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**Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination  
at the seam between the centuries:  
evolution, culture, mind, and brain**

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*Abstract*

*Social psychologists possess considerable enthusiasm and expertise in the study of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, having commenced in the 1920s and 1930s. Research and theory in the next three to four decades focused on motivation, followed by a reactively exclusive focus on cognition in the 1970s and early 1980s, in turn followed by a 1990s joint focus on cognition and motivation. Throughout, intra-individual conflict analyses have alternated with contextual analyses, though both clearly have merit. Based on a social evolutionary viewpoint, a few core social motives (belonging, understanding, controlling, enhancing, and trusting) account for much current research on interpersonal category-based responses. Trends for the future should entail more emphasis on behavior, more sensitivity to cultural specificities and universals, as well as budding efforts on neural mechanisms of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.*

In July 1999, the Oxford meeting of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology witnessed, out of 33 total symposia, 13 focused on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. In October 1999, the St Louis meeting of the American Society for Experimental Social Psychology witnessed, out of 18 symposia, 6 on the same topic. At the seam between the centuries, Western social psychologists enthusiastically stitch away, trying to mend intergroup tears in the fabric of society and to embroider intragroup patterns of identity. The same social wear and tear motivated our forebears in the early part of the century, so perhaps a turn-of-the-century assessment is in order. This paper focuses on the interpersonal level of one person responding to another, based on that person's perceived social category. How have social psychologists approached this patchwork quilt of categorical thoughts, feelings, and behavior? What have we done, what are we doing now, and what are we (maybe) going to do?

For the better part of a century, researchers in stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination have focused on the mind, in both a cognitive and motivational sense. At

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the end of the twentieth century, we concentrated on the mind's adaptation in groups, from an implicitly evolutionary perspective. The twenty-first century may continue to emphasize mind, augmented by (one hopes) a focus on behavior, cultural sensitivity, and altogether new links to the brain. Doubtless, individuals will continue to stereotype, prejudge, and discriminate against each other on the basis of perceived category membership, so social psychologists are unlikely to go out of the mending business any time soon.

### WHAT HAVE WE DONE?

Academic bookshelves overflow with historical overviews of intergroup attitudes (e.g. Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Brown, 1995; Duckitt, 1992; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Jones, 1997; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; collections include Eberhardt & Fiske, 1998; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Hamilton, 1981; Macrae, Stangor, & Hewstone, 1996; Jost & Major, in press; Miller, 1982). For current purposes, this section adopts one historical framework noted earlier (Eberhardt & Fiske, 1996; Fiske, 1998): Generations of researchers have alternated individual versus contextual levels of analysis. A cynic might argue that each cohort wearies of the current approach—pushing either individual or contextual analysis as far as it can go before collapsing under the accumulated complexity of evidence pro and con—meanwhile forgetting the disadvantages of the even older approach. An advocate might argue that the value of revisiting old approaches with new perspectives allows the field to keep viable both levels of analysis, while capitalizing on people's fresh insights and enthusiasm. Besides, the cyclical patterns emerge only when viewed from a distance; up close, the new theories reveal truly new creations. And both individual and contextual analyses must be right, on some level.

Curiously, both the individual and contextual analyses take the same rough form over the decades, moving from motivational to cognitive to combining both types of analysis. In the individual analysis, as the next section will review, the authoritarian approach (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levenson, & Sanford, 1950) rested in nothing if not motivation; the subtle, unconscious prejudice approaches (e.g. Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay & Hough, 1976) focused more on cognition. The dissociation model (Devine, 1989) combined individual cognition with motivational differences between high and low-prejudice people, and the social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), as well as other system justification theories (Jost & Major, in press) also combine motivational and cognitive mechanisms.

#### Intra-Individual Levels of Analysis

As every student of prejudice knows, some of the most extensive early work originated from Europe-to-USA immigrant academics concerned about the nature of Western antisemitism and racial prejudice (Adorno *et al.*, 1950). Varieties of prejudice co-occur, suggesting the possibility of reliable individual differences in overall prejudice. In those psychodynamic times, the account rested in child-rearing practices that

punished, controlled, and repressed, leading to punitive, controlling, and oppressive adults with attitudes to match. The motives involved were Freudian impulses (sex, aggression, obedience). At a broad level, for example, one kind of outgroup (i.e. Negroes) carried the unacceptable impulses of the id, whereas another kind of outgroup (i.e. Jews) carried the unattainable standards of the superego (Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1950; this point will resurface in future research trends). Motivated to repress intrapsychic conflict, authoritarian personalities employ prejudice as the motivational safety valve (for reviews, see Brown, 1965; Christie, 1991). The overall approach died for several decades but would reincarnate (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988), as a later section indicates.

In response to theoretical, methodological, and empirical shortcomings, a new generation of individual-difference researchers in the 1970s jettisoned the excess motivational baggage, crafting an efficient cognitive vehicle for understanding prejudice. Modern bigots, researchers argued, differ from modern egalitarians in cognition, but not in motivation: both types are motivated not to seem prejudiced. (Researchers typically abandon the extremist minority who are content with appearing prejudiced.) Prejudiced and unprejudiced people alike apprehend prevailing norms of tolerance, abandon open expressions of bias, and abhor signs of prejudice in themselves. Because motivation does not distinguish among levels of modern prejudice, it rapidly becomes irrelevant in those analyses.

Nevertheless, modern prejudiced and unprejudiced people do differ subtly in cognition: in the extent to which they display quiet forms of prejudice, which may escape social and personal notice, but not the measuring instruments of social psychologists (or consequences for the targets). Three major theories of subtle prejudice arose:

- (1) Modern or symbolic racism (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976) focuses on policy beliefs that all happen to disadvantage minorities; the high-scoring individual thus has ideological excuses for bias. The difference between modern racists and modern nonracists lies in the political beliefs of the racists.
- (2) Again focused on beliefs, ambivalent racism (Katz & Hass, 1988) notes the tension between 'pro'-black attitudes (paternalistic pity for the disadvantaged) and 'anti'-black attitudes (hostility toward the oppositional deviant); both attitudes reside in the same ambivalent racist. In this view, the difference between ambivalent racists and nonracists lies in the racists' simultaneously high scores on both 'pro' and 'anti' beliefs about blacks in general.
- (3) A final example of cognitive diagnoses of modern individual prejudice, aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) focuses on the tension between not wanting to be racist and simultaneous, unconscious cognitions that reflect racism. The difference between aversive racists and nonracists lies in the extent of their willingness to confront their unconscious biases. Although not formally assessing individual differences, this theory does focus on comparing traditional overt racists and modern subtle racists, and it focuses on individual cognition more than on motivational issues.

Notice that the subtle cognitions all involve intra-individual conflict—whether anti-minority policy beliefs coupled with rejection of overt racism, or pro-black attitudes combined with anti-black attitudes, or conscious egalitarian beliefs co-existing with unconscious cognitive bias. Thus, like the intra-individual motivational conflict of the

authoritarian personality, subtle forms of racism result from intra-individual cognitive contradictions. The heavily cognitive, less heavily motivational analyses of the 1970s and 1980s contrast with the heavily motivational flavor of the 1940s and early 1950s, but conflict and contradiction inhere in both.

In the 1990s, a combined cognitive-motivational theory (Devine, 1989), centered in dissociation, began in the cognitive camp, positing intra-individual contradiction between cultural and personal beliefs, respectively automatic and controlled. In this view, virtually everyone has automatic access to cultural racism. Differences between low- and high-prejudice individuals lie in personal, controlled beliefs. The dissociation theory rapidly moved toward a motivation-cognition mix, examining prejudice with and without compunction, resulting in respective guilt versus anger at one's inevitable transgressions (e.g. Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993).

In the late 1990s, another individual-difference theory combined cognition and motivation, describing individuals high and low in social dominance orientation (e.g. Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The cognitive aspect differentiating those high and low in SDO lies in ideology, myths that legitimate social hierarchy. The motivation that differentiates high and low SDO centers on personal investment in group hierarchies, enacted, for example, through personally choosing hierarchy-attenuating or hierarchy-maintaining careers. In its linkage of individual motivation to beliefs about social hierarchy, the theory brings to mind (a) authoritarian personality theory (as cited earlier), which originally opened up individual difference approaches in the motivational psychology of bias, and (b) Rokeach's (e.g. 1951a, b, 1954, 1956) work on narrow-mindedness and dogmatism, which had followed a more cognitive bent. But SDO combines cognition and motivation in equal measure.

Building on the insights of several decades, individual-differences approaches to stereotyping, prejudice, and racism all apparently emerge from US researchers, an oddity that may stem from historical peculiarities (Fiske, 1998). Centuries of dramatically heterogeneous immigration into one nation may have brought ethnic issues to the surface sooner in the USA than elsewhere. Coupled with an explicit constitutional ideology of equality, the US cultural focus on individualism places responsibility for bias on individuals, and privileges individual autonomy over ethnic group identity. In Europe, the histories of intergroup encounter are centuries older, and occur between nations at least as frequently as within. Coupled with the importance of linguistic, cultural, religious, and geographical boundaries, a lesser cultural focus on individualism makes Europe the logical birthplace of social identity approaches to intergroup relations, a topic to be addressed by another in this series of Y2K essays for the *EJSP*. Be this as it may, Europeans as well as Americans fall prey to modern subtle racism (Jackson, Brown, & Kirby, 1998; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), dissociated cultural and personal beliefs (Lepore & Brown, 1997), and social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

At a more global level, we know little about individual differences in stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination in the Southern and Eastern hemispheres. In some Asian cultures, which have a history of being more ethnically homogeneous within nation and more collective in general, social psychologists rarely study individual variation in stereotyping and prejudice. Likewise, Latin American and African social psychologists still have much to say on this topic, with someday more international impact than thus far.

### Contextual Levels of Analysis

If the individual level of analysis has spanned three-quarters of the century, contextual approaches concentrated in the last half-century. As with individual differences, so too in the contextual analyses: motivational approaches predated more emphatically cognitive approaches, before a motivational-cognitive balance re-emerged.

At the group level of contextual analyses, of course, social identity theory (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; for a recent review, see Brewer & Brown, 1998) blossomed within the European context into a primary approach to intergroup relations from the 1970s onward. The core idea of social identity theory, that people identify with and value their ingroup, thereby derogating the outgroup, carries both cognitive (categorization) and motivational (self-esteem) foundations. Its heir, self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987), eliminated the motivational aspects of SIT and selectively focused on the cognitive. Although the intergroup relations history and forecast both lie outside this article's assigned Y2K portfolio, the pattern apparently replicates the motivation-cognition-combined trend seen elsewhere. A provocateur might argue that theories of system justification (such as social dominance theory; see Jost & Major, *in press*, for a broader collection) will take up the combined motivational-cognitive thread of these group-level analyses, but this is not our focus here.

At a more interpersonal level of contextual analysis, immediate social contexts do shape individual responses to individual outgroup members. This exemplifies a social psychological analysis, that is, how actual, imagined, or implied other people influence an individual's stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. As this section will indicate, in the 1950s, Allport led the way to understanding the contextual nature of interpersonal bias, with one eye on motivational underpinnings, and the other famously on cognitive underpinnings. Then, from the late 1970s through the 1980s, the cognitive shortcuts viewpoint all but eliminated motivational perspectives from contextual analyses, partly in reaction to the previous dominance of psychoanalytic authoritarian personality approaches, but this was followed rapidly in the 1990s by hybrid cognitive-motivational contextual approaches incorporating perceiver goals.

The first wave of context-based, interpersonal, cognitive analysis (Allport, 1954) argued for the normality of individuals prejudging people in categories and specified the conditions for successful intergroup contact at the interpersonal level, both ideas that survive as maxims nearly 50 years later. Although not rejecting the insights of the authoritarian personality theory, isolating extreme bigotry in the benighted few, the novel categorization approach neatly captured a much-needed perspective on ordinary prejudice. These cognitive analyses fly in the face of naive analyses of prejudice, then and now. From the 1950s to the 1990s, students enter university courses on prejudice thinking that prejudice is the province of a few shriveled hearts and warped minds, not the average person. Cognitive theories recognize, in effect, the banality of bias. People normally prejudge, form ingroups, and reject outgroups. As Allport's preface forecasts, though the experiments may change, the framework endures. These cognitive underpinnings of prejudice do not depend on individual differences, for everyone must categorize, in order to function. 'Orderly living depends on it' (Allport, 1954). Categorization thus must vary, if it varies, according to context.

The second, equally enduring, insight, the conditions for successful intergroup contact, explained how people move from normal categorization and prejudice to tolerance. Conditions for contact originally cited equal status, common goals, cooperation, and authority sanction. At the interpersonal level of analysis, these contact conditions waited until the 1990s to have much impact. (At the group level of analysis, not reviewed here, they paralleled the work of Sherif and Sherif, 1953, and both informed the work of Amir, 1969, 1976; Cook, 1962, 1985; Pettigrew, 1971, 1998, and many others).

At interpersonal levels of analysis, the cognitive bases of stereotyping flourished 20 years after Allport's initial insights, coming into the 1970s through the 1980s. People normally divide people into ingroups and outgroups, so that stereotyping is a normal function (Tajfel, 1969, 1970, 1981). The story of the cognitive miser (Fiske & Taylor, 1984) explains how shortcuts to category-based information processes do not require motivation to account for prejudice. Categorization suffices. People accentuate differences between categories and minimize differences within categories (Capozza & Nanni, 1986; Tajfel, 1970; Taylor, 1981). People tag other people by race, gender, and age, so they confuse people within groups and differentiate them between groups (Arcuri, 1982; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). People view categorized groups as homogeneous (e.g. Wilder, 1986), and they privilege category-confirming information in memory (Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979), as well as category-confirming covariation in judgment (Hamilton, 1981). People's category-based behavior elicits confirming behavior from stereotyped targets (Darley & Fazio, 1980; Snyder & Swann, 1978; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1977). The complexity of social content overwhelms the limited human mind, which then employs a number of simplifying strategies. In this 1970s to early 1980s account, as in Allport's 1950s original, the role of content is implicit; if the universal processes do not differ by individuals, then perhaps they differ by context.

Some of the individual difference accounts mentioned earlier did introduce the importance of context. Two theories of subtle racism (ambivalent racism and aversive racism) do take context into account, when they examine the interaction of individual differences and context. For example, when an ambivalent racist encounters a positive exemplar, the result is Allport's 'love prejudice' (overdone positive bias); when the same ambivalent racist encounters a negative exemplar, the result is hate. Thus, extremity results from ambivalence, depending on context. Similarly, when an aversive racist encounters a context that would expose discrimination, tolerance results, but when an aversive racist encounters a context that excuses discrimination, prejudice results.

Even more so, other early 1990s models explicitly took on the new hybrid cognitive-motivational approaches by incorporating perceiver goals. Category-based and individuated responses depend on goals that emphasize respectively various kinds of decisiveness versus various notions of accuracy (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Gollwitzer, 1990; Hilton & Darley, 1991; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1992; Snyder, 1992). For example, our own work provides outcome dependency or accuracy motivations, resulting in more individuating impression formation processes and outcomes (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Neuberg, 1989; Pavelchak, 1989; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Ruscher, Fiske, Miki, & van Manen, 1991).

## WHAT ARE WE DOING NOW?

The lesson of nearly a century's research on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination combines motivation and cognition at all three levels—intra-individual, inter-individual, and inter-group. But the proliferation of potential motives staggers an observer. The challenge of systematizing core social motives elicits as many taxonomies as there are reviewers, but our own efforts led us to the delusion that five (plus or minus five) social motives capture well enough the insights of social and personality psychologists over the last century (Stevens & Fiske, 1995). In considering these motives, we proposed that a social adaptation perspective explains what matters to people in social situations, including their interactions with outgroup members.

People need other people for survival. Over human history, being banished from the group has amounted to a death sentence. People's evolutionary environment, one might argue, is located in other people (not so much in the immediate savannah, forest, tundra, or jungle). As such, people need to function well in the face-to-face ingroup (Caporael, 1997). Loyalty to the sustaining ingroup would be a biological predisposition, and suspicion of the outgroup can result by default or by feared defeat. Viewed this way, the core social motive is *belonging*, getting along in one's own group. From this follow relatively cognitive motives, emphasizing shared social *understanding* and *controlling* socially effective interactions. Also from this follow relatively affective motives, which emphasize *enhancing* self and *trusting* ingroup others. (As a mnemonic, the motives spell BUCET, so with a little adjustment, one might call this a 'bucket' of core social motives.) In any event, this viewpoint helps to systematize motives currently under study as relevant to stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination (for detail, see Fiske, 1998).

### Belonging

At core, people are motivated to maintain affiliations and bonds with others, as more than a dozen social-personality theorists have argued (e.g. Baumeister & Leary, 1995; see Stevens & Fiske, 1995, for more references). If the individual is motivated to get along with an ingroup, because social survival determines physical survival, then people most often work to enhance relationships with similar others. Such relationships are well served, the research on belonging suggests, by attending to individuals on whom one depends, echoing their beliefs, complying with group norms, and mimicking their behavior, all principles demonstrated in current stereotyping research, as follows.

Ingroups result from interdependence, which defines the basic structure of a group, that is, people needing each other for important outcomes. Interdependence motivates individuation: attention to unexpected counter-stereotypic attributes, as well as dispositional (individualized) personality portraits, and attribute-based evaluation, all of which diminish category-based responses relative to individual-based responses. If one depends on another person, one needs to understand the other person specifically, and not as a stereotypical approximation. Interdependence encourages accuracy motivation, which in turn encourages individuating processes of impression formation (e.g. for reviews, see Fiske, in press; Fiske & Depret, 1996). A person who starts as an

outgroup member, if interpersonally interdependent, may become a familiar ingroup member, as the Sherifs (1953) originally demonstrated.

Having understood (or having the sense of understanding) a person on whom one depends, one gets along by going along, that is, by reflecting the other person's beliefs (e.g. Chen, Schecter, & Chaiken, 1996; Dardenne & Leyens, 1995; Leyens, Dardenne, & Fiske, 1998; Ruscher, Hammer, & Hammer, 1996; Snyder & Haugen, 1994, 1995). Conveying shared beliefs is key to belonging. Sometimes the effort to belong means echoing another person's stereotypic beliefs, but sometimes the effort to belong means not expressing one's own stereotypes. More broadly, people motivated to belong will comply with perceived group norms regarding expressing or not expressing stereotypes (Blanchard, Lilly, & Vaughn, 1991; Fiske & Von Hendy, 1992; Leippe & Eisenstadt, 1994; Mackie, Hamilton, Susskind, & Rosselli, 1996; Pryor, Giedd, & Williams, 1995).

Most directly, people mimic the behavior even of stereotyped targets (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998; Dijksterhuis, Spears, Postmes, Stapel, Koomen, Knippenberg, & Scheepers, 1998). Mimicked behavior, unless negative and hostile, may facilitate belonging. That is, young people imitate the slow behavior of elderly people, and students mimic the intelligent behavior of professors, both of which would arguably facilitate those interactions. People enjoy interactions and feel understood when partners mimic their behavior (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).

Thus, as noted here, people's core social motive to belong directs their stereotyping and discrimination, via attending, echoing, complying, and mimicking.

## Understanding

In order to get along in a group, one must share a common understanding of the environment and each other. Again, a dozen-plus social-personality psychologists have posited the core social motive of needing a coherent, shared understanding of one's social world (see Stevens & Fiske, 1995, for references). How people understand outgroup members has captured the imagination of stereotyping researchers over the last 20 years. And indeed, we have learned a lot. Most striking are the insights into automatic categorization processes, as well as other stereotypic information processing.

### *Automatic Categorization*

People detect each other's probable gender, race, and age within milliseconds of meeting, and they especially quickly identify ingroup members (Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Zarate & Smith, 1990). *Categorization* on these dimensions speeds people's ability to sort each other out (McCann, Ostrom, Tyner, & Mitchell, 1985). People respond more positively to ingroup members and they do so more rapidly than to outgroup members (for a review, see Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993; Fiske, 1998); negative responses show small and less reliable speed differences. Thus, as in other research (Brewer, 1979; Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000), ingroup advantage precedes outgroup disadvantage.

Moreover, for a person once categorized as an outgroup member, a *stereotype-*



*matching* speed advantage sets in. People more quickly recognize stereotypic terms preceded by other stereotypic labels and terms, primed both preconsciously (Blair & Banaji, 1996; Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997) and consciously (Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Zarate & Sandoval, 1995). More prejudiced people also more quickly recognize stereotypic terms preceded by category labels alone (Lepore & Brown, 1997; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997).

Some groups differ from the cultural default (i.e. the default being male, middle-class, and heterosexual, neither young nor old, and, in the West, white). Groups that depart from the norm are more often linguistically marked ('young person' or 'old person' versus just a 'person'). *Marked groups* are categorized more quickly than unmarked groups. That is, women have gender, and blacks have race more than men and whites respectively do (Eberhardt & Fiske, 1994; Zarate & Sandoval, 1995). Black men are categorized as black, not male, and white women are categorized as women, not white (Zarate, Bonilla, & Luevano, 1995; Zarate & Smith, 1990).

Automatic categorization has its advantages, saving perceivers mental resources, allowing them to operate under cognitive load (Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994a; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994b; Pendry, 1998) or degraded conditions (Macrae *et al.*, 1994b).

### *Stereotypic Information Search*

Stereotype-matched behavior allows rapid encoding, so people do not examine its perceptual details (von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1995). People using strong stereotypes neglect ambiguous or neutral information (Macrae *et al.*, 1994a) and assimilate others to the stereotype (Krueger & Clement, 1994). People seem to prefer stereotype-matching information (Johnston & Macrae, 1994; Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1991) and may ask stereotype-matching questions (for a review, see Leyens *et al.*, 1994). Thus, when searching for additional information, people privilege stereotypic information.

### *Stereotyped Memory*

Memory, too, shows a stereotype-matching advantage, but only in the most generalizable, real-world situations: under complex circumstances, with strong pre-existing stereotypes, and in natural conditions (e.g. Macrae *et al.*, 1993; Stangor & Duan, 1991; for meta-analyses, see Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Although this finding does not occur or even reverses under some laboratory conditions, and memory does not always relate to judgment, memory's major role appears to reinforce stereotypes. Moreover, group members are confused with each other in memory (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978; for reviews, see Fiske, 1998; Klauer & Wegener, 1998).

### *Outgroup Homogeneity*

Having automatically or at least rapidly categorized, searched for stereotypic information, and remembered it, people famously tend to see the outgroup as more

homogeneous than the ingroup (for reviews, see Brewer & Brown, 1998; Mullen & Hu, 1989). Sometimes minorities see themselves as homogeneous (Simon & Brown, 1987), especially when the judgment dimension is important to their identity, and they may see powerful majorities as heterogeneous (Guinote & Fiske, unpublished manuscript).

### *Stereotypic Attributions*

People seem to advantage the ingroup again, attributing ingroup positivity, success, and status to abstract ingroup dispositions rather than concrete, temporary circumstances. People describe positive ingroup and negative outgroup behavior more abstractly (Maass, Montalcini, & Biciotti, 1998; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989). Attributions explain outgroup members' stereotypic behavior by their enduring dispositions and their incongruent behavior by temporary circumstances or unstable effort (for a meta-analysis of gender effects, see Swim & Sanna, 1996; for a meta-analysis of inter-ethnic effects, see Hewstone, 1990, building on classic proposals respectively by Deaux & Emswiller, 1974, and by Pettigrew, 1979). Again, marked more than unmarked groups require explanation (Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991); for example, explaining the gender gap (e.g. showing that, on average, men vote for more warlike policies and women for more peaceful policies) describes women's behavior as deviant from the male norm, not vice versa.

### *Group Entitativity and Essentialism*

Groups become real entities, instead of social constructions, the more people see them as homogeneous and stereotype-matching. The entitative group allegedly possesses a central essence—dispositional, perhaps biological—that explains its categorical nature. Entitativity and essentialism justify the status quo; supposedly, according to the bigot, it is in the nature of some groups to rise to the top and other groups to sink to the bottom (Glick & Fiske, in press; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, & Gaunt, in press; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997; for a collection, see Jost & Major, in press).

Overall, shared socially constructed understandings—starting with automatic categorization, along culturally condoned lines, proceeding to stereotypic information search, stereotyped memory, perceived outgroup homogeneity, stereotypic attributions, and resulting in entitative groups with essential natures—all these features can and do reinforce stereotypes. At the same time, they enable people to function adaptively within their own group, satisfying a motive to share understanding as a route to belong together.

### **Controlling**

As just anticipated, entitativity and essentialism justify the status quo, exerting control at the system level. At the interpersonal level, people express a core social motive to

be effective, even to control, their social environment (e.g. White, 1959; see Stevens & Fiske, 1995, for more references). At a minimum, this motive expresses the push to experience some contingency between one's own actions and others' responses. People who experience effectiveness and competence last longer in groups than people who experience social interactions as arbitrary and out of control. Again, more than a dozen social-personality psychologists in the twentieth century posited such a core social motive.

Lack of control leads to information seeking in social settings (Pittman, 1998), and persistent lack of control is depressing and unhealthy (see Fiske & Taylor, 1984, ch. 5; Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998, for reviews). A drop in control was posited to set attribution processes in motion (Kelley, 1971). Slight loss of control, entailed in any relationship with others, compels information-seeking which, as just noted under understanding, facilitates group life. As noted earlier, people who lose some control because their outcomes depend on others attempt to restore at least prediction and possibly control by seeking unexpected information about those others, understanding in dispositional terms, and evaluating accordingly (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Goodwin *et al.*, in press; Neuberg, 1989; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Pavelchak, 1989; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Ruscher *et al.*, 1991). Cooperation thus encourages individuation, in the service of control. However, powerless people, when they feel they can have no possibility of control, may also stereotype the powerful in return (Depret & Fiske, 1999) or simply hope for the best without examining the details (Stevens & Fiske, in press). Mostly, though, a slight loss of social control discourages stereotyping.

Conversely, the control motive also can undermine cooperative group life. Too much push for individual control, excessive time pressure, and overdecisiveness all subordinate accuracy to stereotypic and simplistic impressions (e.g. Dijker & Koomen, 1996; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). More specific to stereotyping, when powerful people control other people's outcomes, by definition, they do not feel as contingent on them. Lacking a sense of dependency, they are vulnerable to stereotyping 'by default'; that is, they lack the motivation to pay individuated attention to dependent others, so they rely on automatic categories. In addition, some powerful people even stereotype 'by design'; that is, they attend selectively to stereotypic information and form impressions accordingly (Croizet & Fiske, 2000; Fiske, 1993; Goodwin *et al.*, 2000; Operario & Fiske, 1998). The powerful can satisfy the need for control easily, without necessarily individuating others.

All these results of asymmetrical control reinforce hierarchies, and as such the analysis fits social dominance theory's emphasis on people who subscribe to hierarchy-enhancing beliefs and follow hierarchy-enhancing careers (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), as well as system justification theories (see Jost & Major, in press, for a collection). Thus, too much control motive maintains power hierarchies, but a little control motive simply encourages the earlier understanding motive, enabling individuation.

### **Self-enhancing**

After the two relatively cognitive core social motives (understanding and controlling), now come two more affective core social motives. The first one, self-enhancing, constitutes the motive to maintain and possibly improve self-esteem, and many the-

orists posit its importance in Western cultures (e.g. Epstein, 1991; see Stevens & Fiske, 1995, for references). Like the control motive, a little self-enhancement facilitates group life, but too much self-enhancement destroys it.

As an older example of adaptive, moderate self-enhancement, modern racism theories (reviewed earlier) hypothesize a self-esteem-based motive not to appear racist. Similarly, social identify was founded in the idea of group identify as promoting self-esteem (Tajfel *et al.*, 1971). Current examples would include the ways that stigmatized group identity can, counter-intuitively, bolster self-esteem (e.g. Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991; for a review, see Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998), either by dismissing negative feedback as prejudice or by dis-identifying with that domain. For any group member, moderate self-esteem motivates a healthy ingroup identity and involvement with other people in one's group.

Again, however, too much of a good thing can cause problems. Overly high self-esteem is brittle: rigid, fragile, and vulnerable. Protecting inflated self-esteem endangers those outside the self system. Inflated collective self-esteem and inflated personal self-esteem, when threatened, can lead to, respectively, discrimination (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990) and aggression (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). Being insecure or anxious worsens prejudice in intergroup interactions (e.g. Greenland & Brown, 1999; for overviews, see Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Altemeyer's right-wing authoritarianism (1981, 1988) reflects intense and insecure attachments to one's own ethnic group, demands rigid group cohesion, and completely subordinates the individual to the group. Extreme outgroup prejudice results, predicated on perceived value conflicts (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993, 1994). Viewing the group as an extension of the self may predict intergroup emotions (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Smith, 1993): For example, perceived wrongs to one's group beget anger. The humanity of the other group is denied. One's own group members allegedly experience an array of complex human emotions, whereas outgroup members experience only the primitive primary emotions of animals (Leyens *et al.*, in press).

Attachment to the ingroup and perceived danger from the outgroup fit well with a theory of self-enhancement driving adaptive (in)group behavior. In any event, important insights emerge from a return to the issues that opened social science work on prejudice. Self-enhancement and self-protection matter, in ways that we are still only beginning to explicate.

## Trusting

The final core social motive proposed here, another relatively affective one, involves trusting (ingroup) others, parallel to one enhancing oneself. Although another dozen social-personality commentators view finding the world benevolent as a core social motive (e.g. Janoff-Bulman, 1992; see Stevens & Fiske, 1995, for references), this writer's experience suggests that not all readers are likely to agree with the importance of this motive.

However, consistent with this motive is one of the most basic findings in person perception, namely the expectation that other people will be relatively benign, all else being equal. The general person positivity bias stands well-documented (Matlin & Stang, 1978; Rothbart & Park, 1986; Sears, 1983), as does people's generalized positive expectancy for life outcomes (Parducci, 1968) and the preponderance of positive over

negative words in many languages (Zajonc, 1998). Against a backdrop of a generally benevolent social world, negative interpersonal events stand out. People are surprised and vigilant for negative exceptions to the positive norm (Fiske, 1980; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Pratto & John, 1991; Vonk, 1993). Negative exceptions to a basic trust for other people then are viewed as diagnostic (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). But people soon return to the more positive baseline (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Taylor, 1991). The relevance for stereotype, prejudice, and discrimination is this. Interdependence—the basis for group belonging—is possible only with trust, positive expectations for ingroup others' general benevolence. Because ingroup members deserve trust, people are cautious about assigning ingroup membership to a stranger, and any negative evidence rapidly excludes the person from closely guarded ingroup membership (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992).

Assuming, for argument, that people are motivated to trust at least ingroup others, one can posit the adaptive role of basic trust (until proven otherwise) in promoting (in)group life. All the instances of ingroup favoritism attest to the role of positivity toward the ingroup, that is, giving ingroup members benefit of the doubt, trusting them to be good, including toward oneself. For example, as noted, people respond positively to ingroup members more rapidly than to outgroup members (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998), suggesting that people are predisposed to expect good responses from the ingroup. If one attributes ingroup members' positive behavior to their dispositions (Hewstone, 1990), then one can expect more of the same from them in the future, that is, one can trust them.

Moreover, the motivation to maintain trust with interdependent ingroup others also describes how people learn to trust outgroup members when they must depend on them. Successful interpersonal contact (Fiske, *in press*) and successful intergroup contact (Pettigrew, 1998) both build trust through cooperation. Attitude change may generalize best when ethnic membership is salient, not minimized (Brown, Vivian, & Hewstone, 1999; Van Oudenhoven, Groenewoud, & Hewstone, 1996). But it may also work well when cooperators develop a one-group representation (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998; Gaertner, Dovidio, Rust, Nier, Banker, Ward, Mottola, & Houlette, 1999). In either case, cooperation, which entails trust, undercuts prejudice and stereotypes toward outgroup members.

## WHAT WILL WE BE DOING?

Predicting the future is a fool's task, and like the weather forecast, maybe the safest prediction is 'more of the same'. But for intellectual entertainment, I offer three directions that move outward, from issues central in social psychology to those farther from the core. This section is necessarily brief, because the future is yet to come, but nonetheless urgent, as current events indicate.

### **Behavior: Remember Discrimination?**

Social psychologists have learned a lot, at century's turn, about the complex interplay of motivation and cognition in reactions to outgroup members. By this logic, now we

should be happily combining motivation and cognition to produce behavior, which we are beginning to do, but not enough. Early examples include the work (Bargh, Dijksterhuis, and colleagues, cited earlier) on mimicking the behavior of primed outgroup members. Arguably, social identity theory/self-categorization theory does an adequate job of addressing discrimination, but the intergroup level of analysis does not necessarily reflect one-on-one discrimination. And we are not yet doing enough. Thoughts and feelings do not exclude, oppress, and kill people; behavior does.

Social psychologists have overslept. The stereotyping literature needs a wake-up call, now, on the order of the attitude-behavior wake-up call two or three decades ago, to get serious about predicting behavior (Fiske, 1998). The alarm is urgent. We cannot currently say enough, with enough authority, about what does and does not produce one-on-one discrimination. For example, dissociations among stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are frequent (Mackie & Smith, 1998).

Scattered accounts already suggest that prejudice will do a better job than stereotyping at predicting discriminatory behavior. Meta-analysis (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996) indicates that individual differences in stereotyping correlate only modestly (0.16) with discrimination, whereas individual differences in prejudice do a better job (0.32) of predicting discrimination. As a specific example, emotional responses outperform stereotypes in predicting behavioral social distance measures (Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991).

A pessimist would argue that our neglect of behavior is a disgrace. An optimist would predict that social psychologists over the next decades will understand better the relationships among stereotypes, prejudice, and actual discrimination. And besides, we already have certain leads from the stereotyping literature and from the attitudes literature. From the stereotyping literature, we know that people can be motivated by core social motives (belonging, understanding, controlling, self-enhancing, and trusting) to express or not to express stereotypes. Surely the same moderators motivate discrimination and tolerance. But we do not completely know yet. From the attitudes literature, we know that the attitude-behavior relation depends, among other factors, on the nature of (a) the attitude (read: stereotype/prejudice), that is, its strength, coherence, accessibility, centrality; (b) the person (e.g. sensitivity to norms versus self, chronic motivations, values), and (c) the context (e.g. salient norms, accountability, roles, relationships). Stereotyping researchers need to test our assumptions about generalizability from thoughts and feelings to behavior.

## Culture

Doubtless, in the twenty-first century, moderator variables will strongly support the importance of cultural and local norms in predicting discriminatory behavior. Culture channels stereotyping and prejudice, by defining who constitutes 'us' and who 'them'. A critic might argue that each stereotype is unique, reflecting a unique cultural history, and because it does, psychologists have mostly ignored the contents of stereotypes. If the contents are arbitrary, why bother expending scientific resources on them?

Recently, we have suggested that the content of stereotypes may be systematic, and indeed may respond to universal principles of social structure. That is, a typology

of prejudice suggests (a) paternalistic prejudice toward the incompetent but nice, subordinate outgroup; (b) envious prejudice toward the competent but cold higher-status outgroup; (c) contemptuous prejudice toward the incompetent, exploitative, not warm low-status outgroup that cannot be trusted; and (d) admiration for the ingroup (Fiske, 1998; Glick & Fiske, in press). In our data so far, the first two kinds of outgroup stereotypes apparently predominate: those that are incompetent but maybe warm, and those that are competent but cold. Comparable clusters appear across the United States (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999; Fiske, Glick, Cuddy, & Xu, unpublished manuscript) and in Europe (Phalet & Poppe, 1997). Moreover, status predicts which groups will be seen as competent, implying a just world in which groups get what they deserve. And competition with the ingroup predicts which groups are seen as not warm. Principles such as these can explain cultural differences in stereotype content, depending on social structure in that culture.

Besides content, culture determines acceptable levels of expressed bias, from subtle to overt. Cultures differ in norms for describing perceived differences between social categories, as either inherent and traditional differences between categories, or as unacceptable and controllable. For example, one kind of sexism, ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996), appears in a similar form across a range of varied cultures (Glick *et al.*, unpublished manuscript). Nevertheless, degrees of its expression differ in cultures defined by UN gender indices as more progressive (Australia, the Netherlands) or more traditional (South Korea, Turkey).

Other possibly fertile avenues include pursuing the role of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination in relatively individualistic and collectivistic cultures. In collectivistic cultures, ingroup harmony is key, and ingroup loyalty, favoritism, and conformity motivate social behavior. People belong to fewer groups, and distance from outgroups is considerable. On the one hand, this kind of context would seem to exaggerate bias against the outgroup, but on the other hand, contact with the outgroup would be limited, thereby minimizing the expression of bias. In more individualistic cultures, where people belong to many groups, and have contact with a variety of outgroup members, their opportunities for expressing bias may be more frequent. These speculations aside, collaboration between cultural and stereotyping researchers would benefit both lines of work.

One challenge will be the balance between cultural differences and cultural stereotypes. Several antidotes are prescribed. First, active collaboration with social psychologists from the relevant cultures inhibits a one-sided perspective. Second, cultural differences overlap with affirmed cultural identities, again based on groups' own images of themselves. Third, of course, variability within cultures undercuts stereotypic overgeneralization. Fourth, overlap between cultures teaches us about minority trends within our own cultures of origin, trends that might otherwise go undetected. Finally, some general principles cut across cultural variation and show similar processes operating on different content. Cultural similarities are useful generalities, and cultural differences may be of intrinsic interest, as well as predictable by broad, measurable cultural variables. The trend to study culture in social psychology (A. Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998) has yet to address stereotyping and prejudice in full force, but doubtless it will. We neglect culture at our peril, and cross-national (especially cross-hemispheric) collaboration will prove crucial to scientific progress in the twenty-first century.

## Brain

After the US Decade of the Brain in the 1990s left social psychology relatively untouched, suddenly interest in social neuroscience is sprinkled across universities (in the USA, at least). A variety of initial datasets indicate that racial categorization occurs in unique neural locations closely linked to emotion. People apparently process black and white faces with different patterns of activation (Chiao, Colby, Eberhardt, & Gabrieli, poster presented at the Cognitive Neuroscience Society Meetings, April 2000). Cross-racial identification by both black and white respondents shows more activation in the amygdala, hippocampus, and insular cortex, each regions associated with the processing of emotional stimuli (Hart, Whalen, Shin, McInerney, & Rauch, 1999). Similarly, amygdala activation occurred in whites identifying black faces, and that activation correlated with potentiated startle response, as well as racial bias, as measured by the Implicit Attitude Test (Phelps, O'Connor, Cunningham, Funayama, Gatenby, Gore, & Banaji, 1999, unpublished manuscript). Amygdala activation was not correlated with a conscious measure of racial attitudes (Modern Racism Scale), and it was eliminated in judgments regarding familiar and positively regarded black individuals. The role of the emotionally attuned amygdala urges even more attention to prejudice as well as stereotyping measures in basic research.

On a more cognitive note, functionally independent and anatomically distinct slow-learning and fast-learning memory systems may respectively store general schemas (stereotypes) and specific individuating details (Smith & DeCoster, in press). Moreover, the memory systems that specify specific sources differ from those for stereotypes, and they correlate with performance tests for different areas of the brain (Mather, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1999). As people age, for example, their ability to recall specific details declines faster than their memory for general categories. These types of findings lend converging physiologically based evidence for categorizing and individuating processes (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999).

The budding interest in social neuroscience analyses, whatever their ultimate particulars, does not in itself constitute theory. Geography is not inherently theoretical. But theory-based accounts of psychologically meaningful brain regions allied to responses of social importance could provide encouraging evidence for existing theories (i.e. dual process theories, as just noted) and could facilitate theory development. For example, cross-racial identification apparently links with emotion centers of the brain, which fits together with early indications that prejudice may predict discrimination better than stereotypes do. The role of mid-range, not necessarily grand, theories will be crucial as at least some stereotyping and prejudice researchers seek the neural regions associated with biased responses.

## CONCLUSION

Social psychologists laid out the pattern of research on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination 70 years ago, inspired by Lippmann (1922), and commencing with the initial work of Bogardus (1927) on social distance and of Katz and Braly (1933) on stereotype contents. Having reviewed what we have done (intra-individual and contextual analyses, first motivational, then cognitive, now joint), we came to the



present. A socially adaptive focus on core motives (belonging, understanding, controlling, enhancing, and trusting) captures much of the current activity, which integrates motivational and cognitive features of interpersonal bias. Future prospects suggest we have much yet to do, in studying behavior, culture, and brain. And the state of the world suggests that such expertise will continue to be sorely needed in the twenty-first century.

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