mental energy, Wegner (1989) suggested that it might decrease the individual’s ability to think carefully, leading to superficial judgments (Richards & Gross, 1999), Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Wheeler (1996) found that when perceiving highly stereotypical targets, participants who were suppressing their stereotypes had grave difficulty in remembering anything counterstereotypical about older and skinhead targets. Stereotype suppression is cognitively taxing and may paradoxically reduce the suppressor’s ability to remember nonstereotypical individuating information. Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Ford (1997) found the suppression of stereotype-relevant information interfered with learning words on an unrelated task, suggesting limited processing capacity. When under cognitive load, this effect was enhanced (see also Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998).

Suppressing thoughts and fears leaves less effort to expend on physical and mental endurance tasks. People who had suppressed their desire to eat chocolates, and instead sampled from a plate of radishes, gave up more quickly on a demanding mental puzzle (see
Baumeister, Bratavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998).

Suppression impedes performance beyond attention and memory. Hochschild (1983) found that the suppression of negative affect in female flight attendants took a significant toll, leaving these women less able to enjoy emotionally satisfying relationships. By contrast, the expression of negative emotions releases energy and has a variety of positive effects (Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1988; Petrie, Booth, & Pennebaker, 1998).

In summary, suppression takes mental energy, and a resultant mental fatigue can lead to suppression failures, inadvertent slips, mental backlash, and a reduced ability to self-regulate. The mental suppression of prejudice is not always reliable, and acting on the motivation to reduce expressions of prejudice may serve to create the very problems the suppressor sought to solve.

**Paradoxical Effects of Suppression**

Even though people may be motivated and experienced at suppressing prejudice, the attempts to suppress prejudice are not always successful. In many cases, the suppression of prejudice may have a paradoxical effect, leading to increases in prejudice.

**Ironic mental processes.** Wegner and his colleagues have shown that attempts to suppress thoughts often result, ironically, in the increase of the thoughts in consciousness (Wegner, 1989, 1992, 1994; Wegner & Erber, 1992). Wegner argued that the suppression of a thought or feeling requires that one must (a) monitor consciousness for the presence of the thought and (b) suppress the thought when it bubbles up into awareness. Ironically, to be able to monitor consciousness for the thought requires some representation of the thought in (or near) consciousness. Thus the to-be-suppressed thought ends up being more activated, more persistent, and more insistent as the processes wear on. The more one actively seeks to suppress a thought related to stereotyping or prejudice, the more activated that cognitive “node,” and subsequently the more available the thought, feeling, or stereotype becomes. Macrae et al. (1994) applied Wegner and Erber’s model to the suppression of the skinhead stereotype. Following suppression, participants discriminated more and showed more skinhead stereotype activation than participants who had not suppressed their stereotypes. The act of suppressing stereotypical thought may paradoxically enhance stereotyping. In addition to these ironic processes, we suggest three other ways in which the suppression of prejudice might lead, paradoxically, to increases in the expression and experience of prejudice.

**Suppression as justification.** McConahay et al. (1981) argued that White Americans’ suppression of prejudice may exacerbate racism at the societal level, as the denial of prejudice can lead to failure to perceive racism and discrimination. In this context, Black Americans’ efforts to end discrimination appear self-centered and anti-egalitarian. This can also lead to news coverage and entertainment that are consistent with gatekeepers’ perception of society as increasingly nonracist and egalitarian with respect to opportunity. The depiction of successful upper-middle-class Blacks (e.g., The Cosby Show) has been known to increase Whites’ denial of discrimination and inequality (Jhally & Lewis, 1992).

The suppression of a genuine underlying prejudice can become a moral victory, leading to the self-perception of nonprejudice (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). With this moral victory in hand, the person may then express prejudice in ambiguous ways, feigning rejection of the stereotype but still managing to express it.

The stereotype of the extremely racist person can lead to self-justification as unprejudiced. Feagin and Vera (1995) noted that the American stereotype of the racist person is someone who is uneducated, hostile, violent, Southern, coarse, and common. They argued that this extreme stereotype of a racist provides “cover” for the everyday racist. If people feel that the cultural definition of a prejudiced person is someone who is distinctly different from themselves, then their own rejection of that extreme form of prejudice, in combination with some suppression of their own prejudice, can leave them feeling distinctly nonprejudiced. One may build a repository of nonprejudiced self-images that justify and permit discriminatory behavior in the future (Monin & Miller, 2001; Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995).

**Suppression leads to reactance.** People follow norms regarding the expression of prejudice (e.g., Blanchard et al., 1994; Crandall, Silvia, N’Gbara, Dawson, Tsang, 2002; Pettigrew, 1991), even displaying apparently contradictory behaviors in order to follow the norms of the immediate context (Minard, 1952; Reitzes, 1953). Still, there is evidence of psychological reactance or backlash against the norms of “political correctness” that have been prevalent in recent years (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Haithman, 1993; Heimel, 1993; Sowell, 1995; see S. S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981). People seem to be resisting changes in norms regarding prejudice.

E. A. Plant and Devine (1998, 2001) provided evidence that internal and external pressures to suppress prejudice have different effects on individuals who are primarily internally or externally motivated to avoid expressions of prejudice. They suggested that reactance may occur when people feel forced by situational constraints to suppress prejudice. Increasing such constraints, and therefore decreasing the person’s freedom to be prejudiced, might lead to greater prejudice over time in response to this reactance. According to their theory, external pressures to reduce prejudice must strike a delicate balance between encouraging the development of internally based motivations to avoid prejudice and eliciting reactance.

**Suppression release is rewarding.** Suppression requires mental energy and deflates resources from other goal-oriented pursuits. Failing to express emotional states can lead to feelings of anxiety and an uncomfortable cognitive pressure (Pennebaker, 1990; Wegner, 1989). By contrast, the expression of suppressed emotions reduces this tension and anxiety. Reducing anxiety and releasing tension are inherently pleasurable.

By analogy to the two-factor theory of avoidance learning (Mowrer, 1956), we argue that the expression of suppressed prejudice can be accompanied by positive emotions that serve to reinforce the expression of prejudice. This is a tension-release model of prejudice expression based on operant conditioning. Tension builds up when opportunities to express underlying prejudices are stymied by suppression, social norms, and the fear of audience reaction, competing values. When an opportunity to express the unadulterated prejudice is taken, tension is reduced. The pleasant state that accompanies the public release of prejudice acts as a reinforcer, which may enhance the probability of future prejudice expressions.

To test the idea that prejudice expression can be pleasurable, O’Brien and Crandall (2000) had students freely express negative
thoughts about either a suppressed prejudice (against fat people), a nonsuppressed prejudice (against child abusers or Iraqi soldiers), or a negative topic unrelated to prejudice (pollution). Compared with the other groups, the suppressed-then-released-prejudice group experienced an elevated mood and enjoyed the group discussion more. Tension release—the expression of suppressed prejudice—is accompanied by positive emotions. These emotions may serve as reinforcement of future expression of suppressed prejudice. Because of this affective reward, suppressors may express more prejudice and take more pleasure in doing so than nonsuppressors.

Enhancing Prejudice Suppression

Several “supportive” processes that are not direct forms of suppression can enhance the suppression of prejudice; we review three of these factors: practice, commitment to egalitarian goals, and cognitive ability—capacity.

Practice. The paradoxical effects of suppression may not be inevitable, as a commitment to suppress prejudice may overcome the ironic effects of thought suppression; the success rate of suppression may improve through practice (Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998; Smart & Wegner, 1999; Wegner, 1994). Monteith, Spicer, and Tooman (1998) showed that whereas individuals who were high in prejudice showed a rebound following suppression of antigay prejudice, individuals who were low in prejudice (i.e., more practiced) did not.

Kelly and Kahn (1994) found rebound effects with a novel task (suppressing thoughts of “white bears”), but they found no rebound effect when participants were instructed to suppress familiar intrusive thoughts (e.g., death of a pet). They argued that suppressing novel thoughts led to a rebound effect, whereas the more practiced suppression of familiar thoughts yielded successful suppression. Similarly, Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, and Ruisin (2000) found that practice in negating of stereotypes reduced stereotype activation.

Egalitarian goal commitment. Moskowitz and colleagues (Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schall, 1999; Moskowitz, Solomon, & Taylor, 2000) have argued that people with a chronic commitment to egalitarian goals can suppress activation of stereotypes; important goals that become linked to the self are chronically activated, which then operate implicitly. Those with a chronic egalitarian goal activation (with values that suppress prejudice) do not judge nor remember women or Blacks in terms of the stereotype—apparently the stereotype is not activated among the committed suppressors. Hence, suppression may sometimes be nearly effortless.

Cognitive ability. The suppression of prejudice requires mental energy and effort; people with high levels of cognitive ability should be better at suppressing prejudice. Although data that directly speak to this issue are limited, higher education is associated with cognitive ability, and education is reliably negatively correlated with expressed prejudice across several countries and time periods (Allport & Kramer, 1946; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Schoenbach, Gollwitzer, Stiepel, & Wagner, 1981; Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949).

Other cognitive factors have been associated with prejudice and stereotyping (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). People with low cognitive resources are less able to suppress their stereotypes once activated (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Shah, Kruglanski, and Thompson (1998) found that the need for cognitive closure was associated with greater in-group bias and out-group derogation.

Summary. Practice, goal commitment, and cognitive resources play a role in the suppression of stereotypes; to date the bulk of research on successful suppression has focused more on cognitive than affective factors. At this point we cannot state with assurance whether suppression of prejudice-related affect can be as effective as the suppression of stereotype activation.

Diminishing Suppression Processes

Because the suppression of prejudice has a variety of motives, interrupting these motives can interrupt suppression, leading to increases in reported prejudice. Similarly, lowering the ability to engage in suppression will unleash expressed prejudice. Although diminishing suppression has the same effect as enhancing justifications (more prejudice will be expressed), the underlying cause is the decrease in force used to inhibit prejudice expression and not an increase in the acceptability of prejudice. Several factors will reduce the amount of prejudice suppression people engage in, resulting in increases in measured prejudice.

Anonymity. A concern about audience reaction is a major motivator for suppression; when this is removed, antisocial acts become more common (Zimbardo, 1969). Anonymity may increase reports of prejudice (Evans & Miller, 1969), and situations with anonymity (e.g., on the Internet) are prone to more openly hostile forms of conflict (Carnevale & Probst, 1997).

Hate crimes are rarely perpetrated against people the aggressors know personally (Garofalo, 1997); anonymity is an important ingredient in prejudice-based aggression. Anonymity in the lab enhances cross-racial aggression (E. Donnerstein & Donnerstein, 1976).

Emotional and physical fatigue. Because suppression requires mental energy, a lack of energy will undo suppression. The causes of energy depletion are manifold, including anger, frustration, emotional exhaustion, cognitive overload, psychological stress, sleep deprivation, coping with chronic illness, and so on. Because mental vigor is needed to suppress prejudice, virtually anything that significantly stresses or overloads emotional assets will interfere with suppression processes. Cowen et al. (1959) found that frustration increased anti-Black prejudice. Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1981) found greater anti-Black discrimination among angered participants (see also E. Donnerstein, Donnerstein, Simon, & Ditrichs, 1972). Monteith, Sherman, and Devine (1998) reported that anxiety can increase reports of prejudice.

Emotional resources will be challenged by many life situations; suppressed prejudices will be released by mental fatigue, hunger, a lack of sleep, anxiety, stress, and so on. Higher levels of prejudice have been found late (as compared to early) in the semester (Crandall & Cohen, 1994) when educational responsibilities deplete psychological assets.

Weak social norms. Normative conformity is highest when countervailing social norms are weak or ambiguous (Cantril, 1941); several studies have shown that White bystanders are more likely to discriminate against Black victims in situations in which failure to intervene could be attributed to factors other than the
sured by both inhibiting and instigating cues

...expression of prejudice.3

...quickly changing or novel social situations, newly formed groups, or social groups with high turnover, norms are unstable and not universally agreed upon (Forsyth, 1999). In such anomic situations, one can expect higher levels of prejudice expression.

Alcohol. Alcohol can directly reduce suppression. Alcohol has a psychological and biological effect on inhibition—increased blood alcohol level decreases the ability of a person to inhibit, and to appreciate the consequences of, actions (Steele & Josephs, 1990; Steele, Southwick, & Pagano, 1986). Steele and Southwick (1985) suggested that alcohol increases the expression of behavior that is in inhibitory conflict, that is, “when the response is pressured by both inhibiting and instigating cues” (p. 18). When there are simultaneous pressures to engage and not to engage in a behavior, consumption of alcohol increases expression.

The expression of underlying prejudice is under exactly this sort of conflict. We expected that prejudices would be unleashed by alcohol, but only those prejudices that are suppressed. Prejudices that have free expression while an individual is sober should exhibit no increase with alcohol, whereas prejudices that are inhibited should blossom. Despite its clear relevance for the perpetuation of barroom violence, sports fan-related violence, and hate crimes, we have been able to find very little on the relationship between alcohol and the expression of prejudice.4

O’Brien, Eshleman, and Crandall (2000) reported a study of alcohol intoxication and prejudice. They surveyed people outside of bars, who completed attitude questionnaires and blew into a Breathalyzer. They found a correlation of .31 between blood alcohol level and reports of normatively suppressed prejudice (e.g., toward racial and religious groups).

Summary. Suppression is the motivated attempt to reduce, deny, or avoid the expression of prejudice and the desire to maintain a sense of self that is innocent of prejudice. It is motivated by internal and external forces and is subject to forces that can augment it (e.g., an audience) or subdue it (e.g., alcohol, emotional states). Paradoxically, suppressing prejudice can have the effect of enhancing it. Because suppression involves the thwarting of a motivational state that energizes expression, suppression may have negative affective consequences and cost mental energy. As energetic tension builds up, a person is motivated to seek ways to express the suppressed prejudice; this is the function of justification.

Justification: The Release of Prejudice

Justifications allow a person to express an otherwise suppressed prejudice. Although most of the research and theory on justifications have conceptualized them as causes of prejudice (e.g., politics, religion, values), we think of justifications as releasers of prejudice. Justification undoes suppression, it provides cover, and it protects a sense of egalitarianism and a nonprejudiced self-image (e.g., Allport, 1954, chap. 1; Jost & Banaji, 1994). Justifiers both allow for the expression of prejudice and cover the roots of discrimination.

Definition of Justification

A justification is any psychological or social process that can serve as an opportunity to express genuine prejudice without suffering external or internal sanction. A justification may be based on ideology, allowing or even mandating a negative evaluation of a group or its members. A justification may be a cognition, a role, or a social situation that affords an opportunity for the expression of prejudice without internal or external punishment. Conceptually, justifications are secondary to suppression, because a prejudice does not need a justification unless there is some countervailing belief, attitude, ideological factor, or social norm that identifies the negative emotional attitude as improper.

People may have beliefs or values that serve as justifications but that predate the prejudice—for example, they may believe people’s choices are the sole source of what happens to them in their lives. This belief, which may have been acquired while reading Ayn Rand, can subsequently function as a justification for prejudice against lesbians and gay men, poor people, and people with obesity. This justification will not be present in consciousness to serve as a justification until a prejudice is suppressed. The instantiation of the justification is secondary to suppression; the belief may preexist. Justifications are akin to exaptations (Gould, 1991), innovations that develop in one area but have a useful function in another.

Justifications appear in the expression process when they are needed—when one wishes to express a genuine prejudice and one experiences a simultaneous desire to suppress the prejudice. They can be identified by their “explanatory” nature; genuine prejudice has little cognitive content—it is primarily affective and largely nonverbal. Justifications, on the other hand, may be explanations for why a prejudice may be acceptable or even desirable. Stereotypes, value violations, blaming the victim, and so forth form a “logical” argument in favor of a prejudice, but we argue that they generally do not form the prejudice itself.4 However, in some of the research we review below, there is little empirical evidence that can be used to sort out whether the justification is a releaser or a cause of genuine prejudice. Although we make a strong claim that all of what follows can and should be conceptualized as justifications, the data do not yet exist to test this hypothesis in many cases.

Suppressors of prejudice tend to be broadly aimed and can affect large categories of prejudices (e.g., egalitarian and religious values, personal standards, and desire for a nonprejudiced self-image). By contrast, justifications are often releasers on a more

3 Using a balanced placebo design, Reeves and Nagoshi (1993) found that those high in racism rated an act by a Black man toward a White man as more aggressive when they believed they had consumed alcohol. However, there was no direct effect of drinking alcohol. In this case, alcohol did not serve as a disinhibitor, but thinking that one had drunk alcohol may have served as a justification for the expression of prejudice.

4 This distinction between justifications and genuine prejudice suggests that Allport’s (1954) definition that “prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty or inflexible generalization” (p. 9) does not in fact define prejudice. We suggest that Allport conflated prejudice with justification processes.
naturalistic fallacy and the preservation of the status quo

One set of beliefs about the nature of the social world that supports and justifies prejudice is beliefs that support the status quo. Generally, these beliefs support the naturalistic fallacy that “what is, is good.” The naturalistic fallacy serves as a justification for prejudice against any group that is doing poorly in the social structure, and status quo beliefs and their near relatives take a variety of forms.

Belief in a just world. Lerner (1980) suggested that people tend to believe that the social world is just and fair, where “people get what they deserve.” The judgment of deserving is based on the outcome that someone is entitled to receive” (p. 11). The belief in a just world can have a profound effect on the perception of victims (see Lerner, 1980, for a review).

People who believe in the just world report higher levels of prejudice (Staub, 1996). Belief in the just world has been correlated with prejudice against Blacks (Rim, 1988), fat people (Crandall, 1994), people with depression (Crandall & Cohen, 1994), and people with cancer (Stahly, 1988), among many others.

If one believes that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get, prejudice toward the poor, unemployed, imprisoned, underpaid—any person or group doing poorly—is justified, because such people deserve their unhappy fates (Feather, 1984). Thus, suppressed prejudice can be released by the justification of deservingness, based on belief that the world delivers punishment only to those who have sinned and that it rewards only the worthy.

Right-wing authoritarianism. The most famous example of personality-oriented prejudice research is the authoritarian personality program of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950). Although the research program was attacked on a variety of conceptual and empirical fronts (Brown, 1965), many of the core ideas of the authoritarian personality are solid and well established (Altemeyer, 1981; Christie & Jahoda, 1954; Stone, 1995).

Altemeyer (1981) characterized right-wing authoritarians (RWAs) as people who submit to established authority, aggres-
of prejudice tend to be concentrated in social groups that are only modestly above average in the overarching social structure (e.g., Pavlak, 1973; Schutte, 1995). Kluegel (1990) found that White Americans have reached an “era of stable acceptance of the Black–White economic gap” (p. 512), which in turn justifies prejudice and discriminatory behavior.

The equation of social status with moral value provides a circular argument: “If high status, then good person,” and evidence of goodness can be found in high status. When experimentally given high status, both high- and low-status groups tend to favor the high-status group in the distribution of rewards (e.g., Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987).

Prosperity theology. Prosperity theology is the belief that God shows approval through unequal distribution of mammon from heaven (Cantril & Sherif, 1938; Hadden & Shupe, 1987; Mariano, 1996). In this view, the rich are different—God smiles upon them. This idea has its roots in the doctrines of John Calvin, whose theology has served to promote competitive economic activity and the private accumulation of wealth (Appling, 1975; G. Marshall, 1980). Calvinist beliefs (e.g., “Believers are members of God’s elect”) have been used as part of the ideological justification of apartheid in South Africa (Schutte, 1995).

Protestant ethic. The PWE is a widely—but often tacitly—endorsed value system that promotes the notion that hierarchy, in and of itself, is good. One of the underlying Puritanical arguments of the PWE is that success comes to people who work hard and who deny themselves pleasure and leisure. People who believe in the PWE tend to be racist (I. Katz & Hass, 1988), antifat (Crandall, 1994), and antigay (Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996). One of the most common explanations of the socioeconomic superiority of Whites compared with other racial groups is that minorities lack motivation, preferring the comfort of their families and holidays to work (e.g., Kluegel, 1990; Kluegel & Smith, 1986).

Social dominance. Social dominance orientation (SDO) is the degree of one’s preference for inequality among social groups and the desire that one’s in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). People who endorse SDO beliefs prefer hierarchical (as opposed to equal) relations among groups and support a variety of beliefs that align social groups on a superior–inferior dimension. As a result, people who are high in SDO score high in racial–ethnic prejudice, as well as sexism, nationalism, anti-Arab racism, patriotism, separation between “high” and “low” culture, meritocracy, and political conservatism (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993). Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo (1996) suggested that the well-established correlation between anti-Black racism and conservative politics is based on SDO—conservatives rate Blacks negatively only to the extent that they prefer a hierarchical society, especially one that favors their group.

System justification. Hierarchy exists in all social settings, and most people believe that these hierarchies serve important functions, be they based on race, social class, education, Graduate Record Examination scores, age, experience, or the fashionable-ness of one’s clothing. Jost and Banaji (1994) argued that stereotypes can serve a system-justification function. They wrote that stereotypes serve ideological functions, in particular . . . they justify the exploitation of certain groups over others, and they explain the poverty or powerlessness of some groups and the success of others in ways that make these differences seem legitimate and even natural. (p. 10)

They argued that stereotypes serve three functions: ego justification, to feel better about self and social position; group justification, to justify the actions of the group, particularly toward out-groups; and system justification, to justify the actions of the group, particularly toward out-groups; and system justification, to justify the existing social institutions. The system justification approach argues that stereotypes develop from one’s experience with the current social arrangement. We perceive differences in social status among groups and then create stereotypes about the groups that serve to support the status quo, reify group differences, and palliate resentment about others’ or one’s own low status and poor access to resources. An unfair or inequitable system can become legitimized by creating beliefs about groups that explain (via stereotypes) why such groups deserve their status.

Political orientation. Support for the superiority of the status quo is an element of many belief systems; conservative political rhetoric often refers to the past and emphasizes stability and tradition (Lane, 1965). Many researchers have found political conservatism to be correlated with prejudice of various kinds (e.g., Allport & Kramer, 1946; Bierly, 1985; Crandall, 1994; Crandall & Cohen, 1994; Crandall & Martinez, 1996; Gaertner, 1973; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Lane, 1965; Pratto et al., 1994; W. Wilson, 1970). As age and education increase, so too does the correlation between prejudice and political conservatism, suggesting that sophisticated understandings of political conservatism are accompanied by more sophisticated justifications for prejudice (Bobo, 1997; Sidanius et al., 1996).

Political conservatism is based, in part, on a preference for stability and the status quo, which in turn can support the relative elevation of Whites, heterosexuals, males, and so on, compared with other groups (e.g., Lambert & Chasteen, 1997). Conservatism is associated with SDO (Pratto et al., 1994), as well as Protestant ethic and other religious and social ideologies that are indigenous to White suburban middle-class values. Endorsing these values, and perceiving their violation, can form the basis of the justification of a wide range of prejudice (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Sears, 1988).

Another characteristic of conservative ideology is the tendency to make attributions of controllability or judgments of responsibility. One characteristic of conservative political thought is the belief in individual responsibility—conservatives hold people responsible for what happens to them. Many of the correlates of political conservatism—believing in the just world (Furnham & Gunter, 1984; Rim, 1983; M. Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977), blaming the victim (S. Williams, 1984), and subscribing to the Protestant ethic (Feather, 1984)—are associated with holding individuals responsible for their misfortunes. Attributions of responsibility for negative life events lead to anger, rejection, and refusal to help and can serve as a justification for the expression of prejudice (Weiner, 1993, 1995).

Attributions and Personal Responsibility

Victim blaming. We do not like people who harm themselves. William Ryan’s (1972) powerful Blaming the Victim showed that
Americans reliably find responsibility among those who are suffering that justifies prejudice and discrimination. He reviewed the many ways in which people who have been victimized in some way—because of social organization, history, and structural inequality—are held accountable for their own state. This accountability, in turn, justifies prejudice and discrimination.

**Attributions as justifications.** The judgment that a person is responsible for his or her fate leads to increased expression of prejudice toward people with AIDS (Anderson, 1992); people with alcoholism (Humphreys & Rapaport, 1993); fat people (Crandall, 1994); lesbians and gay men (Whitley, 1990); workers in need of help (Frey & Guertner, 1986); the physically ill (Crandall & Moriarty, 1995); the poor (Zucker & Weiner, 1993); people who have been raped (Pugh, 1983); and people with Alzheimer's, cancer, or blindness (Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988).

Most models of attribution suggest that the negative evaluation and affective reaction to a person or group follows from the attribution (e.g., Feather, 1984; E. E. Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967; Weiner, 1993, 1995). We do not dispute this argument, but in the context of the JSM we conceptualize attributions differently:Attributions of control and judgments of responsibility are conceptualized as justifications that can release prejudice.

Preexisting attitudes toward group members can determine the course of attributions (Heestone, 1990; Vescio, 1995); well-liked groups are given credit for their successes but not blamed for their failures, whereas disliked groups are considered responsible for their failures but not their successes (Greenberg & Rosenfield, 1979; Pettigrew, 1979).

Crandall et al. (2001) proposed an attribution-value model of prejudice that suggests that people are prejudiced against groups that they feel have some negative attribute for which they are held responsible. The expression of prejudice is released when the attribute is considered negative and the individuals are perceived to be responsible for that attribute. The model predicted antifat prejudice successfully across six countries on five continents. This effect was strong and reliable in the individualistic cultures (the United States, Poland, Australia) but not in collectivist cultures (India, Turkey, Venezuela; see also Crandall & Martinez, 1996, comparing the United States and Mexico). In individualistic cultures, an attribution of responsibility satisfies the social norms for what constitutes an adequate justification for the expression of prejudice. In nonindividualistic cultures, judgments of personal responsibility are not so central to person perception (Norenzayan & Nisbett, 2000). As a result, attributions of controllability are not as persuasive as normatively acceptable justifiers of prejudice, and so they are not so highly associated with prejudice.

**Attributions, balance, and moral essence.** Social perception is pressured to be balanced, uniform, and affectively consistent (Heider, 1958). One of the primary motives of the perceptual system, in Gestalt psychology and in Heider’s scheme, is the desire to have a coherent, internally consistent, well-formed perception (see Crandall, Silvia, et al., 2002, for a review). For Heider, a controllable attribution is equivalent to seeing the outcome and the person as a single, harmonious perceptual unit; causal attribution leads to perceptual unit formation (Heider, 1988). An attribution of controllability transforms a person and the outcome into a single perceptual element.

As a result, when a person or a social group is seen to be causally responsible for their fate, then their fate can seem to be a revelation of the person’s or group’s character—a manifestation of their moral essence. Thus, a perception of responsibility for a negative fate leads to a negative evaluation of a person or group, and the negative value of a person’s or group’s characteristics or social position justifies—perceptually—discrimination and prejudice. When a person is responsible for his or her own bad outcome, he or she becomes bad, because of the structure of the perceptual system. This low moral value becomes a simple justification for prejudice and maltreatment—bad people deserve bad treatment (see Crandall & Beasley, 2001).

**Attributional scapegoating.** Scapegoating is the process of attributing responsibility for misfortune and difficulties to a salient and negative target. According to Allport (1954), “Scapegoats may not be lily-white in their innocence, but they always attract more blame, more animosity, more stereotyped judgment than can be rationally justified” (pp. 245–246). Berkowitz (1962) suggested the likely choice for a scapegoat is a group with which one has a prior experience of conflict or a prior dislike of individual members. Scapegoating can serve as the intensification and generalization of attribution of responsibility for a person’s, group’s or society’s ills, which can in turn justify the release of prejudice (see Ezekiel, 1995).

**Covering**

Covering is the process by which the underlying prejudice that motivates an emotion, behavior, or cognition is obscured by focusing attention on a plausible alternative motivation that is socially or personally acceptable. Covering can take several forms, and we highlight four of them—situational ambiguity, legitimacy credits, social roles, and shifting standards.

**Situational ambiguity.** When a discriminatory behavior might be mistaken for a neutral or socially acceptable action, or can masquerade as a more benignly motivated act, then prejudice may be released. When choosing with whom to affiliate, people might be led by prejudice into avoiding some people. If one can appear to be choosing to affiliate on some other basis, then discriminatory patterns may be justified. Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, and Mentzer (1979) found that people avoided a confederate with a physical disability more often when the opportunity to escape his presence was presented as a choice between seeing different movies in separate theaters. When choice-of-movie “covered” the prejudice, most participants chose to avoid him. When the same movie was shown in both theaters, avoiding the stigmatized confederate was not covered, and the majority of participants chose to share a theater (see also Batson, Fink, Schoenrade, Fultz, & Pych, 1986). In these experiments, the ambiguity of whether the participant is choosing to discriminate or choosing a movie provides cover to release a behavioral expression of prejudice.

**Legitimacy credits.** One covering strategy that can release prejudice is the building up of legitimacy credits, which can counteract the expression of opinions or behavior that might be construed as prejudiced. Legitimacy credits are “memory capital” of evidence for previous nonprejudiced behavior, which can be called upon to offset a given release of prejudice.

Legitimacy credits can emerge from overfavoring groups toward which one has a socially unacceptable antipathy. Dutton (1976) has found a wide variety of reverse discrimination effects in which Blacks are treated better than Whites (e.g., Dutton, 1971,
Beliefs, Values, Religion, and Stereotypes

Beliefs, values, and religion promote the suppression of prejudice, but they can also promote the release of prejudice as justifications. Some of these justification beliefs have been covered in the previous section, including the Protestant ethic, beliefs about individual responsibility, social dominance, and political orientation. In this section, we review the role of several beliefs in providing adequate justification for the expression of prejudice: belief incongruence, value violation, religion, and stereotypes as beliefs that justify prejudice.

Belief incongruence. Belief congruence theory (Rokeach, 1960, 1968; Rokeach & Rothman, 1965) suggests that prejudice is based to an important extent on the assumption that members of out-groups hold attitudes, beliefs, and values that are different from one’s own (Byrne & Wong, 1962). Rokeach argued that much of Whites’ racial prejudice was based on the belief that other racial groups did not share their values. Belief congruence (having the same attitudes and values) predicts affiliation choices more reliably than race, especially when social pressures are weak (see Insko, Nacoste, & Moe, 1983).

Belief incongruence is a justification for prejudice, because “we tend to value people in proportion to the degree that they exhibit beliefs, subsystems, or systems of belief congruent with our own” (Rokeach & Rothman, 1965, p. 128). When people do not share one’s beliefs and values, one interprets this as evidence of moral inferiority, and one can practice moral exclusion (Nagata, 1990), in which people are considered outside of the boundary in which moral rules and fairness apply (Opotow, 1990). Once people are excluded from the moral reality of one’s in-group, the amount of justice that one needs to extend toward them shrinks dramatically (Opotow, 1995), and prejudice and discrimination can be justified (Staub, 1990).

Value violation. Rokeach (1960) argued that members of other racial, ethnic, and religious groups are perceived to have different values from one’s own, a belief that can justify prejudice. Of course, sometimes groups in fact do traduce one’s values, and value violations themselves can directly justify prejudice. For example, the Romany “Gypsies” have a cultural value explicitly at odds with mainstream American values—they value economic exploitation and outright cheating of non-Gypsies (Salo, 1981). The direct violation of values of fair play and honesty can serve to release prejudice against the Rom.

There are few studies demonstrating that direct value violation leads to the expression of prejudice, in part because some definitions of prejudice explicitly preclude the possibility that value
violation–based antipathy is part of prejudice (e.g., Allport, 1954). Sniderman and his colleagues (Sniderman, Fiazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick, 1991) found that greater rejection was expressed toward both Whites and Blacks when they were described as violating the Protestant ethic. Biernat, Vescio, and Theno (1996) found that laziness at work led to the rejection of Blacks, especially when the Protestant ethic value had been primed. Similarly, they found that prejudice and rejection toward gay men was highly expressed when they were described as violating family values (acting as a poor parent), especially when profamily values had been primed.

Symbolic racism and value violation. The influential theory of prejudice known as symbolic racism (e.g., Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & McConahay, 1973) suggests that racial prejudice in America is a mixture of old-fashioned, dominant, unvarnished racial prejudice and a set of values and beliefs that combine with the prejudice. Together with the early learned negative affect toward Blacks, symbolic racism is created through the endorsement of a set of nonegalitarian values that include individualism, hard work and self-reliance, and a belief that no group deserves “special treatment.” Although these values do not directly cause racism, symbolic racists believe that Blacks do not live by or support these values. Blacks’ disrespect for Whites’ “traditional American values” leads to prejudice. Symbolic racism can be thus characterized as a value-violation theory of prejudice.

Religion. In earlier sections of this article, religious belief was conceptualized as a direct cause of prejudice (e.g., the Bible and homosexuality) and as a suppressor of prejudice (e.g., Baha’i faith, Christian charity). Similarly, religion can serve as a justification of prejudices. One famous example is the medieval Christian Church’s justification of the Crusades, whose historic purposes were based more on the desire for economic exploitation and anti-Islamic prejudice than Christian principles (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990).

Although religion may teach tolerance, it can also teach that the boundaries of tolerance do not extend to some groups. Christian religion has been used as a justification of prejudice toward the unemployed and single mothers (Jackson & Esses, 1997). Several studies (e.g., Herek, 1987; Johnson, 1987) have found that gay men and lesbians can serve as scapegoats for moral decay and the failure of Christian evangelism.

Religion was once used, in part, as a justification for American slavery. Former slave Frederick Douglass (1860/1985) wrote, “The religion of America was the great support of slavery, the pages of inspired wisdom being tortured to sanction and sanctify the crime. . . . Revivals of religion and revivals of the slave trade went hand in hand” (p. 321).

When the social norms within a group support racial tolerance, members of the group tend to display tolerance, and when the norms support prejudice, members of the group tend to display prejudice (Blanchard et al., 1994). This is also true with religious groups; when social norms within the church favor prejudice, church members show very high individual levels of prejudice (Griffin, Gorsch, & Davis, 1987).

Stereotyping. Stereotypes are beliefs about the attributes of a group of people (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Ellemers & van Knippenberg, 1997; Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Stereotypes serve a cognitive efficiency function, and they also serve a prejudice–justification function—this dual conceptualization dates back to Lippman (1922). Allport (1954) also acknowledged both functions: “The stereotype acts both as a justificatory device for categorical acceptance or rejection of a group, and as a screening or selective device to maintain simplicity in perception and in thinking” (p. 192). D. Katz and Braly (1935) wrote, “We are probably dealing here with the rationalizations rather than the causes of prejudice” (p. 180). More recently, Tajfel (1981) argued that stereotypes of groups serve to justify a group’s actions, and negative out-group stereotypes can justify derogation of that group, resulting in in-group positive distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1975). Jost and Banaji (1994) argued that stereotypes can serve to validate the relative privilege of some groups over others and function as subtle causal explanations, making privilege legitimate, natural, and good.

From their earliest conceptions, stereotypes have been considered as justifications of prejudice (see V. J. Williams, 1989). Early measures of racial attitudes are permeated with “old-fashioned inferiority beliefs,” that is, justifications of prejudice of the most basic kind. For example, one measure of prejudice included the item “It is fairly well-established that Negroes have a less pleasant body odor than White people” (Schuman & Harding, 1964).

Stereotypes also guide cognitions in a way that releases prejudice. Darley and Gross (1983) treated stereotypes as expectancies about the kinds and quality of behavior to expect from group members:

Perceivers simply selectively interpret, attribute, or recall aspects of the target person’s actions in ways that are consistent with their expectations . . . perceivers with different expectancies about another may witness an identical action sequence and still emerge with the divergent expectancies “confirmed.” (p. 20)

Stereotypes guide both information search and encoding, and the results of these processes can justify prejudice.

Leyens, Yzerbyt, and their colleagues (e.g., Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994) have developed a theory of the use and expression of stereotypes, which they called social judgability theory (SJT). They argue that social norms prohibit negative overgeneralizations to members of social groups, and so people suppress stereotypes when only group membership is known, because membership is not a socially valid basis for judgment. In such cases, stereotype suppression and refusals to make judgments are characterized by “don’t know” responses (e.g., Yzerbyt et al., 1994). When people believe that they have enough individual information to make a judgment, judgments are released that prove to be highly influenced by stereotypes, even when the individual information is placebic, bogus, or vacuous (Leyens et al., 1994).

SJT, with its explanation of the release of suppressed stereotypes, is very similar in spirit to the JSM. The JSM is a model of the expression, suppression, and release of prejudice; SJT is a model of the suppression and requirements for the expression of stereotypes. Although Yzerbyt and Leyens are concerned with mental contents rather than affective expression, the theories contain similar elements, and much of the data reported from their lab (e.g., Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1992; Leyens et al., 1994) are consistent with the JSM.

Intergroup Processes

In addition to group categorization and identification (which we have argued above lead to genuine prejudice), several intergroup
processes lead to the justification of prejudice. Intergroup conflict can serve as an instigator to genuine prejudice, and it can also serve as a justification when a preexisting prejudice exists. Other intergroup justifiers include intergroup contact, perceived threat, justification of group rights, and intergroup anxiety.

**Intergroup contact.** Contact was originally suggested as a method of prejudice reduction (Allport, 1954), but the large amount of research on intergroup contact has shown that it can both decrease and increase intergroup hostility (Amir, 1976; Bloom, 1971). When contact is inadequate, role-constricted, or largely negative, underlying prejudice can be justified.

Stangor, Jonas, Stroebe, and Hewstone (1996) found that U.S. college students spending a year in Germany or Britain became increasingly negative toward the host country. This effect was limited to those students who lacked warm personal contact and close friendships with locals, and had fewer interpersonal contacts overall. A moderate degree of experience with Europeans allowed most students to express their prejudice. Similarly, Biernat et al. (1998) found that willingness to express negative evaluations of racial minorities was very low among U.S. Army officers in a training unit. As training progressed, minorities became increasingly negatively evaluated. These intergroup contact findings are consistent both with social judgability theory and the JSM: When enough contact with a negatively evaluated target group has occurred, prejudice can be justified based on the argument of “actual experience.”

**Perceived threat.** When nearby groups are widely considered to be a physical threat, prejudice can be justified. Young (1985) found that proximity to a Black population was associated with Whites’ fears about crime, which in turn was sufficient to increase gun ownership; this effect was especially true among more highly prejudiced Whites.

Henderson-King and Nisbett (1996) found that a single experience with a hostile Black male engendered subsequent avoidance and discrimination. When participants overheard a telephone conversation about an assault by a Black man, as compared with the same conversation regarding a White man, prejudice and the perceived antagonism of Blacks increased. Similarly, Henderson-King, Henderson-King, Zhermer, Posokhova, and Chiker (1997) found that the perception of threat to Russian status from former Soviet provinces led to more negative evaluations of the out-group provinces by Russians (see also Stephan et al., 2002).

When a group is perceived as threatening, and this threat can be communicated, perceived threat can serve as a justification for prejudice. However, it is essential for the establishment of justification that one expect that others would accept the threat posed by the to-be-prejudiced-against group as an authentic threat. Some forms of threat, such as to self-esteem, prestige, and loss of privilege are insufficient to justify prejudice. For a threat to provide justification, that threat must be perceived to be significantly unjust.

**Justification of group rights.** The expression of prejudice can be released through the veil of the justification of group rights; nationalism provides the opportunity for the expression of xenophobia (Ichheiser, 1941). Subtle signs of being an out-group member can unleash prejudices that are suppressed when the group membership is made obvious (Warnecke, Masters, & Kempter, 1992). Patriotism may be the last refuge for scoundrels, but it also provides excellent justification for racial, religious, and ethnic prejudices.

**Intergroup anxiety.** When meeting members of an unusual, exotic, or simply unfamiliar group, one may feel anxious about how to behave, and how one’s behavior will be interpreted by the out-group member; Stephan and Stephan (1985) labeled this phenomenon *intergroup anxiety.* This anxiety can create cognitive biases, intensify emotional reactions, and enhance the expression of prejudice by creating a negative emotional state that can be attributed to the out-group target. For example, Britt, Boniecki, Vescio, and Biernat (1996) found that when anticipating interacting with a Black target, White participants high in intergroup anxiety exhibited high degrees of state anxiety, perceived their partners as very dissimilar, and anticipated a high degree of difficulty in the interaction. Intergroup anxiety also reduces intergroup contact and increases the likelihood of stereotyped or role-based contact (Islam & Hewstone, 1993). Intergroup anxiety can justify the expression of prejudice by associating anxiety with out-group targets, enhancing perceived threat (Eysenck et al., 1991; Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998; Staub, 1996).

**Justification: Supportive Cognitive Processes**

There are a number of social and cognitive processes that enhance the creation of justifications. There are several ways to reach justifications and indulge in prejudices, and we include only a few of them, including the motivated search for justificatory knowledge, patterns of attributions, and linguistic intergroup bias.

**Motivated assimilation of information.** Stereotypes of out-groups can be created, enhanced, and protected by screening the information that is allowed to shape them (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, & O’Brien, 1995) or undermine justifications (e.g., blaming the victim) by providing knowledge of complex social processes. When considering evidence for the justification of a prejudice, people can be biased (a) in encoding or accessing their memory, (b) in using statistical information, and (c) in evaluating research outcomes. Kunda (1990) noted that “there is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions” (p. 480).

For example, Munro and Ditto (1997) presented highly antigay participants with scientific information, some of which supported their prejudices and some of which did not. Not only did the prejudiced participants rate the supportive research as better done and more convincing but their prejudice was increased by exposure to the mixed information.

**Ultimate attribution error.** There is a tendency to make attributions consistent with prejudice. When a member of a negative out-group has a positive outcome, one can attribute this good result to uncontrollable or external forces, and when he or she has a negative outcome, one can attribute this bad result to controllable and internal forces; Pettigrew (1979) labeled this the *ultimate attribution error.* For example, D. M. Taylor and Jaggi (1974) found that Hindu adults made internal attributions for helpful acts by Hindus but external attributions for the same acts by Muslims. Similarly, Greenberg and Rosenfield (1979) found that the more racist their participants, the more credit they gave Whites for their
successes and the more blame they gave Blacks for their failures (see also Vescio, 1995).

Linguistic intergroup bias. Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, and Semin (1989) showed that people communicate positive out-group information in specific and delimited language but communicate negative out-group information in abstract and general language: the linguistic intergroup bias. This selective language use helps communicate and perpetuate stereotypes, which in turn can justify prejudice. This bias can affect attributions and serve to maintain strong negative expectancies of out-groups (Karpinski & von Hippel, 1996).

Summary. Justifications serve the function of releasing prejudice. Whereas only a relative handful of motives are needed to lead to widespread suppression, justifications are often more narrowly focused and thus there are a very large number of justifications, each tailored to its own prejudice (e.g., individual group stereotypes, specific attributions). Although the justification may merely be a “just-so story” one tells oneself, it must have the veneer of truth. Justifications are positively correlated with reports of prejudice; when experimentally manipulated, they appear to cause prejudice (e.g., Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; I. Katz & Hass, 1988). However, we suggest the experimental introduction of a justification may simply approve it for expression. Justifications release prejudice in two ways. First, justifications allow the public expression of prejudice. Second, justifications allow a person to integrate a negative attitude toward a group into oneself without labeling oneself prejudiced. These two functions represent public avowal and private acceptance, which comprise the final element of the JSM, the topic of the next section of this article. But first, we consider genuine prejudice, suppression, and justification, and how to distinguish among them.

Overview of JSM Elements That Lead to Prejudice Expression

In Table 1 we have summarized the components that directly contribute to expressed and experienced prejudice. The table recapitulates the basic logic of the elements of the JSM, and it also provides hypotheses that a researcher can use to differentiate among the elements. For example, if an expression of prejudice is based on a justification, then it should be accompanied by a feeling of energy, relief, or positive mood, and a rationalization for the expression should be cognitively available. If an expression of genuine prejudice has been suppressed, we should find negative mood, fewer attentional resources and less mental energy, and lower reports of other prejudices. Overall, the three elements that contribute to the expression and experience of prejudice differ in their origin, their mutability, the moods that accompany them, the mental energy they absorb or release, the breadth of impact, and their ontogenesis. Researchers who wish to categorize psychological processes among these elements would look for evidence related to mood, attention, longevity of change, and so on to determine which processes had been instantiated.

Expressed and Experienced Prejudice

Genuine, unexpurgated prejudice is rarely directly expressed; prejudice almost always makes it into expression through the filters of suppression and justification. To the extent that suppression and justification play a role in the expression of any given prejudice, the underlying prejudice will only be modestly correlated with the prejudice people are willing (or able) to report. The end results of the justification-suppression processes are (a) the public expression of prejudice, which includes outright derogation, discriminatory behavior, public displays, and paper-and-pencil measures of prejudice, and (b) experienced prejudice, which includes the private acceptance (and acceptability) of negative evaluations of people based on disliked group membership.

Expressed and experienced prejudices are conceptualized as the result of the same processes; genuine prejudice makes it both into expression and into the self-image through the processes of suppression and justification. This is not to say that public reports isomorphically map onto private belief—the evidence against such a hypothesis is overwhelming. Still, the processes that lead to expression and self-concept come from the same place, experience the same hurdles, and exhibit the same tension between the justification and suppression (cf. Crandall, O’Brien, & Eshleman, 2002).

Discrepancy Between Reported and Experienced Prejudice

Even though the same processes lead to what people say and what they will admit to themselves, many times there is a significant discrepancy between the two. When it comes to racial prejudice, “Whites today are, in fact, more prejudiced than they are wont to admit” (Crosby et al., 1980, p. 557). Whites’ reported prejudice toward Blacks is very low (Case & Greeley, 1990; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991), and in college samples, a majority of respondents may score at the extreme low end of the scaling distribution (e.g., Crandall, 1994).

It is difficult to know whether people are aware of their underreporting of prejudice. The studies that show a discrepancy between overt and covert discrimination (Crosby et al., 1980), implicit and explicit prejudice (Banaji & Greenwald, 1994), or intentional and unintentional discrimination (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986) cannot tell us much about the awareness of the participant. A discrepancy between behavior and reported attitude does not necessarily indicate that the participant is aware of this discrepancy—the individual’s justifications and suppression may lead to a genuinely believed self-image of nonprejudice, even while the participant is behaving in a discriminatory way. Still, two areas of research suggest that people are aware of the discrepancy between prejudice reports and their self-image: research using the bogus pipeline and research on personal standards for prejudice.

Bogus pipeline. In bogus-pipeline research, participants are given the sense that a physical apparatus is capable of measuring their “true” attitudes and that this pipeline to their true beliefs, motives, and attitudes will lead them to make more accurate self-reports. When the bogus pipeline is used to measure prejudice, higher levels of prejudice are reported. Roese and Jamieson (1993) reviewed 10 studies using the bogus pipeline to measure prejudice. On average, the bogus-pipeline conditions revealed levels of prejudice about 0.42 standard deviations’ higher than the control comparisons. Because the bogus-pipeline procedure does not actually penetrate the mind, the shift toward greater prejudice expression indicates that participants admit to themselves a higher level of prejudice than they typically admit on attitude scales.
**Personal standards for prejudice.** In a variety of studies, Monteith and Devine (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, 1996a, 1996b; Monteith et al., 1993) have asked people to imagine their affect and behavior in cross-racial situations or while interacting with gay men. They ask their participants about what they ought to feel and do and about what they might actually feel and do in these situations. Their participants commonly report discrepancies between what they ought to do and what they actually would do. When internally motivated to suppress, people feel guilty; this guilt serves as a sign that a person has more prejudice than they would like to admit into their self-concept (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, 1996a, 1996b; Monteith et al., 1993).

When people catch themselves in discriminatory behavior, they may seek to bolster or reaffirm their nonprejudiced identities by engaging in egalitarian acts or even reverse discrimination (e.g., Dutton & Lake, 1973; Steele, 1988). To bring harmony between their self-perceptions and their actions, people can deny that prejudice was expressed, change the meaning of the behavior into something more innocuous, provide a justification, or adapt their self-image to include a higher level of prejudice.

**Summary**

The expression of prejudice and the prejudice people integrate into their self-concept come from the same underlying genuine prejudice, filtered through the processes of justification and suppression. Reports of prejudice are not genuine prejudice; the reports are biased in reliable and predictable ways. Prejudice is often underreported, but there are situations in which prejudice is over-reported (in the locker room, when passing, etc.). Because prejudice is so closely tied to important values, discrepancies between experienced and expressed prejudice can lead to guilt and shame.

**Dynamic Relations Among JSM Elements: Recursion, Ambivalence, Individual Differences, and Education**

**Recursion**

The JSM is a dynamic model, and in Figure 1 the flow of psychological processes and events is from left to right. The illustration of the model is based on individual expression events, but the model is explicitly recursive. For example, the public reporting of prejudice can affect subsequent genuine prejudice, or the undermining of justifications can increase the need to suppress prejudice. We have described the JSM as a unidirectional model, beginning with prejudice, restrained by suppression processes, released by justification processes, and thence expressed. It is important to keep in mind that Figure 1 represents the temporal flow of psychological processes in a single act of expression or experience.

The JSM can be understood in two ways, one of which is firmly sequential, the other of which is not. As (a) a model of a single act of expression, the sequence is fixed—prejudice motivates expression, it meets with suppression, and justification processes facilitate expression. However, as (b) a general model for how tension and equilibrium are reached within individuals between prejudice suppression and expression, the sequence is not fixed. Learning a negative stereotype about Wallonians can lead to genuine prejudice against Wallonians in addition to justifying its expression.

**Attributions of responsibility justify negative emotions, but they can also create them (Weiner, 1995).**

We expect that there are feedback loops and interplay among the elements of the JSM; processes such as self-perception and dissonance, persuasion, values confrontation, and attitude change will change justifications and suppressions. Consistency motives and other self-persuasion processes may sometimes then change the underlying prejudice (cf. T. D. Wilson et al., 2000). A successful justification might entirely disarm a need for suppression. Expressions themselves (and especially their consequences) will motivate new suppression attempts or spur on the need to develop justifications (or enhance suppression).

For the specific model of individual expression the sequence is invariant, for the general model of how prejudice takes expression the model should be understood as more flexible. Nothing in the model should be construed as excluding complex relations among its elements.

**Ambivalence: Instability Among Elements**

American Whites’ attitudes toward Blacks might now be characterized as ambivalent; most Whites have attitudes that are comprised of both positive and negative components (e.g., Devine, 1989; I. Katz & Hass, 1988). A similar argument has been made about other prejudices (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 1996; Monteith, 1993).

The experience of ambivalence, and the behavior that results from it, are a major focus of prejudice research. On the basis of the structure of the JSM, we propose that there are three different psychological processes that might be characterized as ambivalence, each of which is distinguished by a distinct pattern of conflict among the elements of genuine prejudice, suppression, and justification processes.

The first and simplest sort of ambivalence we call *suppression ambivalence*. In suppression ambivalence, genuine prejudice is met by suppression processes that contradict, suppress, and inhibit prejudice, but there is no presence of genuine positive affect. Suppression ambivalence may typify the new undergraduate who enters college and learns from peers that prejudice against racial, religious, or ethnic groups is not to be tolerated. The undergraduate may soon come to believe that his or her prejudices are unacceptable but does not simultaneously have genuinely positive feelings toward the targets of that prejudice. Suppression ambivalence is merely the feelings that come from having emotions that are not acceptable to the self or the public; in suppression ambivalence, people have prejudices, which they feel they should not have or express.

The second kind of ambivalence is characterized by the conflict between the underlying prejudice and positive emotions that serve as suppressors, which we call *affective ambivalence*. Whereas suppression ambivalence is characterized by conflict between underlying prejudice and processes that subdue expression, affective ambivalence is characterized by a conflict from genuine positive and negative emotions toward members of a group. This is a more traditional definition of ambivalence and is exemplified in the work by I. Katz and his colleagues (e.g., Carver et al., 1978; I. Katz, 1981; I. Katz & Hass, 1988; I. Katz et al., 1986; see also Devine et al., 1991; Glick & Fiske, 1996; Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998), which finds affective instability and behavioral amplification accompanying ambivalence.
High levels of both prejudice and suppression characterize suppression ambivalence and affective ambivalence, but the forms of suppression differ. In suppression ambivalence, suppression is simply a quashing, withholding, or checking of the expression of prejudice, whereas in affective ambivalence, the suppressive factor is a secondary but genuinely positive affective state that favors the target.

The third kind of ambivalence is more psychologically complex. Suppression ambivalence represents a state of tension—a stalemate—between suppression and prejudice, and affective ambivalence represents a conflict—a struggle—for expression between positive and negative affect. By contrast, equilibrium ambivalence represents a more stable interlocking set of beliefs that allows some kinds of release from the otherwise stymied emotional expression—a stability. In equilibrium ambivalence, genuine prejudice, suppression, and justification are all involved; the expression of genuine prejudice is normally suppressed, but prejudice can be released when an appropriate justification is instantiated.

Equilibrium ambivalence represents a later and more developed stage. When a person integrates justifications and suppressions into a coherent ideology, and a person accepts both positive and negative emotions toward targets of prejudice, we can say that he or she has achieved equilibrium ambivalence. This form of ambivalence allows for modest expression of prejudice and is characterized by a somewhat higher experienced prejudice; people with equilibrium ambivalence know they have some prejudice and can accept it.

Equilibrium ambivalence requires time and energy to develop; it characterizes the state when the three elements of the JSM have reached a point in which emotional equilibrium within the person is achieved, and interaction with a prejudiced target poses less potential threat to the self-image. Equilibrium ambivalence might be characterized as simultaneous low levels of intergroup anxiety and expressed prejudice. There is stability and self-assuredness in equilibrium ambivalence—although there are still mixed feelings toward the prejudice target, they are organized, sensible, and justified and not particularly characterized by anxiety and feelings of threat. Those who have achieved equilibrium ambivalence are less likely to avoid intergroup experience and will show lower levels of intergroup anxiety; equilibrium ambivalence is marked by behavioral stability and a controlled emotionality.

**Individual Differences**

The JSM is an individual-differences model; the strength of each of the elements varies across persons. When the underlying prejudice is not strong, suppression is likely to be most successful and the need for justifications is small. In such a case, one might successfully suppress a prejudice completely, without further need of justification.

When the person has a vigorous genuine prejudice, however, the ability to express it becomes important. The greater the genuine prejudice, the more justifications will be endorsed. The greater any prejudice is that must be suppressed, the more attractive justifications will be, the more they will be sought out, and the more they will be defensively held. As suppression increases, so too must justifications (or the internal state of tension).

If social norms rule out straightforward expressions, suppression forces are heavily prevailed upon. If the person has few suppression resources or is not motivated at suppression (Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998), the person risks social opprobrium. In this case, expressing genuine prejudice might be socially punished, and so suppression must be effective for the person to remain a group member in good standing. If the genuine prejudice is overpowering or suppression is weak, then a person might seek out social groups that allow such expression. We hypothesize that people will assent into social groups based on expressed prejudice levels and the different kinds of justifications and suppressions. Because people join social groups based on belief and value similarity (Crandall, Schifffauer, & Harvey, 1997), people will form groups based on similar levels of prejudice. However, there is a special need to assert along justification lines; the effectiveness of a justification depends on its normative acceptability. Some groups accept prejudice through the reification of race; others do not. Western societies accept discrimination based on individual responsibility; collective societies do not (Crandall & Martinez, 1996; Crandall et al., 2001). People will join groups according to whether they allow expressions of prejudice and whether they share justifications for that expression.

**Formal Education**

The more formal education people have, the less prejudice they report (Duckitt, 1988; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; W. T. Plant, 1958; Sidanius et al., 1996). We suggest that formal education does not affect prejudice directly but rather does so indirectly through justification and suppression processes (Federico & Sidanius, 2002). Education can provide social norms that inhibit prejudice and teach values that lead to suppression. Consistent with this argument, prejudice is reduced by education in the humanities and social sciences but not in the natural sciences and engineering (Eitzen & Brouillette, 1979; van Laar, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Sinclair, 1999).

Education can also increase prejudice reports; it can teach values and ideologies that provide access to sophisticated justifications. It also provides political training and cognitive complexity that can make attitudes more consistent, which will enhance some justifications and undermine suppression for those with ideologies that can promote prejudice (e.g., Sidanius et al., 1996). Jackman and Muha (1984) wrote that advanced formal education equips its recipients to promote their interests more astutely—indeed, to become the state-of-the-art apologists for their group’s social position. . . . The training and the experience of the well-educated make them the natural leaders in the development of an [ideological] defense of dominant interests. (pp. 752, 765)

Because formal education enhances access to justifications and suppressions, it can push reports of prejudices either up or down. The enhanced cognitive sophistication associated with formal education can enhance cognitive consistency and lead to belief equilibrium ambivalence replacing suppression and affective ambivalence.

**The Measurement of Prejudice**

One of the implications of the JSM is that straightforward measurement of prejudice will be, by definition, the measurement of expressed prejudice, which at times may bear only a modest
relationship with genuine prejudice, the concept most researchers are hoping to assess. There are several implications of the JSM conceptualization for the measurement of prejudice, and the JSM provides an organizing function for different approaches to the measurement of prejudice.

The standard practice in the study of prejudice is to measure it with an attitude scale. In some cases, the purpose of the scale is obscured slightly, either by couching the questions in political and social attitude language (e.g., McConahay, 1986); by embedding prejudice items among other, less suppressed items (e.g., Crandall, 1994); or by including attributions or information that might include justification beliefs in with the prejudice (e.g., Schuman & Harding, 1963). (For an extensive review of standard measures of racial prejudice, see Biernat & Crandall, 1999.)

Several approaches have been taken to improve measurement of prejudice that we suggest increase the correspondence between expressed and experienced prejudice. For example, anonymity can only increase the expression of prejudices that the person accepts as reflective of the self (cf. Ash & Abramson, 1952). Similarly, changing the text of items to increase social appropriateness (or using language that is indirect) addresses the issue of social desirability (Edwards, 1970) and makes it more possible for respondents to admit their prejudices (Biernat & Crandall, 1999). While these techniques are useful and even recommended, they do not bypass suppression, and scales that use them do not measure genuine prejudice directly.

Bogus Pipeline

The bogus pipeline focuses on experienced prejudice. Sigall and Page (1971) found higher levels of racial stereotyping in bogus-pipeline conditions than the more typical attitude administrations. The bogus-pipeline procedure may be a better approximation to the somewhat less varnished truth that a respondent admits into the self, but it does not bypass suppression and justification processes. The bogus pipeline should be considered a measure that approximates experienced prejudice, not a direct pipeline to the truth (Allen, 1975). While it is a useful approach to measuring socially undesirable belief (Roese & Jamieson, 1993), its high expense, use of deception, and difficulty of administration does not recommend it to many applications (Ostrom, 1973).

Priming and Implicit Cognition

In the past decade, a variety of techniques has emerged that are designed to bypass conscious awareness and reach past justification and suppression processes toward genuine prejudice. Several of these measurement devices use technical means (e.g., reaction times), and others study relatively unmonitored speech processes. Fazio et al. (1995) found with White participants that superliminal but brief presentation of White faces on a computer screen facilitated response to positive words, whereas Black faces facilitated response to negative words. Individual differences in the amount of facilitation provided by the faces were significantly correlated with coldness of interaction with a Black experimenter and somewhat less correlated with the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986). The Modern Racism Scale did not predict the warmth of interracial interaction, but it did predict attitudes toward the Rodney King verdict and subsequent race riots in Los Angeles, whereas the facilitation scores did not.

Based on a similar principle (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), Greenwald and his colleagues developed the IAT, which is designed to measure the strength of association between two attitude objects (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998). The IAT works by having people sort items into two logical piles via computer keys using the left or right hand. Participants simultaneously categorize exemplars from two groups, such as Black and White names, and positive and negative words. The measurement of implicit racism begins by measuring the time needed to categorize White–positive words on one hand and Black–negative on the other. In another session, the respondent categorizes Black with positive words and White with negative words. Implicit racism is calculated as the difference in time between coding White–positive/Black–negative words and White–negative/Black–positive words. Greenwald et al. found more evidence of implicit racism using the IAT than explicit racism (using feeling thermometers): White participants who had rated Blacks more positively than Whites on explicit measures revealed substantial anti-Black attitudes using the IAT. The average correlation between implicit and explicit measures of prejudice was .14.

Enthusiasm for measures of implicit cognition now runs high, and the field holds promise. Still, we are less sanguine about the probability that implicit measures reflect unadulterated genuine prejudice. To the extent that implicit measures are impervious to overt and covert experimental manipulations, one thinks of them as measures of genuine attitudes. However, recent research suggests that a variety of manipulations can affect implicit attitudes (Blair & Banaji, 1996; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001), making these measures less pristine than hoped. Certainly, no measure is fully context independent, and the JSM may prove useful for conceptualizing the relation between context and measurement of implicit attitudes.

A more difficult issue arises in the conceptualization of implicit or “dual” attitudes, and that is the question of what the implicit attitudes represent. Some models suggest that they represent the older, earlier learned version of attitudes that have been “changed” by persuasion and experience into the more available explicit attitude (e.g., T. D. Wilson et al., 2000). Other models emphasize the implicit association among concepts or nodes (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). At this point, we wish to suggest that genuine prejudice and implicit attitudes are related, but they are not the same concept. We expect rapid advances in this area.

Linguistic Intergroup Bias

Using the bias toward broad terms to describe out-group negativity and narrow terms for in-group negativity, von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, and Vargas (1997) had people read about and rate in-group and out-group behavior on both specific and general terms. A high degree of linguistic intergroup bias was associated with perceiving an African American as threatening and a Caucasian as meek. Similar to the computer-based measures described above, the subtle measure of prejudice was not correlated with an explicit attitude measure (the Modern Racism Scale).
Physiological Measures

Interest has renewed in assessing physiological markers of prejudice (e.g., Guglielmi, 1999; Vanman et al., 1997). In his review, Guglielmi suggested that affective responses can be measured using facial electromyography, electroencephalography (EEG), event-related potentials (ERPs), and positron emission tomography (PET) scans, and he reviewed preliminary evidence to suggest the potential of these techniques.

These psychophysiological measures are promising—suppression processes far less easily affect them. For testing some theoretical ideas, we agree with several authors who have promoted their use (e.g., Blascovich & Kelsey, 1990; Cacioppo & Tassinary, 1990). There are several conceptual and practical difficulties associated with physiological measures, which limit their utility for measuring prejudice. One of the problems with physiological measures is that they still remain either coarse, in the case of autonomic nervous system (ANS) measures, or limited to one part of the affective experience, in the case of EEG, ERPs, functional magnetic resonance imaging, and PET measures. It is difficult to distinguish between arousal, attention and interest, affect, and conflict using ANS measures, and few of the measures are good at discerning ambivalence, conflict, and mixed motives—hallmarks of the prejudice experience.

Guglielmi (1999) expressed optimism about the power of physiological measures of prejudice, from a practical standpoint, but the measures are intrusive, expensive, often nonspecific, and unwieldy. They can be powerful, however, and Guglielmi pointed to the need to use multiple physiological measures when inferring psychological states from physiological signs.

A Plurality of Measures

Some authors have argued that these technologies for measuring prejudice should supplant the older, scale-based measures of prejudice (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). We disagree for several reasons. First, the different measures of prejudice are not highly correlated with each other (e.g., Mellott & Greenwald, 2000; Monteith, 1996b; S. E. Taylor & Falcone, 1982). Although these newer measurement technologies may validly measure what they purport to, the various methods do not all result in the same measure of this “implicit” construct.

Second, the different measures of prejudice correlate reliably with different constructs and behaviors, suggesting that the low correlation among measures reflects not simply low levels of reliability and validity but rather the presence of different entities and processes. Monteith (1996b) examined the role of prejudice in affective experience and found that different measures of prejudice were associated with different emotional responses. Racial ambivalence (based on I. Katz & Hass, 1988) was associated with anxiety, tension, and fearfulness, and prejudice-related discrepancies (based on Devine et al., 1991) were associated with guilt, regret, shame, and self-criticism. The Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) was uncorrelated with any of the emotional measures. None of the measures of prejudice were significantly correlated with each other.

Third, there is evidence that preexisting motive states, emotional states, and value primes can affect responses on implicit measures, suggesting that these responses are not immune from justification and suppression processes (Cacioppo & Bernston, 2001). For example, Blair and Banaji (1996) showed that asking people to suppress their stereotypes and respond in a counterstereotypical fashion can undermine or even reverse implicit stereotyping effects (see also Blair et al., 2001). These kinds of motive states have also been shown to affect other “uncontrollable” psychological responses, such as eyeblink startle responses (e.g., Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990).

One must assume that such “automatic” cognitions can be made subject to the kinds of cognitions and values that comprise justification and suppression processes, that even implicit cognitions are downstream from justification and suppression processes. We agree that implicit measures have real theoretical value, but we doubt that they are pure measures of underlying prejudice. Still, there is a very real chance that they come closer to the concept of genuine prejudice than many of the other measures. We suggest a wide variety of measures should be used without an overreliance on any one method. Researchers should, of course, carefully choose the measurement technique that is most appropriate to their research hypothesis. What is the “best” measurement depends on the research question.

Dovidio and Fazio (1992) proposed that different aspects of prejudicial attitudes should predict deliberate and spontaneous behaviors. Deliberate behaviors should relate to publicly expressed attitudes; spontaneous behaviors should be predicted by indirectly assessed attitudes. Social desirability-tainted self-report measures of prejudicial attitudes may be strong predictors of behaviors that are governed by social norms. When norms are explicit, self-report measures predict behavior; when norms are ambiguous, reported attitudes are poor predictors of behavior (Lambert et al., 1996; T. D. Wilson et al., 2000).

Finally, the discrepancy among measures can be interesting in its own right, providing a “triangulation” on underlying prejudice. When people score high on one “kind” of prejudice measure but low on another, the discrepancy can provide a window into psychological processes. The separate components in the prejudice process are each interesting topics of study, and the relation among them is a proper topic of study for prejudice researchers.

Summary

Attitude scales measure expressed prejudices. Some techniques bypass social desirability and social display rules as a way to disinhibit reports of prejudice (bogus pipeline); these techniques attempt to measure experienced prejudices. Other techniques enhance justifications (using items with “code words” such as welfare); these techniques also focus on experienced prejudice. Techniques based on technical procedures (reaction time, priming) are designed to circumvent justification and suppression processes, with an eye toward measuring genuine prejudice. These methods focus more on stereotypes and categories than the motivational component of prejudice, but they show promise as measures that are less affected by display rules. Because motives, intentions, and so on can also affect these processes, they are not unambiguous measures. Physiological measures show some promise, but their connection to distinct psychological processes at this time are weak or speculative, and the apparatus is unwieldy and expensive. Finally, quasi-projective techniques (e.g., linguistic intergroup bias) are being developed as a way to measure prejudice that is not...
directly consciously controlled; this technique is also focused on measuring genuine prejudice.

Prejudice as a Generalized Attitude

Are people prejudiced, or do they have prejudices? Do certain people have a propensity to reject any and all out-groups, calling on a deep fund of prejudice that seeks a target of their intolerance, or are prejudices toward different groups learned individually and piecemeal? If one supposes that prejudice is a unitary concept, then one can search for the precursors of hate in personality, patterns of child rearing, or even genetics. On the other hand, if people have acquired prejudices, then the processes of learning, communication of stereotypes, and individual patterns of belief are implicated as causes of prejudice.

What is the evidence of “unitary” prejudice? Primarily, it is that prejudices are correlated (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, & Chein, 1969). For example, Hartley (1946) wrote that people “may expect intolerance of some one group to be accompanied by intolerance of others” (p. 117). Weigel and Howes (1985) suggested that “racial prejudice is but one symptom of a generalized tendency to disparage outgroups” (p. 131). Allport (1954) noted that “people who reject one outgroup will tend to reject other outgroups. If a person is anti-Jewish, he is likely to be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti-any outgroup” (p. 68).

The empirical basis for prejudice as a single entity is both venerable and prevalent. Hartley (1946) had a variety of students rate 49 different social groups on social distance, and found a split-half reliability of .96 on social rejection. He also found that people who rejected Blacks and Jews also rejected Chinese, Catholics, Nazis, and labor union members. They were also likely to express prejudice toward the purely fictitious “Nonesuch” groups (e.g., Wallonians). Pettigrew (1959) found that South African English speakers’ attitudes toward native Africans, Indians, Jews, and Afrikaaners were all highly correlated. Kogan (1961) found correlations among negative attitudes toward older people, those with physical and mental disabilities, and ethnic minorities. Weigel and Howes (1985) reported significant correlations among prejudice toward Blacks, older people, and homosexuals. Agnew, Thompson, and Gaines (2000) found that prejudice toward homosexuals, Blacks, foreigners, “members of other races,” and older people all load reliably on a single latent variable.

Adorno et al. (1950) argued that prejudice came from “deep underlying trends” of an individual’s personality, based on childhood experience and training. An antidemocratic authoritarian personality evolves from early family life, which in turn creates a character based in fear, attempts at control, a rigid understanding of rules, and hypervigilance for signs of deviance. This in turn leads directly to a wide range of prejudices, including anti-Semitism, racism, and prejudice toward other minority groups.

Also in support of the unitary hypothesis, many researchers have used a variety of out-groups interchangeably in studying a single process phenomenon. Generally, these studies find that the processes of stereotyping and prejudice apply similarly across groups (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; Crandall & Cohen, 1994; Devine et al., 1991; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991).

We hypothesize that a more likely cause of correlation among prejudices is not because they share a common wellspring but rather because they are subject to the same justification and suppression processes that govern the expression of prejudice. Because the process of expression has all of these factors in common, the same obstacle course between affect and expression must be passed through for all prejudices, large and small.

Several of the justification processes can release a wide range of prejudices, such as just world beliefs, SDO, and intergroup anxiety. Some justification processes are very specific, such as group stereotypes or particular religious beliefs. On the other hand, suppression beliefs and values tend to be broad ranging, such as liberalism, humanitarianism, and egalitarianism, and are likely to suppress many forms of prejudice.

We suggest that the “prejudiced personality” might be more properly conceptualized as the “justification personality” or the “low-suppression personality.” Because justification and suppression processes filter the expression of all prejudices, the correlations among various prejudices can be created by the different prejudices’ shared heritage of filtration. A person who suppresses prejudice because of egalitarianism will report low levels of prejudice across many targets, including groups for whom he or she has a great deal of genuine prejudice and groups for whom he or she has little.

According to the JSM, “prejudice” should be conceptualized as “prejudices.” Although the different prejudices may be correlated in any given sample, we suggest that these correlations are spurious, in that the prejudices rise and fall with the tide of justifications and suppression that affects them all.

Conclusion

The JSM is a dynamic model of how prejudice comes to be expressed—underlying prejudice becomes stymied by a variety of suppression processes but can be released into expression by a variety of justification processes. The JSM focuses on the internal processes that create each individual’s personal rules of expression. The same processes that lead to expression also lead to one’s self-image as a prejudiced or nonprejudiced person. We propose that people’s genuine, underlying prejudice is only one aspect of the prejudice process, but it provides the motivational impetus that drives the suppression and justification.

Envoi

As the opening lines by Donald Hall (1956) suggest, final honesty about one’s own prejudices cannot be expected. We are pessimistic about psychologists’ ability to directly measure the unfiltered psychological reality of prejudice. Instead, all self-report measures, all behaviors, and even all indirect measures of prejudice are affected by processes that are not prejudice per se but rather are processes that amend, cover, divert, obscure, stymie, and falsify the underlying emotional state. Still, more can be learned about prejudice when we have theoretical tools that are useful for conceptualizing the complex processes that come between emotions and behavior, which intercede between the urge and the act.

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Received May 10, 2001
Revision received September 12, 2002
Accepted September 12, 2002

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